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Dutch Summary 
 
Het idee van de consument die zich als een goede burger in de marktomgeving begeeft (bv. 
Ringberg, Odekerken-Schröder, & Christensen, 2007) staat in schril contrast met de vele studies die 
wijzen op de alomtegenwoordigheid van onethische consumentenpraktijken (Reynolds & Harris, 
2006). Denk maar aan winkeldiefstal, niets zeggen wanneer men teveel geld terugkrijgt aan de kassa, 
of het illegaal downloaden van muziek. Negatief consumentengedrag is niet eigen aan een ‗crimineel 
segment‘ binnen onze maatschappij, maar is typisch voor de consument in het algemeen (Bazerman & 
Banaji, 2004; Harris & Reynolds, 2004). Dit wijdverspreid wangedrag onder consumenten heeft 
verregaande gevolgen voor de bedrijfswereld, andere consumenten, en de maatschappij in het 
algemeen (Fullerton & Punj, 2004).  
 Binnen marketingethiek zijn studies die zich focussen op businessethiek (d.i., studies die de 
aanvaardbaarheid of onaanvaardbaarheid van businesspraktijken onderzoeken; Ferrell, Fraedrich, & 
Ferrell, 2008) relatief wijdverspreid. Echter, onderzoek dat gericht is op consumentenethiek (d.i., 
onderzoek dat zich toelegt op de aanvaardbaarheid of onaanvaardbaarheid van consumentenpraktijken; 
Dodge, Edwards, & Fullerton, 1996) is minder aanwezig in dit domein (Neale & Fullerton, 2010). 
Nochtans maakt een beter inzicht in consumentenethiek het mogelijk om de gangbaarheid alsook de 
diepgaande impact van wanpraktijken bij consumenten in te perken (Vitell, 2003). Het doel van dit 
proefschrift is dan ook om bij te dragen tot de bestaande kennis aangaande consumentenethiek. Meer 
bepaald omvat dit proefschrift, naast de algemene inleiding (d.i., Hoofdstuk 1) en de algemene 
discussie (d.i., Hoofdstuk 6), 4 hoofdstukken die zich toespitsen op 3 specifieke onderzoekstopics. 
 In eerste instantie focust mijn doctoraal onderzoek zich op de invloed van persoonlijkheid op 
ethische percepties bij consumenten (d.i., hun oordeel over allerhande onethische 
consumentenpraktijken). Ondanks de erkenning van de algemene relevantie van 
persoonlijkheidskarakteristieken voor ethische beslissingen bij consumenten, is er meer onderzoek 
vereist dat de impact van specifieke persoonlijkheidskarakteristieken voor consumentenethiek nagaat 
(Vitell, 2003). Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt meer bepaald de rol van zelf-regulatieve focus op ethische 
overtuigingen bij consumenten.   
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 Ten tweede legt dit proefschrift zich toe op de rol van intuïtieve gevoelens in het morele 
beslissingsdomein. Traditioneel wordt ethische beslissingsvorming beschouwd als een resultaat van 
rationele processen (bv. Kohlberg, 1976). Meer recent onderzoek daarentegen schrijft een belangrijke 
rol toe aan intuïtie binnen het morele domein en roept op tot meer onderzoek aangaande dit onderwerp 
(bv. Haidt, 2001). In Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik de rol van ‗affective priming‘ en ‗conceptual fluency‘, 
een specifieke vorm van metacognitieve ervaringen, in morele oordelen van individuen.   
 Ten derde, heel wat studies focussen zich op de heersende percepties over negatieve 
businesspraktijken. In veel mindere mate worden ook de percepties over negatieve 
consumentenpraktijken bestudeerd. Echter, studies die zich toeleggen op de vergelijking van deze 
twee percepties zijn schaars. Nochtans toont eerder onderzoek aan dat individuen geneigd zijn om 
onethische businesspraktijken veel strenger te beoordelen dan identieke consumentenpraktijken (bv. 
DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). Dit fenomeen wordt ook wel bestempeld als 
dubbele standaarden, een specifiek voorbeeld van zogenaamde morele hypocrisie. Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 
spitsen zich toe op dit fenomeen.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The perception that all customers behave ethically may not be much more than wishful thinking. 
—Wirtz & Kum (2004, p. 159).  
 
The idea that consumers act in functional and good-mannered ways (e.g., Ringberg, 
Odekerken-Schröder, & Christensen, 2007) has been widely contradicted by research pointing to the 
prevalence of consumer misbehavior
1
 (defined as ―behavioral acts by consumers which violate the 
generally accepted norms of conduct in consumption situations, and thus disrupt the consumption 
order,‖ Fullerton & Punj, 2004, p. 1239; see also Reynolds & Harris, 2006). Questionable consumer 
behavior is not a segregated exception but rather is typical of consumers overall (Bazerman & Banaji, 
2004; Harris & Reynolds, 2004). Consider, for example, one form of misbehavior: Shoplifters 
represent all socio-economic and demographic groups (Alberstat, 1989), which means retail theft is 
not restricted to a small criminal subculture but rather represents consumers in general (Dawson, 
1993). Studies estimate that as many as 60 percent of consumers have shoplifted at least once in their 
lifetimes (Klemke, 1992). Recent research indicates the prevalence of other consumer misbehaviors as 
well. The Global Software Piracy Study 2010 by the Business Software Alliance indicates that half of 
the 116 geographical areas studied reported piracy rates of 62 percent or higher, and in two-thirds of 
them, one software program was pirated for every one that was installed legally. 
Business suffers badly from such consumer misbehavior. For example, the Global Retail Theft 
Barometer 2011 published by the Centre for Retail Research identifies customer theft as still the most 
important contributor to retail shrinkage, accounting for 43.2 percent of the total, or $51.5 billion. 
Such daily misconduct forces retailers to face the increasing costs of (replacing) lost merchandise, 
while also instituting expensive measures associated with prevention, detection, and prosecution 
(Yaniv, 2009). These extra costs have significant roles in many retail failures (Cole, 1989). 
Questionable consumer practices have other profound impacts as well; a 2010 report by Tera 
Consultants (Building a Digital Economy: The Importance of Saving Jobs in the EU’s Creative 
Industries) estimated 345,000 job losses in Europe between 2008 and 2010 due to piracy in the film, 
23 
 
music, software, and television industries. If digital piracy cannot be reduced, the European Union 
could witness a cumulative loss of 1.2 million jobs in creative industries by 2015, in line with the 
potential for more than €240 billion in lost retail revenues over that period. Even consumers are 
negatively influenced by other consumers‘ unethical behaviors (Fullerton & Punj, 2004). For example, 
stores often make up for shrinkage losses with higher prices, which means honest customers share in 
the costs of shoplifting (Tonglet, 2002). Specifically, retail crime costs families in 43 countries 
surveyed by the Global Retail Theft Barometer 2011 an average of €149 extra on their annual 
shopping bills.  
All this evidence combines to reveal that consumer misbehavior is not a rare event but rather 
constitutes a daily practice, with far-reaching consequences for the business world, consumers, and 
society in general (Fullerton & Punj, 2004). Studies focused on ethical transgressions by businesses 
are relatively widespread, but the body of work on consumer transgressions is far less abundant (Neale 
& Fullerton, 2010). Yet a better understanding of consumer ethics (i.e., questions concerning the 
acceptability or unacceptability of actions by the consumer; Dodge, Edwards, & Fullerton, 1996) 
might help reduce the prevalence and profound impact of such consumer misbehaviors (Vitell, 2003).  
The various studies contained in this doctoral dissertation aim to contribute to the consumer 
ethics domain by tackling three particular topics. First, I focus on the role of personality—specifically, 
self-regulatory focus—in consumer ethical beliefs (i.e., consumers‘ judgments2 of various unethical 
consumer practices). Despite recognition of the general relevance of personal characteristics for 
individual ethical decision making, we need more research to examine the role of specific personality 
characteristics in the consumer ethics domain (Vitell, 2003).  
Second, this doctoral dissertation addresses the role of intuitive feelings in moral decision 
making. Traditional views regard ethical decision making as the result of a rational process (e.g., 
Kohlberg, 1976). More recent research instead asserts an important role of intuition in the moral 
domain and calls for further insights (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Therefore, I examine the impact of affective 
priming and conceptual fluency, a particular form of meta-cognitive experiences, on people‘s moral 
judgment.  
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Third, many studies have investigated perceptions of questionable business practices. To a 
lesser extent, perceptions of questionable consumer practices have been studied. Nevertheless, studies 
dealing with comparisons of these two perceptions are scarce. Yet, research shows that people tend to 
evaluate questionable business behaviors more harshly than similar consumer behaviors (e.g., 
DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). This phenomenon has been labeled ‗double 
standards‘, a specific instance of so-called ‗moral hypocrisy‘. This dissertation considers this later 
theme as well.  
Before providing an overview of the various studies that constitute this doctoral dissertation, I 
elaborate on some core concepts of the reported research in this dissertation. These concepts are 
central to the consumer ethics domain as well. First, I elaborate on the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy 
& Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005), which has been applied by various empirical studies in 
the consumer ethics domain to measure the extent to which individuals tolerate various questionable 
consumer practices. Second, I address the role of personality characteristics in the consumer ethics 
domain. Third, this chapter sheds some light on the ratio versus intuition debate in the moral domain. 
Fourth, I explain the concepts of moral hypocrisy and double standards in more detail, before 
elucidating neutralization techniques.  
 
1. Core Concepts  
 
1.1. Consumer Ethics Scale  
 
Early models of marketing ethics, such as Ferrell and Gresham‘s (1985) and Hunt and Vitell‘s 
(1986), focused on the seller side (i.e., business) of the buyer–seller relationship. Less attention was 
devoted to the buyer side (i.e., consumer; e.g., Vitell, Lumpkin, & Rawwas, 1991). To tackle this gap 
in marketing ethics literature, Muncy and Vitell (1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992) developed the 
Consumer Ethics Scale. This scale determines the extent to which individuals believe certain 
questionable consumer behaviors are (un)ethical. Results from their survey of 569 U.S. heads of 
households indicated that consumers react differently to different ethical issues. More specifically, 
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Muncy and Vitell (1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992) identified four distinct constructs of ethically 
questionable consumer practices: (1) actively benefiting from illegal activities, (2) passively benefiting 
at the expense of others, (3) actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices, and (4) no 
harm/no foul.  
The distinguishing features of practices in the first category include their initiation by the 
consumer and the fact that they are almost universally perceived as illegal (e.g., changing price tags on 
merchandise in a store). The second category comprises situations in which the consumer takes 
advantage of a seller‘s mistake, rather than actively cheating (e.g., getting too much change at the 
checkout and not saying anything). In the third dimension, the consumer is actively involved in 
deceptive practices that might not necessarily be perceived as illegal but rather as morally questionable 
(e.g., not telling the truth when negotiating the price of a new car). Finally, the fourth dimension 
contains actions that most consumers perceive as causing little or no harm, and thus view as quite 
permissible. An example of this ―no harm/no foul‖ category is spending extensive time trying on 
clothing but not buying anything.  
Muncy and Vitell (1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992) find that overall, consumers perceive 
activities from the first dimension as more unethical than those from the second dimension. Perhaps, 
consumers think that if they do not initiate the questionable practice, then ethical issues are resolved. 
In other words, a first issue on which consumers seem to base their ethical judgments is whether the 
consumer actively seeks a benefit or is rather passive in the process (i.e., locus of fault). Yet, the same 
research confirmed that consumers tolerate activities from the ―passively benefiting‖ category less 
than activities that fall in the third ―actively benefiting‖ dimension. Consequently, a second issue that 
consumers seem to take into account when forming ethical judgments is whether the action may be 
perceived as illegal (i.e., legality of  behavior). Nevertheless, both ideas (i.e., ‗locus of fault‘ and 
‗legality of behavior‘) emerge in these studies (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992). Finally, 
consumers evaluated some practices as not unethical at all. These practices belong to the ―no harm, no 
foul‖ dimension which mainly involve the copying of intellectual property. So a final issue on which 
consumers seem to base their ethical judgments is whether there is any perceived harm to the seller 
(i.e., ‗degree of harm caused‘). 
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Empirical studies in the consumer ethics field have often adopted the Consumer Ethics Scale 
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005) and applied it to various samples, either within 
one country (e.g., Chiou & Pan, 2008; Kavak, Gurel, Eryigit, & Tektas, 2009; Lu & Lu, 2010) or 
cross-culturally (e.g., Al-Khatib, Vitell, Rexeisen, & Rawwas, 2005; Rawwas, Swaidan, & Oyman, 
2005; Schneider, Krieger, & Bayraktar, 2011). Despite differences in their focus, these various studies 
all support a relatively consistent factor structure for the Consumer Ethics Scale (i.e., ‗locus of fault‘, 
‗legality of behavior‘, and ‗degree of harm caused‘; e.g. Rawwas & Singhapakdi, 1998). Lascu (1993) 
considers the extent to which several ethics scales are appropriate for use in cross-cultural studies. 
Using a panel of expert assessments, he determined that the Consumer Ethics Scale is appropriate to 
use in cross-cultural studies, though some items might need rewording (e.g., ―supermarket‖ should be 
changed to ―store‖). Because ethical judgments are situation-specific (Barnett & Karson, 1987), a 
good measurement scale should cover ethical behaviors in a wide variety of situations, as is true of the 
Consumer Ethics Scale.  
In 2005, Vitell and Muncy have updated their Consumer Ethics Scale by rewording and 
adding several new items that represent three distinct categories: (1) downloading/buying counterfeit 
goods (e.g., buying counterfeit goods instead of buying the original manufacturers‘ brands), (2) 
recycling/environmental awareness (e.g., buying only from companies with a strong record of 
protecting the environment), and (3) doing the right thing/doing good (e.g., correcting a bill that has 
been miscalculated in one‘s favor). 
 
1.2. Personality as an Antecedent of Consumer Ethics 
 
At least three comprehensive, theoretical models are relevant for studying decision-making 
processes about ethical issues in marketing and business (i.e., Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 
1986, 1993; Trevino, 1986). The Hunt-Vitell model (Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 1993) emerges as the most 
appropriate for investigating individual consumer behavior though (Vitell, 2003), because it eliminates 
constructs related to professional, organizational, and industry environments. This model (Hunt & 
Vitell, 1986, 1993) states that, next to cultural environment, personal characteristics provide 
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background factors that influence people‘s ethical decision making processes. Literature dealing with 
unethical behavior generally distinguishes two broad categories that interactively influence individual 
ethical decision behavior. The first includes personality variables associated with the individual 
decision maker; the second category refers to situational variables that form and define the situation in 
which the decision maker reaches those decisions (Wirtz & Kum, 2004). A variable in the latter 
category is one‘s cultural environment, as postulated by the Hunt-Vitell model (Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 
1993).  
The establishment of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 
1992) prompted an increase in studies to tie consumer ethical beliefs to one or more personality 
variables. Several studies examined and found evidence of an influence of socio-demographic 
variables, such as age (e.g., Vitell, Singh, & Paolillo, 2007), income (e.g., Vitell & Paolillo, 2003), and 
education (e.g., Swaidan, Vitell, & Rawwas, 2003). The impacts of attitudinal characteristics on 
consumer ethics were studied with variables such as attitude toward mankind, attitude toward 
business, and attitude toward illegal acts (Chan, Wong, & Leung, 1998). Several studies also have 
investigated the role of individual difference variables on Consumer Ethics Scale scores (Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005), including risk propensity (e.g., Rallapalli, Vitell, Wiebe, & 
Barnes, 1994), consumer alienation (e.g., Vitell & Paolillo, 2003), and materialism (e.g., Muncy & 
Eastman, 1998). Finally, religion (e.g., Vitell et al., 2007) and cognitive moral development (e.g., 
Rawwas & Singhapakdi, 1998) have been tied to the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005).  
Beyond this widespread reliance on the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell 
& Muncy, 1992, 2005) to gain a better insight into consumer ethics, other studies have taken different 
approaches to examine the consumer ethics domain (Vitell, 2003). Some of these studies also test 
personal characteristics that might influence ethical judgments and intentions, such as value 
consciousness and level of integrity (e.g., Ang, Cheng, Lim, & Tambyah, 2001). However, it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to give a complete overview of all the personal characteristics that 
already have been linked to the consumer ethics domain; I refer readers to review articles, such as 
Vitell‘s (2003) for such detailed information.  
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In Chapter 2, the relationship between self-regulatory focus and consumer ethical beliefs is 
investigated. Although this personality variable will be explained in more detail in that chapter, we 
now briefly explain what this construct is about. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) postulates 
that two separate and independent self-regulatory orientations guide people‘s goal-directed behavior: 
promotion focus and prevention focus. Both foci are assumed to be related to different needs, desired 
end states, and strategic inclinations to achieve these needs and states. Promotion focus is founded on 
nurturance related needs (e.g., hopes, accomplishments, advancement) and goals are framed as ideals. 
People with such a focus are strategically concerned with approaching gains and avoiding non-gains. 
Prevention focus, on the other hand, is founded on security related needs (e.g., safety, responsibility) 
and perceives goals as oughts. Prevention focused people are strategically inclined to approach non-
losses and to avoid losses. Individuals with a prevention focus, whether chronically or situationally 
induced, thus prefer a vigilant strategy whereas individuals with a promotion focus prefer an eager 
strategy (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).  
 
1.3. Morality: Ratio versus Intuition  
 
Traditionally, moral judgments have been considered as the result of rational and deliberate 
reasoning processes (e.g., Jones, 1991; Turiel, 1983). Kohlberg‘s study (1976) exemplifies this 
rational approach. Kohlberg (1976) characterizes children‘s moral development by focusing on the 
content of their justifications rather than on the source of their moral judgments. This perspective 
implicitly assumes that people generate moral judgments by consciously reasoning about the 
principles they articulate in their moral justifications (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).  
This traditional point of view has been challenged by the more recent idea of bounded 
ethicality. Similar to the ―bounded rationality‖ principle which entails that individuals are prone to 
systematic and predictable cognitive errors, the idea of bounded ethicality postulates that individuals 
are prone to systematic and predictable ethical errors as well. Stated otherwise, bounded ethicality 
refers to the systematic and predictable ways in which humans act unethically beyond their awareness 
(Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005).  
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First of all, people are bounded in their own ethicality. For instance, Kern and Chugh (2009) 
demonstrated that people act differently in the face of a potential loss compared to a potential gain, 
even when the two situations are transparently identical. More specifically, people acted more 
unethical if a decision was presented in a loss frame compared to a gain frame. Second, people are also 
bounded in noticing the ethicality of others. For instance, Gino, Moore, and Bazerman (2009) showed 
the influence of the outcome bias in people‘s judgment of others‘ unethical behavior. Results indicated 
that people are more likely to judge others‘ unethical behavior more harshly when this behavior results 
in a negative compared to a positive outcome. In sum, the bounded ethicality principle implies that 
people may be unable to recognize the ethical considerations of any particular situation or decision 
(Gino & Bazerman, 2009). That is, people may be able to perceive themselves and others as moral 
beings even as they make immoral decisions (Chugh et al., 2005).  
The idea of unconsciousness playing a primordial role in the moral domain receives support 
from recent research on moral intuition. In contrast with the conscious-reasoning perspective on moral 
judgment (e.g., Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1976; Turiel, 1983), some scholars argue that moral decision 
making is influenced, if not dominated, by intuitive factors (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; 
Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), such that deliberate reasoning plays only a secondary role 
(Hofmann & Baumert, 2010). Haidt (2001, p. 818) defines moral intuition as ―the sudden appearance 
in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without 
any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a 
conclusion.‖ Haidt‘s (2001) social intuitionist model thus proposes that moral judgments result from 
quick moral intuitions, followed, when needed, by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning.  
Research dealing with the role of intuitive feelings in the moral domain has increased recently. 
For example, moral research dealing with metaphor-representation theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; 
Meier & Robinson, 2005) fits with the intuitive perspective on moral judgments. This theory 
postulates that abstract knowledge representation can be aided with conceptual metaphors: People not 
only communicate by means of metaphors but also think that way (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, 
& Schjeldahl, 2007). Morality then is an abstract concept, used to describe behavior or beliefs that are 
considered right and moral (e.g., fairness) or wrong and immoral (e.g., intolerance; Haidt & Algoe, 
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2004; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Previous research shows that people often use metaphors to discuss 
morality. For example, Meier, Sellbom, and Wygant (2007) show that people have implicit 
associations between morality and vertical space (i.e., moral is up; immoral is down).  
 Adherents to the moral intuition perspective are not necessarily anti-rationalists. Rather, they 
emphasize the existence of complex, dynamic interrelationships between reasoning and intuition as 
two processes that result in moral judgments (e.g., Haidt, 2001). These two perspectives on how 
people arrive at moral judgments (i.e., moral reasoning and moral intuition) have been combined in a 
dual-process model (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Greene and colleagues more specifically postulate that people 
make moral judgments by combining automatic and more controlled processes, such that they use the 
controlled cognitive processes to overcome their initial quick and automatic moral judgment responses 
(Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene 
et al., 2001). This proposition fits the central notion of dual-system models of information processing, 
which contrast an automatic, fast, effortless, and unintentional route or system of processing with a 
controlled, slow, effortful, and intentional one (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
Cushman et al. (2006) support the idea that moral judgment might be accomplished through 
multiple (being rational and intuitive) systems. These authors examined three specific moral 
principles: (1) harm caused by action is worse compared to harm caused by omission, (2) harm 
intended as the means to a goal is worse compared to harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and 
(3) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse compared to harm involving no physical 
contact. Results showed that individuals appealed to the first and the third principle in their 
justifications, but not to the second one. In other words, the first and third principle were available to 
conscious reasoning, while the second was not. In general, some moral principles are available for 
conscious reflection, permitting but not guaranteeing a role for conscious reasoning, whereas others 
are better characterized by an intuitionist model. Regardless of where the division between affect and 
cognition occurs, a multisystem model of moral judgment appears warranted.  
In contributing to the recent research stream on the role of intuitive feelings in the moral 
domain, Chapter 3 investigates the impact of affective priming and conceptual fluency on moral 
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judgments. Although these concepts will be addressed in Chapter 3, we briefly explain them in this 
introductory chapter as well. First of all, affective priming contends that a target that is preceded by a 
prime is processed faster and more accurately if the prime and the target have the same valence 
compared to an opposite valence (see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003). For instance, individuals 
identify the word disaster faster when it is preceded by the word cancer than when the word sunshine 
appears first.  
Second, conceptual fluency is a specific instance of processing fluency. This latter 
metacognitive experience refers to a subjective sense of ease versus difficulty in processing 
information and stimuli. Experiencing processing fluency evokes a positive affective state that people 
misattribute to the stimuli they are processing rather than to the ease of processing (Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). For instance, people regard their childhood memories as more 
intact when they must recall four episodes from their childhood instead of twelve (Winkielman, 
Schwarz & Belli, 1998) as retrieving just four episodes is presumably easier compared to retrieving 
twelve episodes. This ease (versus difficulty) during the retrieval task then gets attributed to the 
quality of childhood memory rather than to the task at hand.  
Conceptual fluency is a specific instance of processing fluency and arises when the mental 
representation of a stimulus is easy to activate because it offers semantic relatedness to the context in 
which it appears (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). So if people would have to evaluate a boat, their evaluation 
would be more positive if they were at the seaside compared to when they were in the mountains. An 
example of a conceptual fluency study is the one of Lee and Labroo (2004). They examined the effect 
of conceptual fluency on attitudes. Their study demonstrated that when a target comes to mind more 
readily and becomes conceptually fluent, as when it is presented in a predictive context (e.g., a bottle 
of beer featured in an ad showing a man entering a bar), or when it is primed by a related construct 
(e.g., ketchup following an advertisement of mayonnaise), participants develop more favorable 
attitudes toward the target. Positive valence of fluent processing is thought to underlie these findings.  
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1.4. Moral Hypocrisy 
 
Academic literature has approached the moral hypocrisy phenomenon in two ways. Some 
studies focus on the discrepancy between people‘s expressed moral standards and their actual behavior 
(e.g., Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson & Thompson, 2001; 
Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999; Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 
1997). In this sense, moral hypocrisy implies publicly maintaining certain moral norms while privately 
violating these norms through one‘s behavior. Other studies examine the discrepancy between 
people‘s evaluations of moral transgressions committed by themselves versus those by others (e.g., 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008). In this context, moral hypocrisy refers to ―a fundamental bias in 
moral judgment in which individuals evaluate a moral transgression enacted by themselves to be less 
objectionable than an identical transgression enacted by others‖ (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, p. 
1334).  
 The double standard concept from marketing ethics literature aligns with this latter approach. 
Business research suggests that people judge the unethical behavior of businesses (or their 
representatives) more harshly than similar behavior by individual consumers. For example, Wilkes 
(1978) finds that consumers tend to hold businesses to a higher standard than they themselves are 
willing to follow. Specifically, he investigates consumers‘ judgments of certain consumer activities 
(e.g. shoplifting, false warranty claims). Even when consumers disapprove of engaging in questionable 
activities, they tolerate some of them, justifying these ―points of tolerance‖ by arguing that the 
business, rather than the consumer, is at fault. Drucker (1981) maintains that a double standard is 
implicit in treatments of business ethics and business social responsibility as topics separate from 
ethics in general. Establishing ―business ethics‖ means holding business to a different (i.e., higher) 
standard of conduct than ―ordinary people.‖ 
To demonstrate the double standard empirically, DePaulo (1985) conducted a telephone 
survey and asked respondents to indicate whether they feel that similar misconduct (i.e., saying things 
that are not true when bargaining to increase or lower a price) by a salesperson and a consumer is 
wrong. Only 8 percent of the respondents openly admitted to a double standard, asserting that 
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deception was wrong for the salesperson but not for the customer. However, DePaulo (1987) argues 
that this 8 percent figure probably underestimates the prevalence of double standards, because 
respondents may realize their inconsistency and find it embarrassing, or because this study did not 
investigate the degree of perceived wrongness. To avoid these problems in a follow-up study, DePaulo 
(1987) used a between-groups design with two versions of an anonymous questionnaire that asked 
respondents to evaluate an automobile salesperson or a customer using similar deceptive bargaining 
tactics. Respondents were more critical of sellers who engaged in potentially unethical behavior than 
they were of buyers undertaking the same practices. 
Vermeir and Van Kenhove (2008) recently confirmed DePaulo‘s (1985, 1987) work, showing 
that consumers have a double standard when it comes to their own unethical behavior compared to that 
of businesses. Specifically, their participants evaluate unethical business actions as less admissible 
than similar unethical consumer actions. Further, their study shows evidence for the role of gender as 
women are less likely to use double standards compared to men.  
 
1.5. Neutralization Techniques 
 
The concept of neutralization techniques stems from social disorganization and deviance 
literature and, more specifically, the work of Sykes and Matza (1957). They wondered how it was 
possible for juvenile delinquents to show deviant behavior while, at the same time, also evincing 
awareness of conventional social values and an understanding of their behavior as wrong. 
Neutralization theory (Sykes & Matza, 1957) postulates that most juvenile delinquents are able to 
commit questionable practices while supporting social norms by employing neutralization techniques. 
These techniques are justifications people use to explain away their non-normative behavior and lessen 
the impact of the behavior on their self-concepts and social relationships. In this way, feelings of 
shame and guilt they feel for violating societal norms are mitigated.  
The flexibility of normative systems enables people to neutralize. In other words, social norms 
are still valid for people, but are also limited in their applicability due to time, place, and/or personal 
and social circumstantial factors (Chatzidakis, Hibbert, & Smith, 2007; Strutton, Pelton, & Ferrell, 
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1997). So when a person neutralizes, he or she does not reject existing norms but rather believes that 
these norms are not applicable in the current circumstances (e.g., due to external pressures, time 
constraints, etc.). Because the person conducting the questionable behavior feels the need to explain 
away the behavior, it actually is evidence that the person is supporting existing norms and values 
(Vitell, Keith, & Mathur, 2011). 
Neutralization theory also recalls the concept of moral disengagement (specifically, moral 
justification as a form of moral disengagement), a process to make detrimental conduct personally 
tolerable by persuading oneself that the questionable behavior is morally admissible (Bandura, 1990; 
Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). Through moral disengagement, people escape 
self-sanction and the accompanying guilt that would ensue if their behavior violated their internal 
standards, such that they are more likely to make unethical decisions (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 
2008). One form of moral disengagement is moral justification, which refers to the act of validating 
and rationalizing unethical behavior by cognitively reconstructing the questionable behavior (Bandura, 
1999). In this sense, the concept of moral justification is similar to the neutralization techniques 
described by Sykes and Matza (1957). 
When they introduced the concept of neutralization into the marketing ethics domain, Vitell 
and Grove (1987) addressed the need for more conceptual work in this domain and examined relevant 
techniques to explain unethical behaviors among marketing practitioners. Some years later, Grove, 
Vitell, and Strutton (1989) presented a model of neutralization techniques to discuss how consumers 
might justify their non-normative behavior. In line with Sykes and Matza‘s (1957) work, consumers 
can explain away negative behavior by invoking five distinct techniques that represent various motives 
that insulate consumers from blame.  
The first technique, denial of responsibility, implies that people argue that they are not 
accountable for their norm-violating actions, because factors beyond their control are in operation. A 
typical example might state: ―It‘s not my fault, I had no other choice.‖ The second technique is denial 
of injury, such that people contend their misbehavior is not really serious, because no party suffers 
directly as a result of it, such as ―What‘s the big deal? No one was hurt.‖ A denial of victim 
rationalization means that individuals counter any blame for their actions by arguing that the violated 
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party deserves whatever injury was received. One might comment, ―If they‘re foolish enough to 
believe that, it‘s their own fault they were taken advantage of.‖ By condemning the condemners, 
individuals deflect moral condemnation to those ridiculing them by pointing out that they engage in 
similar behavior, such as ―I was only doing what others do all the time.‖ Finally, the last neutralization 
technique is an appeal to higher loyalties, in which questionable behavior appears as a by-product of 
attempts to actualize a higher order ideal or value. An exemplary comment might protest, ―To some 
what I did may appear wrong, but I did it for my friends and family.‖ 
Several studies have investigated consumers‘ use of these neutralization techniques in more 
depth, including which situations evoke a greater extent of neutralization. For example, Strutton, 
Vitell, and Pelton (1994) compare the extent to which a consumer engages in neutralization during 
acquisition versus disposition situations. They find that the techniques of neutralization appear more 
appropriate as an explanatory framework when the situations involve an unethical disposition, rather 
than an acquisition, of retail goods. Other studies investigate which people are more likely to use 
neutralization techniques. Strutton et al. (1997) compare the extent of neutralizing between two 
generations (i.e., Thirteeners and PB‘ers) and find that younger people were more likely to attempt to 
rationalize away unethical retailing consumption behaviors than their parents‘ generation was. 
Rosenbaum and Kuntze (2003) show that consumers with high levels of cynicism also are more likely 
to employ techniques to justify their unethical retail disposition. A study by Bersoff (1999) reveals 
decreased unethical behavior (i.e., more participants pointed out overpayments for taking part in a 
study) when the participants‘ abilities to construct neutralizations were impeded. Again, it is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to give a complete overview of all studies dedicated to neutralization 
techniques, though this concept is worthy of investigation, considering its potential to explain why 
―ordinary people‖ sometimes engage in unethical behaviors (Vitell, 2003).  
 I now return to the concept of bounded ethicality, or the idea that moral concerns are 
influenced by automatic, self-favoring interpretations, which ultimately results in people being able to 
see themselves as moral beings even as they engage in immoral decisions (Chugh et al., 2005). The 
fact that these processes rarely take place consciously is supported by recent research on morality, 
intuition, and affect, and especially studies of the concepts of moral intuition (e.g., Haidt, 2001) and 
36 
 
moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura, 1999) (De Cremer, 2009). These psychological processes invoke 
the so-called ethical fading phenomenon, ―a process that removes the difficult moral issues from a 
given problem or situation, hence increasing unethical behavior‖ (Tenbrunsel, 2005, p. 96). The 
ethical implications of decisions fade away because of the underlying dynamics of people‘s self-
serving and self-deceiving perceptions (De Cremer, 2009).  
 
2. Overview of Studies 
 
To end this introductory chapter, I provide an outline of the studies included in this doctoral 
dissertation. The studies in the following four chapters focus on three specific topics: (1) the role of 
personality in consumer ethical beliefs (Chapter 2), (2) the role of intuitive feelings in moral decision 
making (Chapter 3), and (3) the moral hypocrisy phenomenon (Chapters 4–5)3. At the end of this 
chapter, the structure of this doctoral dissertation is visually represented. This table (Table 1) outlines 
each study by means of the general topic, the respective chapter, as well as the independent and 
dependent variables that are studied.  
 
2.1. The Role of Personality in Consumer Ethical Beliefs 
 
The importance of personality for consumer ethics has been supported (e.g., Hunt & Vitell, 
1986, 1993). However, insufficient research has considered the relationship between specific 
personality characteristics and commonplace crimes, such as unethical consumer behavior (Egan & 
Taylor, 2010). Consequently, many researchers call for further investigation of the possible 
antecedents of undesirable consumer behavior (e.g., Al-Rafee & Cronan, 2006; Fullerton & Punj, 
2004; Vitell, 2003). Therefore, this doctoral dissertation begins by examining the impact of a specific 
personality variable on consumer ethics. More specifically, Chapter 2 deals with the relationship 
between self-regulatory focus and consumer ethical beliefs (i.e., individuals‘ judgments of various 
unethical consumer practices).  
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Self-regulatory focus is highly influential and has appeared in relation to an impressively wide 
spectrum of topics across a diverse array of domains (for an overview, see Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). 
However, little research has been done about this construct in the marketing domain (e.g., Aaker & 
Lee, 2001; Andrade, 2005; Cohen & Andrade, 2004; Kidwell, Hardesty, & Childers, 2008) while no 
studies ever linked this personality characteristic to individuals‘ consumer ethical beliefs. As a basic 
distinction, promotion- versus prevention-focused self-regulation appears to have a pervasive impact 
on human judgment, thought, and behavior (e.g., Aaker & Lee, 2001; Zhou & Pham, 2004). 
Accordingly, self-regulatory focus offers promising potential for the study of consumer ethics.  
Results described in both Study 1, conducted among students, and Study 2, conducted among 
a sample drawn from a more general population, show a significant relationship between self-
regulatory focus and consumer ethical beliefs. First of all, promotion influences individuals‘ attitude 
toward questionable practices: those with a higher (versus lower) promotion focus perceive such 
questionable practices as less unacceptable. Second, prevention also impacts consumer ethical beliefs: 
people scoring higher (versus lower) on prevention are more likely to not tolerate these various types 
of consumer misbehavior.  
These findings contribute to the marketing ethics field in which most attention to date has been 
focused on the (un)acceptability of business practices, while less attention has been paid to the 
(un)acceptability of consumer practices (Neale & Fullerton, 2010). Further, this study also adds to the 
knowledge already developed about self-regulatory focus in the marketing domain making the present 
study valuable for marketing theorists. Research fields are prone to stay within the own literature 
boundaries. Nevertheless, developing more knowledge about phenomena with a rich but diverse 
research tradition as consumer ethics necessitates enrichment by delving into the wide existing array 
of perspectives and positions (Reynolds & Harris, 2009). 
The established relationship between self-regulatory focus and consumer ethics also is of 
practical relevance as self-regulatory focus not only varies across individuals but also across situations 
(e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001; Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995). In other words, self-regulatory focus 
can temporarily be induced so to lower consumer misbehavior. Moreover, if people‘s chronic self-
regulatory focus is not known to those who want to influence people‘s ethical decision making, self-
38 
 
regulatory focus can be assessed through more easy to infer characteristics such as individuals‘ 
cultural background (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000) or professional occupation (Förster, Higgins, & 
Bianco, 2003).  
 
2.2. The Role of Intuitive Feelings in Moral Decision Making 
 
Colors are prevalent in people‘s live (Mehta & Zhu, 2009), but involve more than aesthetics in 
that they also carry psychological meanings and associations. Chapter 3 investigates if and how the 
valence of color cues might affect evaluations of positively and negatively valenced behaviors. Study 
1 and Study 2 use colors with definite differences in terms of valence (i.e., red and green), while Study 
3 endows initially neutral colors with positive versus negative valences. Intriguingly, these three 
studies show an ironic color effect: undesirable behaviors are evaluated less negatively when described 
on a negatively (versus positively) valenced background color. Or, using colors with a negative 
valence in campaigns aiming to prevent negatively valenced behavior may actually backfire as it 
renders the undesirable behavior less unacceptable. 
This chapter contributes in several ways. First of all, these studies add to the emerging 
research stream on color functioning (e.g., Deng, Hui, & Hutchinson, 2010; Lindsey et al., 2010). 
Second, several studies exemplify the positive effects derived from a match among message elements 
(e.g., Kahle & Homer, 1985; Kamins, 1990; Mayer & Tormala, 2010; Zhao & Pechmann, 2007). In 
contrast, we find that a match may backfire in persuasive contexts: processing fluency may turn out 
badly when the ensuing positive affect gets attributed to the behavior, rather than to the processing, 
and makes negative behavior seem less negative. Third, by demonstrating the effect of seemingly 
irrelevant color cues on moral judgments, the studies reported in Chapter 3 add to recent research on 
intuitive feelings in the moral domain (e.g., Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004). Fourth, this research 
identifies an important and ubiquitous source of conceptual fluency that has been previously 
overlooked, namely, fluency stemming from a valence match between a stimulus and its context, 
rather than from semantic priming. 
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The findings reported in Chapter 3 are of practical relevance. Decision makers who want to 
promote desirable behavior or discourage undesirable behavior should avoid colors with a negative 
valence in the prevention and promotion campaigns they develop. Especially the color red or other 
negatively valenced colors appear ill conceived for such campaigns. Even if decision makers prefer to 
use the color red as it draws people‘s attention, they should be aware of the fact that using this color 
might render undesirable behaviors less negative and desirable behaviors less positive. Our findings 
also suggest that undesirable behavior, like petty crime, might be more likely if the physical 
environment prompts negative evaluations. 
 
2.3. Moral Hypocrisy 
 
A growing amount of studies deals with the (un)acceptability of business practices. To a much 
lesser extent, research on the (un)acceptability of consumer practices is growing. However, studies 
that deal with the comparison of both acceptability ratings remain scarce. Yet, previous research 
shows evidence for double standards; that is, business misbehavior is judged more harshly compared 
to similar consumer misbehavior (e.g., DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). 
Although this double standard phenomenon has often been quoted as an important research line in the 
ethics domain (e.g., Rallapalli et al., 1994; Rawwas, Vitell, & Al-Khatib, 1994; Vitell et al., 1991; 
Vitell & Muncy, 1992) and is of relevance for the business world (Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008), 
little work has been done on it.  
One of the gaps with regard to the double standard phenomenon involves the investigation of 
possible underlying mechanisms (cf. Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 deal 
with this particular issue. Chapter 4 more particularly examines whether neutralization techniques 
might provide a meaningful approach. Accordingly, this chapter adds to the limited work related to 
neutralization techniques in the field of consumer behavior (Chatzidakis et al., 2007). Findings 
demonstrate that the higher the extent to which people agree with arguments explaining away 
misbehavior enacted by consumers or businesses, the more they tolerate these misbehaviors. More 
importantly, these techniques give an answer on the question why people judge businesses more 
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harshly compared to consumers; that is, why people use double standards. More specifically, results 
show that respondents who justify questionable actions of consumers to a certain degree, condone the 
same mistreatment enacted by businesses to a much lesser extent. In this way, the techniques of 
neutralization concern a process explaining the double standard phenomenon. Therefore, a valuable 
strategy to lower the use of double standards might be to make it harder to explain away consumer 
misbehavior (cf. Bersoff, 1999). 
As DePaulo wondered in 1987, to what extent might double standards arise because one party 
is a business (or its representative), while the other is a consumer? He argues that the critical 
underlying factor could be the perceived wealth of the negotiating party. In other words, misbehavior 
instigated by a business may appear less acceptable because it seems more financially secure and thus 
less in need of gaining additional financial benefits through deceptive practices. In addition to 
investigating wealth as a possible motivator of double standards, Chapter 5 investigates whether the 
use of double standards might reflect respondents‘ relationship with businesses versus other 
consumers. That is, perhaps double standards exist because respondents feel more related to other 
consumers, compared with businesses.  
Results of Study 1 show that individuals were not only harsher for unethical behavior by 
business companies (compared to consumers), but also for unethical behavior by prosperous 
consumers (compared to non-prosperous consumers) and prosperous business companies (compared to 
non-prosperous business companies). Stated otherwise, the perceived difference in wealth between 
subjects may lead to different moral judgments of unethical behavior enacted by these subjects. 
Results of Study 2 demonstrate that individuals were not only less tolerant of unethical behavior by 
business companies (compared to consumers), but also of unethical behavior by consumers (versus 
one‘s best friend) and business companies with which they have a not so good relationship (versus 
business companies with which they have a good relationship). In other words, the difference in 
relationship with subjects may lead to different moral judgments of unethical behavior enacted by 
these subjects. Taken together, as wealth and relationship underlie double standards, double standards 
are not strictly reserved to consumer–business relations (cf. previous studies on double standards; e.g., 
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DePaulo, 1985, 1987), but might emerge in business–business and consumer–consumer relations as 
well.  
 These findings imply that, although earnings have benefits for a company, companies should 
realize that strong financial figures may backfire as they allow individuals to adopt a more critical 
view of their deceptive practices. Further, previous research shows that consumers who are highly 
committed to a company behave more ethically toward it than do less committed consumers 
(Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2005). The findings reported in Study 2 contribute to and extend this 
finding; highly committed consumers also are more tolerant of the company‘s unethical behaviors than 
are less committed consumers. These results clearly emphasize the need for businesses to keep 
investing time and energy in developing high relationship commitment with stakeholders, because 
these strong relationships make stakeholders less morally condemning.  
 
 
 
 Table 1 
Structure of doctoral dissertation 
 
 
 
Topic 
 
 
Chapter  Study Independent variables Dependent variables 
The Role of Personality in 
Consumer Ethical Beliefs 
Chapter 2: Consumer 
Ethics: The Role of Self-
Regulatory Focus  
Study 1 
(Students) 
Self-regulatory focus  
(BIS/BAS Scales; Carver & White, 
1994; Franken, Muris, & Rassin, 
2005) 
 
Consumer ethical beliefs (Consumer 
Ethics Scale; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005) 
 
  
 
Study 2 
(Non-
students) 
 
Self-regulatory focus  
(BIS/BAS Scales; Carver & White, 
1994; Franken, Muris, & Rassin, 
2005) 
 
Consumer ethical beliefs (Consumer 
Ethics Scale; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005) 
 
 
The Role of Intuitive 
Feelings in Moral Decision 
Making 
 
Chapter 3: When Colors 
Backfire: The Impact of 
Color Cues on Moral 
Judgment 
 Study 1 
 
2 (Behavior: Illegal vs. Legal music 
downloading) 
2 (Background color: Red vs. Green) 
 
 
Moral acceptability judgment 
  
 
Study 2 
 
 
2 (Behavior: Undesirable vs. 
Desirable) 
2 (Background color: Red vs. Green) 
 
Moral acceptability judgment 
 
  
 
Study 3 
 
 
2 (Behavior: Undesirable vs. 
Desirable) 
3 (Background color valence: 
Negative vs. Positive vs. Neutral) 
 
Moral acceptability judgment 
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Table 1(continued) 
Structure of doctoral dissertation 
 
 
 
Topic 
 
 
Chapter  Study Independent variables Dependent variables 
 
Moral Hypocrisy 
 
 
Chapter 4: Double 
Standards: The Role of 
Techniques of Neutralization 
 
 
2 (Version: Consumer vs. 
Corporation) 
 
Extent of neutralization  
 
 
Chapter 5: ―What‘s the 
harm in being unethical? 
These strangers are rich 
anyway!‖ Exploring 
Underlying Factors of 
Double Standards  
 
Study 1 
2 (Subject: Consumer vs. Business) 
2 (Wealth: Prosperous vs. Non-
prosperous) 
Moral acceptability judgment 
 
  
 
Study 2 
 
 
 
2 (Subject: Consumer vs. Business) 
2 (Relationship: Not good vs. Good) 
 
Moral acceptability judgment 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 
A wide range of terms has been used to refer to misbehavior by consumers, such as deviant consumer 
behavior, aberrant consumer behavior, problem customers, unethical consumer behavior, inappropriate 
behavior, jaycustomers, immoral consumer behavior, non-normative behavior, and unfair customers 
(Fisk et al., 2010). These terms are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation.  
 
2 
In Chapter 2, respondents have to indicate how acceptable they believe various questionable 
consumer practices to be. These beliefs are expected to reflect their own level of ethicality. In Chapter 
3, respondents‘ judgments mainly involve judgments about other consumers‘ ethical behavior. Finally, 
in Chapters 4 and 5, participants also evaluate others‘ undesirable behavior, others being equal to 
other consumers or companies.  
 
3 
The respondents who participated in the studies reported in this doctoral dissertation were all Dutch 
speaking. All the appendices therefore show the original Dutch scenarios and measurement scales used 
in the described studies. Next to these Dutch versions, the English translations of these scenarios and 
measurement scales are also included in the appendices. 
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Chapter 2: 
Consumer Ethics: The Role of Self-Regulatory Focus 
 
1. Abstract 
 
The two studies reported in this chapter investigate the influence of self-regulatory focus on 
consumer ethical beliefs (i.e., consumers‘ judgment of various unethical consumer practices). The self-
regulatory focus framework is highly influential and applies to an impressively wide spectrum of 
topics across a diverse array of domains. However, previous research has not yet examined the link 
between this personality construct and consumer ethical beliefs. Further, there is a call for more 
research into the antecedents of consumer misbehavior.  
Study 1 uses a student sample, while Study 2, for reasons of generalizability, uses a sample 
drawn from a more general population. Findings of both studies are identical. More specifically, they 
indicate that promotion affects one‘s attitude toward questionable consumer practices with those 
having a stronger (versus weaker) promotion focus being more likely to evaluate these consumer 
misbehaviors as less unacceptable. Further, both studies show that prevention influences one‘s 
perception of morally dubious consumer practices with those having a stronger (versus weaker) 
prevention focus being more inclined to evaluate these questionable consumer activities as 
unacceptable. 
 
Keywords: consumer ethical beliefs, consumer ethics, Consumer Ethics Scale, personality, self-
regulatory focus 
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2. Introduction 
 
Contrary to what is brought up by the concept of customer sovereignty (i.e., customers will 
behave in a manner that is both rational and functional), research indicates that consumer misbehavior 
is not part of a small criminal subculture but representative of consumers in general (Fullerton & Punj, 
2004; Reynolds & Harris, 2009). Focusing on just one individual form of unethical consumer 
behavior, shoplifting, previous studies represent the shoplifter as a general consumer rather than a 
distinct criminal type. For example, research estimates that as many as 60 percent of consumers have 
shoplifted at least once in their lifetime (Klemke, 1992). When the business world wants to tackle 
consumer misbehavior, they need a better insight into why consumers believe these questionable 
consumer practices to be acceptable. The overall importance of personality in the consumer ethics 
field has been supported (e.g., Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 1993), but the roles of more specific personality 
variables are less certain (Vitell, Singhapakdi, & Thomas, 2001). This leads researchers to call for 
more studies that examine the range of personality antecedents of consumer ethics (e.g., Vitell, 2003). 
The aim of the present study is to enrich the consumer ethics field by investigating the impact of self-
regulatory focus on individuals‘ beliefs concerning unethical consumer practices. 
The regulatory focus framework (Higgins, 1997, 1998) enjoys rapidly growing interest in 
academic literature, being a core personality variable in the more general domain of consumer 
behavior. Although self-regulatory focus is related to an impressive diversity of consumer behaviors 
(for an overview, see Higgins & Spiegel, 2004), previous research has not yet examined the 
relationship between this personality construct and one‘s perception of unethical consumer practices. 
Though, as the basis distinction between promotion and prevention-focused self-regulation appears to 
have a pervasive impact on human judgment, thought, and behavior (e.g., Aaker & Lee, 2001; Zhou & 
Pham, 2004), self-regulatory focus might offer potential for the study of consumer ethics. Further, if a 
relationship between self-regulatory focus and consumer ethics is found, this result might be of 
practical relevance as self-regulatory focus not only varies across individuals (i.e., self-regulatory 
focus as a personality trait) but can also be situationally induced (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001; 
Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995). Moreover, if people‘s chronic self-regulatory focus is not known to 
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those who want to influence people‘s ethical decision making, self-regulatory focus can be inferred 
through other, more easy to infer characteristics, such as individuals‘ cultural background (Lee, Aaker, 
& Gardner, 2000) or professional occupation (Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003).  
 
3. Theoretical Background: Self-Regulatory Focus  
 
Consumers‘ decisions take place in a context of goals they are striving for, needs they want to 
accomplish, and drives that color their thoughts (Pham & Higgins, 2005). Self-regulation refers to 
these processes individuals use to set their goals, choose means to achieve these goals, and assess 
progress toward these goals (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998). Building on the hedonic principle which 
entails that people approach pleasure and avoid pain, Higgins‘ regulatory focus theory (1997, 1998) 
posits that two distinct motivational orientations, shown by bio psychologists to have distinct 
physiological bases (e.g., Gray, 1990), regulate this goal-directed behavior. These two types of 
regulatory foci are labelled as promotion focus and prevention focus. Both foci relate to distinct types 
of needs, desired end states, and strategic inclinations. 
Concerning the distinct types of needs, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) states 
that the promotion and the prevention system each serve a distinct survival function. More 
specifically, the theory proposes that individuals‘ behavior is guided by a need for nurturance in a 
promotion-focused mode of self-regulation. Within the prevention system, individuals‘ actions are 
guided by a need for security. 
A second difference between the promotion focus and the prevention focus are the distinct 
types of desired end states. Although there are many ways of classifying goals (e.g., Huffman, 
Ratneshwar, & Mick, 2000), Higgins (1987) distinguishes between two types. On the one hand, he 
discerns ideals which refer to hopes, wishes, and aspirations that one would like to achieve and strive 
for (e.g., dreaming of an adventurous vacation). On the other hand, he distinguishes oughts which refer 
to people‘s obligations, duties, and responsibilities (e.g., having to provide for a child‘s education). 
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) suggests that ideals tap into the promotion system 
while oughts tap into the prevention system. 
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The promotion and the prevention system are not only different in the needs (nurturance 
versus security) and the goals (ideals versus oughts) they regulate, but also in terms of the strategic 
inclinations they invoke to fulfil these needs and goals (Pham & Avnet, 2004; Pham & Higgins, 2005). 
Both promotion and prevention strategies enable one to decrease the discrepancy between the current 
state and the desired outcome, but use different means to accomplish this. A promotion focus is 
captured by an approach-oriented strategy. These eagerness means are concerned with the avoidance 
of errors of omission (i.e., missing an emerging opportunity to accomplish something) and as a result 
involve achievement through immediate action rather than reflective deliberation. In line with this, 
promotion-focused individuals think in terms of gains versus non-gains (e.g., Roney et al., 1995; Shah, 
Higgins, & Friedman, 1998) and show a high sensitivity to the presence and absence of positive 
outcomes. In addition, success reflecting the presence of positive outcomes results in cheerfulness-
related emotions (e.g., feeling satisfied), while failure reflecting the absence of positive outcomes 
results in dejection-related emotions (e.g., feeling disappointed; Shah & Higgins, 2001). 
In contrast, a prevention focus is captured by an avoidance-oriented strategy. These vigilance 
means generate cognitive or behavioral courses that avoid errors of commission (i.e., making 
mistakes). As a result, prevention focus strategies involve careful assessment of the social context and 
action consequences. In line with this, prevention-focused individuals tend to frame goal pursuits and 
outcomes in terms of losses versus non-losses (e.g., Roney et al., 1995; Shah et al., 1998) and are 
highly sensitive to the presence and absence of negative outcomes. Whereas success reflecting the 
absence of negative outcomes results in quiescence-related emotions (e.g., feeling calm), failure 
reflecting the presence of negative outcomes results in agitation-related emotions (e.g., feeling tense; 
Shah & Higgins, 2001). 
Research considers these two foci to develop since childhood, deriving from parents‘ different 
styles in terms of regulation (Higgins & Silberman, 1998). Parents stressing positive outcomes by, for 
example, commending the child when s/he acts desirable (while not commending the child when s/he 
does not behave desirable) brings about a promotion focus. In contrast, parents‘ focus on negative 
outcomes by, for example, penalizing the child when s/he acts undesirable (and not penalizing when 
s/he does not behave undesirable) causes a prevention focus. Research assumes that these two foci 
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underlie people‘s perspectives about what they consider significant in their lives (Carmona, Buunk, 
Dijkstra, & Peiro, 2008) and have a major impact on people‘s feelings, thoughts, and actions (Higgins, 
1998). A considerable amount of empirical evidence supports the major tenets of regulatory focus 
theory (see for example Higgins, 1997, 1998). 
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) posits that an individual‘s specific focus can 
vary across situations (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001; Shah et al., 1998). Whether an individual 
actually uses the promotion or the prevention strategy might thus depend on which self-regulation 
system is temporarily induced in momentary situations. However, and important for this study, self-
regulatory focus can also vary across individuals. In other words, individuals may differ in their 
chronic or habitual self-regulatory orientations (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Further, as 
proposed by regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998), promotion focus and prevention focus are 
distinct constructs or continuums rather than ends of a single continuum as other research‘s 
experimental designs often depict and operationalize (Wu, McMullen, Neubert, & Yi, 2008). 
Consequently, although one system may be chronically more accessible than the other in a given 
person, research assumes that both self-regulatory foci co-exist in every individual (Zhou & Pham, 
2004). The present study constructs separate hypotheses for the two self-regulatory foci as people‘s 
chronic promotion and prevention orientations are theoretically independent. That is, individuals can 
be high in promotion focus only, high in prevention focus only, high in both, or low in both (Pham & 
Higgins, 2005). 
 
4. Hypotheses  
 
Under a promotion focus, the individual‘s strategic inclination is to approach matches to end 
states s/he would like to achieve (Higgins, 1999). Such individuals are motivated to use eagerness 
means to ensure hits (representing gains; i.e., looking for means of advancement), and to ensure 
against errors of omission or ―misses‖ (representing non-gains; i.e., not closing off possibilities) 
(Higgins et al., 2001). This eager drive of capturing as many existing opportunities as possible 
(Higgins, 1998) entails greater risk taking (i.e., risky bias) (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Förster et al., 
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2003; Higgins, 1998; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999) which relates to lower ethical 
beliefs (Rallapalli, Vitell, Wiebe, & Barnes, 1994). 
When individuals have a promotion focus, they are open to change (Liberman et al., 1999), 
resulting in an orientation of ―open mindedness‖ and a preference for openness to change (Dholakia, 
Gopinath, Bagozzi, & Nataraajan, 2006). Valuing openness to change (compared to valuing such 
openness less) is more likely to correspond with an unethical disposition as questionable consumer 
practices might give the opportunity to explore variety and stimulation through change from fixed 
patterns. Compared to individuals preferring conservation, individuals with an open mind will more 
easily slip into unethical behavior on the condition that this behavior forms a way of experiencing 
change and quickly approaching one‘s desired end state. When openness to change is important to an 
individual‘s life, s/he is more likely to let her/his life be guided by the excitement of experiencing and 
discovering opportunities (which sometimes might be more unethical) rather than by customs, 
traditions, and standards (which are more likely to ensure ethical behavior). In line with this reasoning, 
a recent study of Steenhaut and Van Kenhove (2006) shows that valuing openness to change results in 
a more tolerant judgment of unethical consumer practices. Therefore, we expect that consumers being 
high (versus low) in promotion are more likely to evaluate questionable consumer actions as 
appropriate.  
Promotion focus strategies involve goal pursuit in a wilful or approach-oriented manner in 
which achievement is more likely to be reached by immediate action rather than reflective deliberation 
(e.g., of the social context, of the prevailing norms and standards). We are not suggesting that people 
with a high score on promotion have an ideal end state that is less than ideal (being unethical); only 
they will be more likely, when necessary, to use less ethical means to ensure these ideal end states. 
Based upon all these findings, we expect that (as we believe there is no reason to expect different 
results with regard to the different dimensions of ethical beliefs, we formulate one hypothesis instead 
of one hypothesis for each dimension of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & 
Muncy, 1992, 2005): 
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Hypothesis 1:  Individuals scoring higher on promotion are more likely to tolerate unethical consumer 
practices compared to individuals scoring lower on promotion. 
 
People with a prevention focus are strategically inclined to avoid mismatches to desired end 
states (i.e., oughts, obligations, duties; Higgins, 1999). This inclination results in a motivation to use 
vigilance means to ensure ―correct rejections‖ (representing non-losses; i.e., be careful) and to ensure 
against errors of commission or ―false alarms‖ (representing losses; i.e., avoid mistakes) (Higgins et 
al., 2001). This vigilant drive of protecting against potential mistakes or threats (Higgins, 1998), in 
turn, ends up with being less open to risk (i.e., a conservative bias) (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Förster et 
al., 2003; Higgins, 1998; Liberman et al., 1999). Previous research demonstrates that such lower risk 
propensity is related to higher ethical beliefs (i.e., more likely to believe that questionable consumer 
practices are unacceptable; Rallapalli et al., 1994). This is a first reason why we hypothesize that 
prevention is positively related to consumer ethical beliefs. That is, the higher one‘s score on 
prevention, the more likely this individual is to not tolerate questionable consumer practices. 
In addition, prevention focused people are  likely to frame their desired end states in terms of 
oughts, obligations, and duties which are more likely to be achieved when following the prevailing 
norms and standards. Similarly, individuals with a prevention focus fixate on stability and status quo 
(Liberman et al., 1999). Such stability preference has the potential benefit of safety and security, 
which individuals with a prevention focus prefer (Liberman et al., 1999). As a consequence of this 
stability preference, prevention-focused individuals show inclinations toward careful and routine ways 
of thinking (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Liberman et al., 1999; Liberman, 
Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001; Seibt & Förster, 2004; Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & 
Valencia, 2005; Zhu & Myers- Levy, 2007). When such conservation is important to an individual‘s 
life, s/he is more likely to let her/his life be guided by customs, traditions, and standards rather than 
changes from fixed patterns. Steenhaut and Van Kenhove (2006) show that valuing conservation 
results in a more intolerant judgment of unethical consumer practices.  
Further, prevention-focused individuals are particularly sensitive to and vigilant about (the 
violation of) normative standards (Keller, Hurst, & Uskul, 2008). Before acting, they carefully assess 
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the social context and actual consequences, with normative expectations guiding their behavior. We 
want to make clear that in the present chapter, we do not suggest that individuals with a strong 
prevention focus desire to be more ethical than those with a lower prevention focus (i.e., ethicality as 
part of their ideal end state); only, we expect these prevention focused people to be less likely to use 
unethical means to achieve their ideal end states. Achieving the ideal end state being equal to oughts, 
obligations, and duties is often more easily reached when following the prevailing (moral) norms and 
standards.  
Based on all these findings, we put forward the following hypothesis (as we believe there is no 
reason to expect different results with regard to the different dimensions of ethical beliefs, we 
formulate one hypothesis instead of one hypothesis for each dimension of the Consumer Ethics Scale 
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005): 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Individuals scoring higher on prevention are less likely to tolerate unethical consumer 
practices compared to individuals scoring lower on prevention. 
 
5. Study 1 
 
5.1. Methodology  
 
5.1.1. Sample 
 
Data were collected in two phases, separated by a period of about two weeks. In a first phase 
of data gathering, undergraduate students fill in a self-administered online questionnaire. The authors 
inform them about the fact that this research would consist of two unconnected parts of interrogation 
(cf. psychological separation; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003) which would take place at 
different points in time. The first part of the research consists of questions about self-regulatory focus. 
After two weeks, all the participants (N = 594) of the first phase get an invitation to respond to another 
questionnaire with the goal of examining their consumer ethical beliefs. In total, 452 students 
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(response rate: 76.1%), ranging in age from 17 to 26 years (M = 20, SD = 1.85), participate in the 
second research part (258 females). We opt for this temporal separation of measurement of the 
predictor (i.e., self-regulatory focus) and criterion variable (i.e., consumer ethical beliefs) to control for 
common method bias. That is, asking about one‘s self-regulatory focus may make these foci more 
salient to the respondents, which could ultimately lead to an artifactual covariation of the two 
constructs under investigation (i.e., self-regulatory focus and consumer ethical beliefs) (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). 
 
5.1.2. Measures  
 
Independent Variables  
A reliable and valid Dutch version of Carver and White‘s (1994) BIS/BAS Scales (Franken, 
Muris, & Rassin, 2005) assesses participants‘ chronic self-regulatory foci. The Behavioral Inhibition 
System (BIS) and the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) are two general motivation systems that 
underlie affect and behavior (Gray, 1990). The BIS controls the experience of anxiety in response to 
anxiety-relevant cues, and is particularly sensitive to signals of punishment and the presence or 
absence of negative outcomes. The BAS controls the experience of such positive feelings as 
satisfaction and happiness when a person is exposed to cues of impending reward, and of such 
negative feelings as sadness and frustration when the reward is unattainable (Carver, 2004; Carver & 
White, 1994). In addition, the BAS is specifically sensitive to signals of reward as well as to the 
general presence or absence of positive outcomes. These definitions reflect the core features of the 
prevention focus and the promotion focus, respectively (Carver, 1996; Carver & White, 1994; Higgins 
et al., 1994). Therefore, we use the BIS/BAS Scales, which became one of the established ways of 
investigating self-regulatory focus, as indicators of chronic availability of prevention and promotion 
foci (cf. Dholakia et al., 2006; Lauriola, Russo, Lucidi, Violani, & Levin, 2005; Leone, Perugini, & 
Bagozzi, 2005; Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2004).  
The BIS subscale, used to operationalize prevention focus, consists of seven items (e.g., ‗I 
worry about making mistakes‘). Three subscales refer to different BAS facets which this study uses to 
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measure promotion focus: Reward Responsiveness (five items; e.g., ‗When I see an opportunity for 
something, I get excited right away‘), Drive (four items; e.g., ‗When I go after something I want, I 
move on it right away‘), and Fun Seeking (four items; e.g., ‗I will often do things for no other reason 
than they might be fun‘). To get an overview of the BIS/BAS items, see Appendix A (i.e., original 
BIS/BAS Scales; Carver & White, 1994) and Appendix B (i.e., valid Dutch version of BIS/BAS 
Scales; Franken et al., 2005). In the remainder of this chapter, we speak about prevention and 
promotion instead of BIS and BAS respectively.  
Respondents indicate the extent to which they endorse the different statements reflecting 
promotion and prevention goals on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Both subscales are reliable (prevention: α = .83; promotion: α = .76) and do not 
correlate with one another (r = .04; p > .05). Distinct promotion and prevention scores are calculated 
by averaging the items belonging to each of these subscales. As we expect no different results with 
regard to the three different BAS dimensions, we calculate the average of all the BAS items. Higher 
scores on the separate subscales indicate greater chronic-prevention and chronic-promotion goal 
orientations. This study treats the prevention (M = 5.2; SD = .93) and promotion (M = 5.1; SD = .61) 
scores as separate continuous variables in subsequent main analyses (cf. Yi & Baumgartner, 2008). 
 
Dependent Variables 
We use the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992; see 
Chapter 1: Introduction) to measure respondents‘ ethical beliefs. In 2005, Vitell and Muncy updated 
their Consumer Ethics Scale by rewording and adding several new items that represent three distinct 
categories: (1) downloading/buying counterfeit goods, (2) recycling/environmental awareness, and (3) 
doing the right thing/doing good. In the present chapter, we are interested in unethical consumer 
behavior, and therefore exclude the latter two categories from this study. Further, we add two items 
involving the downloading of copyrighted materials and the buying of counterfeit goods to the ‗no 
harm/no foul‘ dimension (cf. Vitell, Singh, & Paolillo, 2007). Appendix C reports the English items of 
this scale. Appendix D reports the Dutch version of this scale.  
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Respondents indicate how acceptable they think the various unethical consumer practices to be 
on a seven-point Likert scale going from ‗completely unacceptable‘ to ‗completely acceptable‘. Higher 
scores thus indicate a more tolerant view. The reliabilities of the four dependent dimensions are as 
follows: ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ (five items; α = .65), ‗passively benefiting at the 
expense of others‘ (six items; α = .70), ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ 
(five items; α = .65), and ‗no harm/no foul‘ (eight items; α = .79). We sum the appropriate items 
within each dimension to come up with one single numeric value for each of the four dimensions. 
Descriptive statistics show that respondents generally judge the practices of the ‗actively benefiting 
from illegal activities‘ dimension to be the least acceptable (M = 2.7, SD = .82). On the other hand, 
participants tolerate the ‗no harm/no foul‘ activities the most (M = 5.3, SD = .82). Respondents judge 
the activities of the active/legal dimension (M = 3.7, SD = .93) more harshly than those of the passive 
dimension (M = 4.5, SD = .89). 
 
5.2. Results  
 
We use regression analysis to analyse the data and to test the hypotheses with promotion and 
prevention as independent variables and the four dimensions of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992; 2005; i.e., ‗Actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ 
(Active/Illegal), ‗Passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ (Passive), ‗Actively benefiting from 
deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ (Active/Legal), and ‗No harm/No foul‘ (No harm/No foul)) as 
dependent variables. Table 1
1
 presents the correlation matrix for all these variables.  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Correlations between variables used in regressions 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Active/Illegal      
2. Passive .47***     
3. Active/Legal .62*** .53***    
4. No harm/No foul .34*** .48*** .42***   
5. Promotion .10* .11* .11* .13**  
6. Prevention -.18*** -.15** -.18*** -.03 .04 
N = 452; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
In order to examine the relationships between the independent variables and each of the four 
dependent variables, we conduct four separate regression analyses of which the results are shown in 
Table 2. This table clearly indicates that respondents‘ self-regulatory focus significantly explains their 
perception of morally dubious consumer practices (i.e., consumer ethical beliefs), with prevention 
being the sole exception with regard to the ‗no harm/no foul‘ dimension. The signs of the respective 
beta weights are all in the expected direction (i.e., negative for prevention and positive for promotion). 
That is, the stronger (versus weaker) respondents‘ promotion focus, the more likely they are to judge 
the questionable consumer practices less harshly. In contrast, the stronger (versus weaker) 
respondents‘ prevention focus, the more likely they are to not tolerate these activities. Consequently, 
these findings support Hypotheses 1 and 2. However, results do not confirm our expectations 
concerning the negative relationship between prevention and the ‗no harm/no foul‘ dimension. This 
insignificant relationship may exist because respondents may not perceive any of these items to be 
harmful at all. This finding would be consistent with previous research as the ‗no harm‘ label for this 
dimension indicates. However, following this line of reasoning would bring along that promotion 
would not significantly explain respondents‘ ethical judgments of the ‗no harm/no foul‘ activities, 
which is not the case in this study. 
72 
 
Table 2 
Study 1: Results of regression analyses 
 Dependent variable 
 Active/Illegal Passive Active/Legal No harm/No foul 
Promotion .10* .12* .12* .13** 
Prevention -.18*** -.16** -.18*** -.036 
R² .04 .04 .05 .02 
F-value 9.92*** 8.55*** 10.48*** 4.23* 
N = 452; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
6. Study 2 
 
In the past, many studies examining consumer ethics use student samples since they represent 
an important segment of consumers for many marketers (Chan, Wong, & Leung, 1998; Higgs-Kleyn, 
1998; Muncy & Eastman, 1998; Rallapalli et al., 1994). Because of the essentially exploratory nature 
of this research, and because the items of the measurement scales are relevant to the respondents who 
answer them, using a student sample forms no serious limitation for this study (Ferber, 1977). 
However, a restriction of this sampling frame is that caution should be taken in trying to generalize the 
findings to other samples. Therefore, we want to investigate whether the results of the first study hold 
when using a sample drawn from a more general population. 
 
6.1. Methodology  
 
The methodology of the second study is exactly the same as the one used in the first study 
among students (cf. supra). In total, 254 respondents participate in the second study. Table 3 provides 
an overview of the characteristics of this sample.  
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Table 3 
Study 2: Sample characteristics 
Gender Male 40.9% 
  Female 59.1% 
     
Age ≤24 2.8% 
  25-34 41.7% 
  35-44 20.9% 
  45-54 19.3% 
  55+ 15.3% 
     
Education Primary education 1.2% 
  Lower secondary education 2.4% 
  Higher secondary education 16.5% 
  Higher (non-university) education 39.8% 
  Higher university education    35.4% 
  Postgraduate education 4.7% 
     
Income < 500 euro 3.1% 
  500 - 1499 euro 26.0% 
  1500 - 2499 euro 46.1% 
  2500 - 3499 euro 13.0% 
  ≥ 3500 5.1% 
  I'd rather not say this 6.7% 
N = 254 
 
6.2. Results 
 
Table 4 gives an overview of the reliabilities, mean scores, and standard deviations of 
promotion, prevention, and the four dimensions of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005). Similar to our first study, these statistics show that respondents 
generally judge the practices of the ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ dimension most 
harshly, while they tolerate the ‗no harm/no foul‘ activities the most. Further, respondents again 
perceive the activities of the active/legal dimension to be more unacceptable than those of the passive 
dimension. 
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Table 4 
Study 2: Number of items, reliabilities, means and standards deviations of variables used in 
regressions 
Construct # items Alpha M SD 
1. Active/Illegal 5 .71 2.1 .76 
2. Passive 6 .75 3.7 1.03 
3. Active/Legal 5 .68 3.4 1.05 
4. No harm/No foul 8 .77 4.7 .91 
5. Promotion 13 .83 5.0 .73 
6. Prevention  7 .79 5.2 .82 
N = 254 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for both the independent and dependent variables. 
 
Table 5 
Study 2: Correlations between variables used in regressions 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Active/Illegal      
2. Passive .59***     
3. Active/Legal .63*** .67***    
4. No harm/No foul .37*** .52*** .52***   
5. Promotion .16* .17** .16* .18**  
6. Prevention -.22** -.21** -.18** -.05 .09 
N = 254; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Similar to the findings of Study 1, results (see Table 6) indicate that respondents being high in 
promotion judge unethical consumer practices less harshly compared to respondents being low in 
promotion. Further, we find that high prevention-focused individuals tolerate unethical consumer 
practices less than low prevention-focused individuals. Consequently, these findings support 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2. There is, however, one exception. As in the first study, results indicate an 
insignificant relationship between prevention and the ‗no harm/no foul‘ dimension. 
 
Table 6 
Study 2: Results of regression analyses 
 Dependent variable       
 Active/Illegal Passive Active/Legal No harm/No foul 
Promotion .18** .19** .17** .18** 
Prevention -.23*** -.22*** -.19** -.06 
R² .08 .08 .06 .03 
F-value 10.85*** 10.37*** 8.03*** 4.48* 
N = 254; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
As already mentioned before in this chapter, Higgins (1997, 1998) postulates that promotion 
focus and prevention focus are theoretically independent constructs, rather than the extremes of a 
single motivational continuum. Therefore, we developed separate hypotheses for the two self-
regulatory foci. Hypothesis 1 states that individuals scoring higher (versus lower) on promotion are 
more likely to tolerate unethical consumer practices while Hypothesis 2 postulates that individuals 
scoring higher (versus lower) on prevention are less likely to tolerate unethical consumer practices. 
One might question what happens with individuals‘ ethical beliefs if these individuals score high on 
both promotion focus and prevention focus. This would, based on both hypotheses, mean that one 
holds higher and lower ethical beliefs at the same time.  
To tackle this particular issue, we assessed respondents‘ dominant self-regulatory focus. In 
case their promotion focus score was higher than their prevention focus score, respondents were 
attributed to a dominant promotion focus. In case respondents‘ prevention focus score was higher than 
their promotion focus score, they were attributed to a dominant prevention focus. One respondent had 
identical scores on both foci and was excluded from the analyses. The results of the Independent 
Samples T-tests show a significant difference between a dominant promotion focus and a dominant 
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prevention focus for all the dimensions of the Consumer Ethics Scale (see Table 7). More specifically, 
individuals with a dominant promotion focus judge the various questionable consumer practices less 
harshly compared to the individuals with a dominant prevention focus.  
 
Table 7 
Study 2: Results of T-tests 
  
Prevention  
(N = 149) 
Promotion 
 (N = 104) 
      
  M SD M SD t df p-value 
Active/Illegal 1.95 .72 2.33 .78 -4.00 251 .000 
Passive 3.48 1.03 3.94 .99 -3.60 251 .000 
Active/Legal 3.21 1.05 3.61 1.02 -2.97 251 .003 
No harm/No foul 4.58 .86 4.87 .96 -2.47 251 .014 
N = 253 
 
7. Discussion  
 
Both studies described in this chapter examine the impact of self-regulatory focus (Higgins, 
1997, 1998) on individuals‘ judgment of unethical consumer practices (i.e., consumer ethical beliefs). 
Study 1 uses a student sample, while Study 2 makes use of a sample drawn from a more general 
population. Both studies indicate that promotion affects one‘s attitude toward questionable consumer 
practices: Those having a stronger (versus weaker) promotion focus are more likely to judge consumer 
misbehaviors less harshly. Further, both studies show that prevention influences one‘s perception of 
morally dubious consumer practices with those having a stronger (versus weaker) prevention focus 
being more inclined to judge these questionable activities more harshly. 
This study contributes to the marketing ethics field. In this latter area of research, most 
attention to date focuses on the morality of business and marketing practices (Fukukawa, 2003; 
Schlegelmilch & Robertson, 1995; Vitell et al., 2001). However, marketing is an exchange process 
between buyers and sellers who both might be subject to ethical lapses (Rao & Al-Wugayan, 2005). 
Consumers are also a major part of the sales transaction dyad and ignoring them in ethics research 
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may result in an inadequate understanding of that process (Swaidan, Vitell, & Rawwas, 2003; Vitell, 
2003) and in the development of ineffective marketing strategies (Swaidan, Rawwas, & Al-Khatib, 
2004). By examining perceptions of unethical consumer practices, both studies described in this 
chapter fill this ‗consumer ethics gap‘ in marketing ethics literature. Further, this study also meets the 
more general and recent call for research into deviant consumer behavior (e.g., Fullerton & Punj, 
2004; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002). 
Another contribution of these studies is that they address the need expressed by recent 
research to examine the range of antecedents of dysfunctional consumer behavior (e.g., Al-Rafee & 
Cronan, 2006; Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Vitell, 2003). By investigating the relationship between self-
regulatory focus and consumer ethical beliefs, we also add to the knowledge surrounding regulatory 
focus. In the course of its existence, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) has proven to be 
highly influential. This framework of motivational processes applies to an impressively wide spectrum 
of topics and psychological phenomena across many different domains (for an overview, see Higgins 
& Spiegel, 2004). Despite the wide relevance of the regulatory focus theory, no previous studies have 
examined the consequences of a promotion and a prevention focus for individuals‘ perceptions of 
questionable consumer practices. Even less attention has been devoted to these regulatory systems in 
marketing (e.g., Aaker & Lee, 2001; Andrade, 2005; Cohen & Andrade, 2004; Kidwell, Hardesty, & 
Childers, 2008). This makes the present study of interest to marketing theorists. As Reynolds and 
Harris (2009) state, there exists a tendency within research fields to stay within the own literature 
boundaries. However, creating new insights into phenomena with a rich but diverse research tradition 
like unethical consumer behavior necessitates enrichment by delving into the wide existing array of 
perspectives and positions. 
This study is also of practical relevance. As a focus for research, consumer ethics has the 
benefit of generating a better understanding of why consumers engage in unethical behavior (Vitell & 
Paolillo, 2003). Answering this question can help to limit consumer misbehavior in the marketplace 
which often poses a significant cost to business (Rawwas & Singhapakdi, 1998). An increased insight 
into the factors that relate to unethical consumer behavior enables to design systems, structures, and 
priorities calculated to lower misbehavior (Reynolds & Harris, 2009). Suppose, for example, that the 
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movie industry wants to launch a movie message to decrease digital piracy behavior. As the two self-
regulatory foci can be situationally induced (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001; Roney et al., 1995), it 
might be useful to make the prevention focus salient within this message (e.g., individuals facing the 
contingency of suffering or avoiding punishment) as both studies show that high prevention relates to 
greater ethicality.  
Another ‗practical advantage‘ of self-regulatory focus is that this personality variable can be 
assessed by other, more easy to infer characteristics. For instance, previous research shows that people 
living in Western cultures, due to their dominant independent self-construal, are more likely to hold a 
promotion focus. People living in Eastern cultures, on the other hand, are more likely to be prevention 
oriented due to their dominant interdependent self-construal (Lee et al., 2000).  
 
7.1. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
 
We want to end this chapter by pointing to some limitations and suggestions for further 
research. In both studies, a restriction concerns the limited percentage of variance that the independent 
variables explain for each dimension of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & 
Muncy, 1992, 2005). Actually, various studies claim that personality variables often fail to explain 
more than ten percent of the variance in behavior (e.g., Kassarjian, Olsen, & Sims, 1981). In this way, 
our study is no exception. Obviously, other constructs not included in this study may account for the 
rest of this variance. As a matter of fact, a lot of variables could intervene between the ‗stage‘ of self-
regulatory focus (which is something quite ‗abstract‘ and deeply routed within a person) and consumer 
ethical beliefs (which forms a more concrete ‗phase‘ in the ethical decision making process). 
Unravelling the processes that lie behind this interrelationship would be a research endeavor.  
Second, in the theoretical background section, we made clear that a prevention focus fosters a 
strategic inclination to avoid mismatches to desired end states. Based on this reasoning, we might 
expect that prevention focused individuals become more likely to behave unethical if this unethical 
behavior is the only way or a more easy way to achieve a desired end state or to avoid such 
mismatches to desired end states. Suggesting that prevention focused individuals are more ethical 
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compared to promotion focused individuals might oversimplify the relationship between self-
regulatory focus and consumer ethics. Consequently, it would be worthwhile for future research to dig 
deeper into this particular issue and to establish possible boundary conditions.  
Previous research demonstrates that promotion focused people are more likely to show 
extreme response styles on self-reported measures while prevention focused people are more likely to 
show midpoint response styles (Cabooter, 2010). Therefore, it might be that the results described in 
the present chapter are due to people‘s tendency toward certain response styles rather than their ethical 
predisposition. Consequently, it is necessary that future research investigates the extent to which the 
results in the present chapter are distorted by stylistic responding. Further studies might control for 
such responding or could correct for response styles. Another way of avoiding this possible distortion 
would be to situationally induce self-regulatory focus and to measure real ethical behavior instead of 
using self-reported measures to assess one‘s self-regulatory focus and ethicality.  
Third, the BIS/BAS Scales (Carver & White, 1994) or other established ways of assessing 
self-regulatory focus (e.g., Higgins et al., 2001; Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002) have a restriction 
in that they are self-reported measures. Consequently, the degree to which respondents possess insight 
into their own motivational state and experiences limits the use of these scales (Summerville & Roese, 
2008). Instead of these multi-item measurement scales, future research might use different tests that 
distinguish well among a promotion and a prevention focus. Examples are the speed/accuracy test 
(Förster et al., 2003), choice test (Wang & Lee, 2006), determination task (Liberman et al., 1999), and 
gift task (Liberman et al., 1999). These tasks are beneficial as participants do not need good 
knowledge about their own self-regulatory focus. In addition, respondents are not aware of the real 
intention of these tests. Further, the use of such tests allows to control for respondents‘ likeliness to 
respond in accordance with certain response styles (see limitation in the paragraph above).  
Finally, future studies investigating the interrelationship between self-regulatory focus and 
consumer ethics might include a behavioral aspect or at least behavioral intentions into their research 
design. Just like almost all previous consumer ethics studies, the reported studies use ethical beliefs as 
a proxy for intentions and behavior, theorizing that these ethical evaluations influence consumers(‘) 
(intentions) to engage in morally dubious practices. However, factors other than ethical beliefs are 
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likely to have an impact on unethical behavior (Vitell, 2003). Moreover, next to using various tests 
that are not based on self-reported measurements to distinguish between a promotion and prevention 
focus, the use of behavioral measures allows to control for respondents‘ propensity to stylistic 
responding. 
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Note 
 
1 
With regard to Tables 1, 2, 5, and 6, we would like to make clear that, rather than running a full 
structural model and thus including control variables, we ran regression analyses without taking into 
account any control variable. Consequently, the lines in Tables 1 and 2, as well as in Tables 5 and 6, 
are quite overlapping.  
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9. Appendices 
 
9.1. Appendix A: BIS/BAS Scales  
 
BIS 
 
1. I worry about making mistakes 
2. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something 
3. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me 
4. I have very few fears compared to my friends® 
5. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen, I usually get pretty ―worked up‖ 
6. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness® 
7. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit 
 
BAS-Reward 
 
1. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly 
2. When I‘m doing well at something, I love to keep at it 
3. When I get something I want, I feel excited right away 
4. When I see an opportunity for something, I get excited right away 
5. It would excite me to win a contest 
 
BAS-Drive 
 
1. When I go after something I want, I move on it right away 
2. When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it 
3. I go out of my way to get things I want 
4. If I see a chance to get something, I use a ―no holds barred‖ approach 
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BAS-Fun 
 
1. I will often do things for no other reason than they might be fun 
2. I often act on the spur of the moment 
3. I crave excitement and new sensations 
4. I‘m always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun 
 
® Reverse scored item 
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9.2. Appendix B: Dutch Version BIS/BAS Scales  
 
BIS 
 
1. Ik pieker wel eens over het maken van fouten  
2. Ik voel me bezorgd als ik denk dat ik slecht heb gepresteerd  
3. Ik voel me bezorgd of overstuur als ik denk of weet dat iemand boos op mij is  
4. Ik ervaar weinig angsten vergeleken met mijn vrienden® 
5. Ik raak enigszins gestrest als ik denk dat er iets vervelends staat te gebeuren  
6. Ik voel zelden angst of zenuwen, zelfs als me iets vervelends staat te wachten® 
7. Kritiek of uitbranders raken mij behoorlijk  
 
BAS-Reward 
 
1. Als ik iets leuks meemaak, heeft dat duidelijk invloed op me  
2. Als ik iets goed doe, wil ik er graag mee doorgaan 
3. Als ik iets krijg wat ik wil, voel ik me opgewonden en energiek  
4. Als ik ergens een buitenkansje zie dan word ik meteen enthousiast  
5. Als ik een wedstrijd zou winnen, zou ik erg enthousiast zijn  
 
BAS-Drive 
 
1. Als ik de kans zie iets te krijgen wat ik wil, zal ik die kans meteen grijpen  
2. Als ik iets wil, zal ik er gewoonlijk alles voor doen om dit te krijgen  
3. Ik zal mijn grenzen overschrijden om de dingen te krijgen die ik wil  
4. Als ik iets van plan ben dan laat ik mij door niets weerhouden  
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BAS-Fun 
 
1. Vaak doe ik dingen alleen voor de lol 
2. Ik doe vaak dingen in een vlaag van opwelling  
3. Ik verlang naar spanning en sensatie  
4. Ik ben altijd bereid iets nieuws te proberen als ik denk dat het leuk zal zijn  
 
® Reverse scored item 
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9.3. Appendix C: Consumer Ethics Scale  
 
Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
 
1. Changing price tags on merchandise in a retail store 
2. Drinking a can of soda in a supermarket without paying for it 
3. Reporting a lost item as ―stolen‖ to an insurance company in order to collect the 
insurance money 
4. Giving misleading price information to a clerk for an unpriced item 
5. Returning damaged goods when the damage was your own fault 
 
Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
 
1. Getting too much change and not saying anything 
2. Moving into a new residence, finding the cable TV is still hooked up, and using it (rather 
than signing up and) (without) paying for it 
3. Lying about a child‘s age in order to get a lower price 
4. Not saying anything when the waiter or waitress miscalculates a bill in your favour 
5. Joining a CD club just to get some free CD‘s, with no intention of buying any 
6. Observing someone shoplifting and ignoring it 
 
Actively benefiting from deceptive ( or questionable) practices 
 
1. Using an expired coupon for merchandise 
2. Stretching the truth on an income tax return 
3. Not telling the truth when negotiating the price of a new automobile 
4. Using a coupon for merchandise you did not buy 
5. Returning merchandise to a store by claiming that it was a gift when it was not 
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No harm/no foul 
 
1. Taping a movie off the television 
2. Copying computer software or games that you did not buy 
3. Installing software on your computer without buying it 
4. ―Burning‖ a CD instead of buying it 
5. Returning merchandise after trying it and not liking it 
6. Spending over an hour trying on clothing and not buying anything 
7. Downloading music from the Internet instead of buying it 
8. Buying counterfeit goods instead of buying the original manufacturers‘ brands 
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9.4. Appendix D: Dutch Translation Consumer Ethics Scale  
 
Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
 
1. Het prijsetiket van een product in de winkel veranderen 
2. Een blikje frisdrank uit het winkelrek nemen en uitdrinken zonder ervoor te betalen 
3. Een voorwerp dat je verloren hebt als gestolen aangeven aan de verzekering, om het geld 
te krijgen 
4. Doelbewust een lagere prijs zeggen tegen een kassierster die je vraagt hoeveel een 
ongeprijsd product kost 
5. Een product dat je zelf hebt beschadigd gratis proberen omruilen, zeggende dat het reeds 
beschadigd was 
 
Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
 
1. Teveel wisselgeld terugkrijgen aan de kassa en niets zeggen 
2. Verhuizen naar een nieuwe woonplaats, opmerken dat de kabeltelevisie nog steeds is 
aangesloten en er gebruik van maken zonder ervoor te betalen 
3. Liegen over de leeftijd van een kind om een lagere prijs te krijgen 
4. Niets zeggen wanneer de ober zich in jouw voordeel vergist in de rekening 
5. Lid worden van een cd-club enkel om wat cd's gratis te krijgen, maar zonder enige 
intentie om cd's te kopen 
6. Iemand zien stelen in de winkel en dit niet melden 
 
Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
 
1. Een kortingsbon gebruiken die niet meer geldig is 
2. Je belastingsformulier fout invullen om zo minder belastingen te moeten betalen 
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3. Niet de waarheid vertellen wanneer je onderhandelt over de prijs van een nieuwe wagen 
4. Een kortingsbon gebruiken voor een product dat je niet gekocht hebt 
5. Een product terugbrengen naar de winkel met het excuus dat het een geschenk was, 
terwijl dit niet zo is 
 
No harm/no foul 
 
1. Een film opnemen die op tv wordt uitgezonden 
2. Computersoftware of spelletjes kopiëren die je zelf niet gekocht hebt 
3. Software op je computer installeren zonder hiervoor te betalen 
4. Een cd kopiëren in plaats van deze aan te kopen 
5. Een product dat je uitprobeerde, inruilen omdat je er niet van houdt  
6. Een uur kleren passen in een winkel en uiteindelijk niets kopen 
7. Muziek downloaden van het internet in plaats van deze aan te kopen 
8. Bewust nagemaakte producten kopen in plaats van de merken van de oorspronkelijke 
fabrikant te kopen 
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Chapter 3:  
When Colors Backfire: The Impact of Color Cues on Moral Judgment 
 
1. Abstract 
 
This chapter reports three studies that investigate if and how the valence of color cues affects 
evaluations of positively
1
 and negatively valenced behavior. Study 1 and Study 2 use colors with 
definite differences in terms of valence, namely, red and green. Instead of using the colors red and 
green, Study 3 applies an evaluative conditioning paradigm to endow initially neutral colors with 
negative versus positive valences. Findings of all three studies show an ironic color effect: undesirable 
behaviors become less unacceptable when presented with negatively valenced colors. In general, 
respondents find (un)desirable behaviors more acceptable/less unacceptable when a background color 
is of the same valence rather than neutral or opposite in valence. Paradoxically, using colors with a 
negative valence (e.g., red) in campaigns that aim to prevent negatively valenced behavior may 
backfire, because this usage appears to render the undesirable behavior more acceptable. 
 
Keywords: affective priming, color, fluency, intuition, moral judgment, moral psychology, 
persuasion 
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2. Introduction  
 
Colors are ubiquitous. The objects, people, and environments we face daily all contain color 
information. As Mehta and Zhu (2009) remark: ―color is a fundamental aspect of human perception‖ 
(p. 1226). Colors also entail more than just aesthetics in that they carry psychological meanings and 
associations. The current paper investigates if and how the valence of color cues might affect 
evaluations of positively
1
 and negatively valenced behaviors. Intriguingly, our findings show an ironic 
color effect: using colors with a negative valence in campaigns aiming to prevent negatively valenced 
behavior may actually backfire as it renders the undesirable behavior less unacceptable. 
This study contributes to several research lines. First, we add to the emerging stream of 
research on color functioning (e.g., Deng, Hui, & Hutchinson, 2010; Lindsey et al., 2010). Second, 
several studies document match effects, such that a match between a message cue and the message 
content exerts beneficial effects on judgment and persuasion (e.g., Cavazza, Graziani, Serpe, & 
Rubichi, 2010; Mayer & Tormala, 2010). This study instead reveals the potential detrimental effects of 
a valence match between a cue and a message on moral judgments. Third, moral judgments have 
traditionally been considered as the result of rational and deliberate reasoning processes (e.g., Jones, 
1991; Kohlberg, 1976; Turiel, 1983). More recently, scholars have argued and showed that moral 
decision making is also influenced, if not dominated, by intuitive factors (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Meier, 
Robinson, & Clore, 2004). The current paper supports this latter argument by demonstrating the effect 
of seemingly irrelevant color cues on moral judgment. Fourth, this research identifies an important and 
ubiquitous source of conceptual fluency that has been previously overlooked, namely, fluency 
stemming from a valence match between a stimulus and its context, rather than from semantic 
priming. 
Our findings are important for a host of settings. For example, marketers and policy makers 
attempt to develop messages that discourage undesirable behaviors, often by appeals to moral 
judgment and behavior. Such decision makers need to consider the effects of colors carefully, because 
they might assume a negative connotation color, such as red, to aid to deter people from a bad 
behavior, whereas these messages may inadvertely render the undesirable behavior less unacceptable. 
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Our findings also suggest that undesirable behavior, like petty crime, might be more likely if the 
physical environment prompts negative evaluations. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
 
In many situations, particular colors get paired with particular messages, concepts, and 
experiences (Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman, & Meinhardt, 2007). Through repeated pairings, people 
form strong color associations (Mehta & Zhu, 2009), such that the mere presence of a color in a 
situation can activate corresponding associations that influence affect, cognition, and behavior (Elliot, 
Maier, Binser, Friedman, & Pekrun, 2009). Research on grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008) 
demonstrates that the act of perceiving a stimulus activates memory traces that in turn mentally 
stimulate actions associated with the stimulus and thus prompt corresponding thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors.  
Two colors that are of interest for written communication to indicate desirability or 
undesirability are green and red, respectively. Red, as typically associated with dangers and mistakes 
(e.g., traffic lights, stop signs, warning signals; Elliot et al., 2007; Smeesters & Liu, 2011), activates an 
avoidance motivation (Mehta & Zhu, 2009), making people more vigilant and risk averse (Friedman & 
Förster, 2002, 2005). Green contrasts chromatically and psychologically with red and offers general 
associations with approach motivations (Elliot & Maier, 2007). Briefly stated, colors that convey 
positive meanings (e.g., green) generally induce approach responses, whereas colors carrying negative 
meanings (e.g., red), induce avoidance responses.  
It thus seems reasonable to argue that using the color red should enhance communications 
aimed at reducing unwanted behavior, while using green should improve campaigns aimed at inducing 
wanted behavior. Indeed, we conducted a pilot study in which participants indicated which color (i.e., 
red or green) they find more appropriate for campaigns aimed at stimulating good behavior (N = 45) or 
deterring bad behavior (N = 46). Results showed that 93% preferred green over red for stimulating 
good behavior and 80% preferred red over green for deterring bad behavior. In both cases, the 
observed percentages differ from indifference (i.e., 50%), zs > 5.19, ps < .001.  
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Based on affective priming and conceptual fluency theory, this study suggests alternative 
predictions for the commonly held belief that negative (versus positive) color cues are better suited for 
messages to prevent negative behavior. Affective priming refers to the fact that people process targets 
faster and more accurately if they are preceded by primes with the same rather than an opposite 
valence (see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003). For example, people identify the word cancer 
faster when it is preceded by the word spider than by the word flower. Affective priming even occurs 
when the prime and target appear simultaneously instead of sequentially (e.g., Spruyt, Hermans, De 
Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007). Although affective priming studies generally use simple 
stimuli (i.e., single words or pictures of an easily identified object), this phenomenon may be relevant 
for more complex stimuli too. 
In affective priming, a valenced prime is presumed to activate the corresponding valence 
which makes it easier to activate concepts with a similar valence (Fazio, 2001). Although never 
recognized as such, affective priming may thus imply a form of conceptual fluency, which arises when 
the mental representation of a stimulus is easy to activate because it offers semantic relatedness to the 
context in which it appears (Whittlesea, 1993). If we designate a background color as prime and an 
(un)desirable behavior as target, a valence match between the background color and the behavior 
might generate conceptual fluency. In the moral domain, a red background color entails a context that 
is associated with something bad. Consequently, one may experience conceptual fluency when 
processing a bad behavior described on a red background. A green background color, on the other 
hand, entails a context that is related to something good. Therefore, one may experience conceptual 
fluency when processing a good behavior described on a green background.  
Such conceptual fluency represents a specific form of processing fluency. In general, 
experiencing processing fluency evokes a positive affective state that people misattribute to the stimuli 
they are processing rather than to the ease of processing (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 
2003). For instance, people regard their childhood memories as more intact when they must recall four 
episodes from their childhood instead of twelve (Winkielman, Schwarz & Belli, 1998), presumably 
because retrieving just four episodes is easier than retrieving twelve episodes. This ease (versus 
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difficulty) during the retrieval task then gets attributed not to the task at hand but rather to the quality 
of childhood memory.  
We similarly propose that people may view any given (un)desirable behavior as more 
positive/less negative if its valence matches the valence of the background on which it is described. 
So, we predict that a good behavior would be viewed as even more positive when described on a green 
(versus red) background while a bad behavior would be viewed as less negative when described on a 
red (versus green) background. In the case of prevention attempts in the moral domain, a message that 
attempts to discourage undesirable behavior may be less persuasive when it appears against a red 
(versus a green) background color. This line of reasoning also implies that promotions of desirable 
behavior could benefit from creating a positively (compared to a negatively) valenced context, such as 
by using a green background color. We test this idea in Study 1, focused on the context of music 
downloading.  
 
4. Study 1 
 
4.1. Participants and Procedure 
 
Two hundred twenty-one respondents (72 men, 149 women) between the ages of 18 and 67 
years (M = 36.90, SD = 13.54) participated in an anonymous, self-administered online survey. They 
were randomly assigned to the conditions of a two (behavior: illegal versus legal music downloading) 
by two (background color: red versus green) between-subjects design. Participants confronted a 
message about either a negatively valenced behavior (i.e., illegal music downloading) or a positively 
valenced behavior (i.e., legal music downloading), describing either the negative consequences of 
illegal downloads or the positive consequences of legal ones (see Appendix A for the original Dutch 
messages as well as some screenshots and Appendix B for the English translation of these original 
messages). These messages appeared against a red (i.e., negatively valenced) or green (i.e., positively 
valenced) background. After reading the message, participants rated the acceptability of the behavior 
described on three seven-point semantic differential scales, anchored as ―unacceptable–acceptable,‖ 
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―unethical–ethical,‖ and ―wrong–right.‖ We averaged these ratings to form a judgment of moral 
acceptability (α = .97).  
 
4.2. Results and Discussion 
 
We conducted an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with behavior and background color as the 
between-subjects independent variables and the moral acceptability judgment as the dependent 
variable. A significant main effect of behavior, F(1,217) = 366.74, p < .001, showed that overall, 
participants evaluated illegal music downloading as less positive (M = 2.94, SD = 1.80) than legal 
music downloading (M = 6.27, SD = 1.86). We found no main effect of background color, F(1,217) = 
.00, p = .96.  
 
Figure 1 
Study 1: Interaction between behavior and background color 
 
 
However, as we depict in Figure 1 above, there was a significant interaction effect of behavior 
and background color, F(1,217) = 7.83, p < .01, such that respondents evaluated legal music 
downloading more positively when they saw a green background (M = 6.51, SD = .66) rather than a 
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red background (M = 6.02, SD = 1.27), F(1,217) = 3.92, p < .05. Conversely, illegal music 
downloading prompted more negative evaluations when the background was green (M = 2.70, SD = 
1.52) compared with when it was red (M = 3.18, SD = 1.47), F(1,217) = 3.91, p < .05.  
 These results are important for marketers or policy makers who hope to discourage consumers 
from behaving unethically or to encourage consumers to behave ethically. The findings indicate that 
discouraging unethical consumer behavior by means of persuasive messages can benefit from using a 
green background color instead of red in the background. Promoting desirable behavior also benefits 
from the use of a green (versus red) background. This relatively practical study has focused on one 
specific consumer behavior (i.e., music downloading). In Study 2, we pursue a conceptual replication 
of these findings while including various consumer behaviors.  
    
5. Study 2          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
5.1. Participants and Procedure 
 
 One hundred twenty-seven respondents (41 men, 86 women) between 18 and 68 years old (M 
= 33.05, SD = 13.57) were randomly assigned to the conditions of a two (behavior: undesirable versus 
desirable) by two (background color: red versus green) between-subjects design. Participants rated the 
acceptability of four desirable (see Appendix C for the original Dutch scenarios and Appendix D for 
the English translation of these original scenarios) or undesirable (see Appendix E for the original 
Dutch scenarios and Appendix F for the English translation of these original scenarios) consumer 
behaviors (in random order). The first scenario involved a consumer receiving too much change at a 
checkout. In the undesirable behavior condition, the consumer did not mention the error to the cashier 
and kept the extra change. In the desirable behavior condition, the consumer told the cashier and 
returned the extra change. In the second scenario, a consumer downloaded music from the Internet 
either legally or illegally. The third scenario concerned a consumer who, upon leaving a supermarket, 
noticed that he or she had not been charged for a particular item and either did or did not go back to 
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pay for it. Finally, the fourth scenario described a consumer who took a soft drink from the store shelf, 
drank it in the store, and did or did not pay for it at the checkout. 
These four consumer behaviors were described on either a red or green background. The three 
semantic differential scales from Study 1 (―unacceptable-acceptable,‖ ―unethical-ethical,‖ and ―wrong-
right‖) were highly correlated (all Pearson correlation coefficients were above .91), so for Study 2, 
participants only had to make one judgment. They rated the acceptability of the four consumer 
behaviors on a Likert scale, ranging from ―completely unacceptable‖ (1) to ―completely acceptable‖ 
(7). After these moral judgments, participants rated the background color on which the (un)desirable 
behaviors were described on two seven-point semantic differential scales, with the anchor points 
―wrong‖ versus ―right‖ and ―negative‖ versus ―positive.‖  
 
5.2. Results and Discussion 
 
As a manipulation check, we created a color valence index by averaging the wrong–right and 
negative–positive ratings (α = .86). The ANOVA used behavior (desirable versus undesirable) and 
background color (red versus green) as between-subjects independent variables and the color valence 
index as the dependent variable. As intended, only a significant main effect of background color 
emerged, F(1,123) = 44.89, p < .001. Specifically, red was rated as more negative/less positive (M = 
3.52, SD = 1.75) than green (M = 5.27, SD = 1.08). Further, red was regarded as more negative (p = 
.028), and green as more positive (p < .001), than the neutral midpoint of 4. 
We averaged the acceptability ratings across the four scenarios (α = .78) and subjected them to 
a between-subjects ANOVA with behavior and background color as factors. As we are interested in 
the overall result across the various scenarios and want to rule out situation specific influences, we 
averaged responses across the scenarios instead of treating these scenarios as a within factor. 
The significant main effect of behavior, F(1,123) = 134.75, p < .001, showed that undesirable 
consumer behaviors (M = 4.17, SD = 1.11) were less accepted than the desirable ones (M = 6.09, SD = 
0.81). We also identified a significant interaction effect between behavior and background color, 
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F(1,123) = 14.68, p < .001 (see Figure 2). Desirable consumer behaviors were perceived as more 
acceptable when described on a green background (M = 6.33, SD = 0.53) rather than a red background 
(M = 5.85, SD = 0.95), F(1,58) = 5.68, p = .020. Conversely, undesirable consumer behaviors were 
perceived as less acceptable on a green background (M = 3.78, SD = 0.76) than on a red background 
(M = 4.56, SD = 1.24), F(1,65) = 9.47, p = .003. Finally, we found no significant main effect of 
background color, F(1,123) = .84, p = .36. 
 
Figure 2 
Study 2: Interaction between behavior and background color  
 
 
In summary, the results of Study 2 show that a valence match between a behavior and a 
background color on which this behavior is described affects moral judgments of that behavior. More 
specifically, desirable behaviors are rated as more acceptable when described on a green background 
than on a red background, while undesirable behaviors are rated as more acceptable when described on 
a red background than on a green background. The latter finding contrasts with the lay belief 
demonstrated in our pilot study that negative colors such as red are better suited to prevent negative 
behavior.  
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6. Study 3 
 
In Study 2, we did not manipulate the valence of the background colors and relied instead on 
the associations of red with negativity and green with positivity. The effects obtained in Study 2 could 
therefore be due to differences in specific associations with red and green rather than to their 
difference in valence. To rule out this alternative interpretation, Study 3 aims to replicate the effect of 
the color-behavior valence match on moral judgments by endowing initially neutral colors with either 
positive or negative valences through an evaluative conditioning procedure (i.e., a procedure that 
changes the liking of a stimulus through pairing that stimulus with positive or negative stimuli; for an 
overview, see De Houwer, 2011; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). 
Further, one may wonder whether the obtained effects are not due to experiencing processing 
fluency in case of behavior-color valence matches, but rather due to experiencing processing difficulty 
in case of behavior-color valence mismatches (i.e., disfluency). In particular, it could be that people 
consider describing behaviors on backgrounds with opposite valences as inappropriate or odd, as a 
result of which valence mismatches lead to less positive/more negative moral acceptability judgments 
(compared to the situation in which behaviors are described on backgrounds with similar or neutral 
valences). To investigate this possibility, Study 3 adds a control condition in which the (un)desirable 
behaviors are described on neutral colors (i.e., the colors that are endowed with either a positive or 
negative valence in the other conditions). This allows examining whether the obtained effects are due 
to valence matches and/or valence mismatches.  
 
6.1. Participants and Procedure 
 
 Respondents (N = 216, 90 men, 126 women; aged 18–72 years, M = 26.85, SD = 11.89) were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a two (behavior: undesirable versus desirable) by three 
(background color valence: negative versus positive versus neutral) between-subjects design. The 
survey consisted of two parts.  
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In a first part, participants considered 34 statements (see Appendix G for the original Dutch 
statements and Appendix H for the English translation of these original statements) and indicated, for 
each statement, whether they thought it was true or not. The statements were chosen to be obscure 
enough so that respondents would not know the correct answer but instead would have to guess, such 
as ―1522 passengers died on the Titanic,‖ ―Chlorine was discovered by Carl Scheele in 1774,‖ and 
―The Chinese Wall is 6259 kilometers in length.‖ Participants received feedback about their answers 
indicating whether they were wrong or right.  
In the three different ‗background color valence‘ conditions, the feedback (i.e., ―wrong‖ and 
―right‖) appeared in different colors. For the participants in the negative and positive background color 
valence conditions, the feedback appeared in light purple and beige. For half of them, ―wrong‖ was 
written in light purple and ―right‖ in beige; for the other half of these participants, this association was 
reversed. We chose light purple and beige on the basis of a pretest indicating both colors prompted 
neutral evaluations. The aim of this first part for those participants was to endow these two initially 
neutral colors with either negative or positive valences through their repeated association with ‗wrong‘ 
and ‗right‘. In the control condition (i.e., the ‗neutral background color valence‘ condition), the 
negative feedback label (i.e., ―wrong‖) appeared in red, while the positive feedback label (i.e., ―right‖) 
appeared in green. Hence, in the control condition, the colors beige and light purple were not endowed 
with either negative or positive valences. 
In the second part of the survey, participants rated the acceptability of either four undesirable 
or four desirable consumer behaviors (which were counterbalanced), identical to those in Study 2 (see 
again Appendix C, D, E, and F). These behaviors appeared on either beige or light purple backgrounds. 
Depending on the condition to which one was assigned in the first part of the survey, these 
backgrounds were associated with a positive, negative, or neutral valence. Participants rated the 
acceptability of the consumer behaviors on a Likert scale, ranging from ―completely unacceptable‖ (1) 
to ―completely acceptable‖ (7). After judging these behaviors, participants rated the background color 
of the scenarios (beige versus light purple) on two seven-point semantic differential scales, with the 
anchor points ―wrong‖ versus ―right‖ and ―negative‖ versus ―positive.‖  
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6.2. Results and Discussion 
 
We averaged the background color (i.e., either light purple or beige) ratings for the wrong–
right and negative–positive scales to create a color valence index (α = .75). As a manipulation check, 
we conducted an ANOVA, with behavior and background color valence as between-subjects 
independent variables. We found only a significant main effect of background color valence, F(2,210) 
= 16.29, p < .001. Colors were rated as more negative and wrong when associated with negative 
feedback (M = 3.42, SD = 1.18) than with positive feedback (M = 4.35, SD = 1.19; p < .001) or in the 
neutral condition (M = 4.00, SD = 0.34; p = .001). Further, colors were rated as more positive when 
associated with positive feedback than in the neutral condition (p = .035). Finally, the colors 
associated with the negative feedback were regarded as more negative (p < .001), the colors associated 
with the positive feedback as more positive (p = .014), and the colors used in the neutral condition as 
not different (p = .859) than the neutral midpoint of 4.  
We averaged the acceptability ratings across the four scenarios (α = .76) and subjected this 
average to a between-subjects ANOVA with behavior and background color valence as the factors. As 
in Study 2, we are interested in the overall result across the various scenarios and want to rule out 
situation specific influences. Therefore, we averaged responses across the scenarios instead of treating 
these scenarios as a within factor. 
While we obtained no main effect of background color valence, F(1,210) = 1.13, p = .325, a 
significant main effect of behavior, F(1,210) = 157.16, p < .001, showed that undesirable consumer 
behaviors were considered less acceptable (M = 4.32, SD = 1.00) than desirable ones (M = 5.92, SD = 
0.95). As shown in Figure 3, we also found a significant interaction effect between behavior and 
background color valence, F(2,210) = 10.42, p < .001. Background color valence significantly 
affected acceptability ratings of desirable consumer behaviors, F(2,110) = 3.25, p = .043. They 
appeared more acceptable in the positive feedback (M = 6.24, SD = 0.87) than in the negative (M = 
5.73, SD = 1.11; p = .021) or neutral feedback condition (M = 5.80, SD = 0.79; p = .043). We obtained 
no significant difference between the negative and the neutral feedback condition (p = .74).  
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Figure 3 
Study 3: Interaction between behavior and background color valence 
 
 
Acceptability ratings of undesirable consumer behaviors were also affected by background 
color valence, F(2,100) = 8.27, p < .001. They were regarded as more acceptable in the negative 
feedback condition (M = 4.79, SD = 1.08) than in the positive (M = 3.91, SD = 0.97 p < .001) or 
neutral feedback condition (M = 4.28, SD = 0.63; p = .034). The acceptability ratings of the 
undesirable consumer behaviors did not significantly differ between the positive and neutral feedback 
condition (p = .11).  
In summary, these results replicate those of Study 2. More specifically, undesirable behaviors 
appear more acceptable/less unacceptable when they are described with a negatively (versus 
positively) valenced background while desirable behaviors are perceived as more acceptable when 
they are described on a positively (versus negatively) valenced background. More generally, a match 
between the valence of an (un)desirable behavior and the valence of its color context results in more 
positive/less negative evaluations of the behavior.  
In contrast to Study 2, we manipulated color valence rather than relied on colors with 
established and contrasting valence associations (i.e., red and green). This makes it more likely that 
the results we obtained can be attributed to color valence and not to any other specific color 
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associations. In addition, the results of Study 3 show that the valence match effects are not limited to 
the colors red and green but extend to other colors with a definite valence. Further, by adding  neutral 
conditions (i.e., undesirable or desirable behaviors described on neutral backgrounds), this third study 
showed that the findings are due to experiencing processing fluency in case of behavior-color valence 
matches, rather than to experiencing processing difficulty in case of behavior-color valence 
mismatches (i.e., disfluency).  
 
7. General Discussion 
 
 In many situations, written communication aims to deter people from engaging in some 
unwanted behavior or to incite them to display some wanted behavior. In addition to the content of the 
message, diverse elements of the presentation may determine the effectiveness of such written 
persuasion attempts. This chapter focuses on color cues associated with the message. Various lines of 
research have documented so-called match or fit effects, but we find that a match between color cue 
valence and message valence is not always beneficial. Colors with a positive valence may help 
instigate wanted behavior, but colors with a negative valence might not reduce unwanted behavior. 
Ironically, they may even increase the prevalence of negative behaviors. 
 Findings of Study 1 showed that people evaluate illegal music downloading less negatively 
after they have read a message designed to persuade people of its unacceptability that uses a red 
(versus green) background color. Legal music downloading instead earns more positive evaluations 
when the message to persuade people of this behavior‘s acceptability uses a green (versus red) 
background color. In Study 2, we conceptually replicated these findings by describing various 
consumer behaviors instead of just legal versus illegal music downloading. The findings demonstrated 
that people rate undesirable behavior more acceptable when its description appears on a red instead of 
a green background. Desirable behavior instead gets rated as more acceptable when the description 
uses a green background rather than a red one. In Study 3, we replicated these findings by describing 
various (un)desirable consumer behaviors on a background of which the color valence had been 
manipulated through an evaluative conditioning procedure. In line with the results of Study 2, 
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undesirable behaviors are rated as more acceptable on a negative (versus positive or neutral) 
background while desirable behaviors are rated more acceptable when described on a positive (versus 
negative or neutral) background. This suggests that the obtained effects are due to processing fluency 
in case of valence matches and not to disfluency in case of valence mismatches.  
 From a practical point of view, these findings are useful for decision makers (e.g., marketers, 
policy makers) who work to improve moral judgments and behaviors. Both prevention and promotion 
campaigns should avoid colors that exhibit a negative valence; specifically, the use of the color red 
appears ill conceived for promotion and prevention campaigns. This finding is notable; it not only flies 
in the face of common intuition that predicts increased persuasion when the color cue valence matches 
the behavior valence (see our pilot study), but it also defies that the color red is beneficial because it 
may serve to draw people‘s attention. Even if decision makers prefer to use the color red as it draws 
people‘s attention, they should be aware of the fact that using this color might render undesirable 
behaviors less negative and desirable behaviors less positive.  
 Our study also contributes to extant literature in several respects. First, our results indicate that 
moral decision making is not limited to conscious, rational, deliberative thinking processes, as long 
has been suggested (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1965; Rest, 1986). By demonstrating the effect of 
irrelevant color cues on moral judgment, our findings support an emerging stream of research that 
calls for more investigation of the importance of intuitive elements and their influence on moral 
judgments (e.g., Haidt, 2001).  
 Second, in many situations, the use of the color red has positive consequences. Research 
indicates that red prompts the highest levels of perceived hazard and behavioral compliance with 
warnings (e.g., Braun & Silver, 1995; Chan & Ng, 2009). Other studies show that red enhances 
cognitive task performance (e.g., Kwallek & Lewis, 1990; Stone, 2003). Nevertheless, our findings 
warn that the use of the color red may backfire and result in negative consequences. It should be noted, 
however, that the valence associations with red and green may be culture specific (e.g., in China, red 
stands for luck). So, our interpretation only holds for cultures that view red as negative and green as 
positive.   
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 Third, literature is replete with examples of positive effects derived from a match among 
message elements. Thus beautiful endorsers are more effective in endorsing beauty products than less 
beautiful endorsers (e.g., Kahle & Homer, 1985; Kamins, 1990), and affective messages are better 
suited to change affective attitudes, whereas cognitive messages are more effective for changing 
cognitive attitudes (Mayer & Tormala, 2010). People also tend to be more persuaded by messages that 
match, rather than mismatch, their chronic self-regulatory orientation (e.g., Adams, Faseur, & Geuens, 
2011; Zhao & Pechmann, 2007). In contrast, and for the first time to the best of our knowledge, we 
find that a match may backfire in persuasive contexts. On one level, the match between color valence 
and message valence may be beneficial if it results in enhanced processing fluency. For prevention 
campaigns, however, such processing fluency may backfire when the ensuing positive affect gets 
attributed to the behavior, rather than the processing, and makes the negative behavior seem less 
unacceptable.  
 Fourth, our study extends research on fluency in several respects. Although perceptual and 
conceptual fluency are independent, distinct constructs, with their own antecedents and consequences 
(e.g., Cabeza & Ohta, 1993; Lee, 2002; Tulving & Schacter, 1990), most studies of processing fluency 
focus on perceptual fluency (i.e., ease with which people perceive and identify the physical 
characteristics of stimuli) while the number of studies on conceptual fluency is rather limited (Lee & 
Labroo, 2004). Further, our research adds to the limited literature on conceptual fluency because we 
focus on a different aspect of this type of fluency. In fact, studies on conceptual fluency mainly use 
semantic priming which is very specific. Our studies show that affective priming may also yield 
results that are compatible with conceptual fluency, which is much more general because it merely 
requires overlap in valence rather than in content.  
 Our research also extends prior literature on fluency because it shows that it not only affects 
preferences and liking judgments, which may be rather malleable (Simonson, 2008), but also more 
profound moral acceptability judgments. This answers to the call for research on the effects of fluency 
on alternative evaluative judgments (Winkielman et al., 2003). In fact, no other studies exist 
demonstrating the impact of conceptual fluency in the moral domain. In addition, while the theory on 
processing fluency assumes that fluency could render any stimulus more positive, most fluency studies 
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show effects for neutral or new stimuli, mostly perceptual ones. This paper, on the other hand, uses 
complex, linguistic stimuli with very clear valence connotations. Our results show that fluency effects 
may be more general and robust than shown in previous research, as fluency may indeed not only 
render neutral stimuli positive or negative, but also render positive and negative stimuli more 
positive/less negative. 
 Our findings are not only interesting in their own right but also support a reinterpretation of 
previous research findings, such as the notion that participants in a room with slightly dimmed lighting 
cheat more and earn more undeserved money than those in a well-lit room (Zhong, Bohns & Gino, 
2010). The authors explain these findings by means of anonymity, but they might also be evidence of 
altered moral judgments due to fluency effects. Darkness is often related to badness (Meier et al., 
2004), so a darker room could make it easier to think of behaviors related to cheating and dishonesty. 
Such fluency could prompt a sense of greater moral acceptability of these behaviors and thus increase 
the likelihood of displaying such behavior. Further research is needed to test this reinterpretation, but 
our findings imply that negative behavior might be tolerated more in the presence of negative cues. 
 
7.1. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 Ultimately, these findings raise several questions for further research. First, it is important to 
investigate to what extent our findings generalize to, among others, other cues and situations. For 
instance, it remains unclear if other negatively valenced cues (e.g., symbols, pictures) lead to similar 
valence match effects. In addition, we do not know if color cues also affect consumption experiences. 
For example, if a patient expects a cough syrup to taste bad, might this syrup taste better if the package 
uses red colors or depicts negative elements or symbols? Interesting in this particular context is the 
fact that a syrup that is expected to taste bad might actually indicates its high therapeutical quality. Or, 
what if people repeatedly are confronted with this syrup? It might be that the influence of intuitive 
feelings gets overridden by experience. It might thus be interesting to investigate to which extent the 
‗intuitive use‘ of colors triggers lasting effects on moral judgments. Furthermore, it would be valuable 
for further studies to examine to which extent our results extrapolate to other senses. At the same time, 
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future research should take a closer look at possible boundary conditions (next to the ‗experience‘ 
factor already mentioned above). For instance, drawing on previous research (Tsai & McGill, 2011), 
we might expect that the conceptual fluency effect is limited to people processing the information at 
lower (versus higher) construal levels. Further, in our studies participants merely saw 
descriptions of behaviors and had to judge their moral acceptability. Future research might 
investigate the actual effects on behavior or intentions rather than on moral acceptability 
ratings. 
 Second, drawing on affective priming, we argue that negative messages are easier to process 
in the presence of negative cues. However, in affective priming paradigms, the stimuli are very simple 
and automatically activate the associated valence. Our results suggest that affective priming effects are 
obtained for more complex stimuli too, which raises the question of how valence of complex stimuli is 
determined. A message designed to deter people from engaging in unwanted behavior by definition 
involves a negatively valenced behavior, but the message itself, by advocating an avoidance of 
something negative, seems positive. Still, prevention campaigns usually try to persuade people from 
avoiding something that they enjoy, such that they imply some restriction on individual freedom and 
thus could create a negative connotation. Additional research should investigate whether message 
valence is determined by message content or by message purpose. 
 Third, we attribute the effects we obtain to conceptual fluency, but offer no direct evidence to 
support this. Further research should test this underlying process, such as by using moderation 
mechanisms. For example, if processing speed is the primary reason, then manipulating cognitive load 
should mitigate this effect. Other methods that could provide evidence of the underlying process are 
self-reported measures of ease of processing or response time during judgment. Alternatively, a 
separate test might measure response times to related words presented against a certain background 
color that matches or mismatches the valence of these words. Such extra studies should also control 
for level of arousal to rule out that the obtained results are due to the different level of arousal colors 
might evoke rather than to their difference in valence. 
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 Finally, future studies should examine the viability of alternative explanations. Several 
alternative explanations may come to mind. First, one could argue that valence incongruency would 
result in less thorough processing, thereby resulting in less polarized judgments. This explanation, 
however, only holds for the results obtained for the desirable behavior. An explanation that proposes 
that the colors red and green may bring to mind a set of respectively negative and positive behaviors 
that serve as reference points for the judgmental behavioral stimuli and polarize evaluations in the 
mismatch conditions is inconsistent with the results obtained for desirable behaviors. A more 
challenging alternative explanation proposes that valence (in)congruency affects mood rather than 
processing fluency. In line with mood-as-information theory (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983), any mood effect may bias subsequent evaluative judgments, like the moral 
acceptability judgments in our studies. In other words, an (un)desirable behavior described on a 
background with a similar (opposite) valence might result in a positive (negative) mood which, in turn, 
results in a more positive/less negative (less positive/more negative) evaluation of the (un)desirable 
behavior. Although more research is needed to tease out the exact mechanism, for now, our studies 
show that the use of negative color cues in campaigns aimed to prevent unwanted behavior may be ill 
advised. 
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Note 
 
1 
The terms bad, negative, unwanted, undesirable, and immoral are used interchangeably in this 
chapter, and so are the terms good, positive, wanted, desirable, and moral.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
8. References 
 
Adams, L., Faseur, T., & Geuens, M. (2011). The influence of the self-regulatory focus on the 
effectiveness of stop-smoking campaigns for young smokers. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 
45(2), 275-305.  
Barsalou, L.W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645.  
Braun, C.C., & Silver, N.C. (1995). Interaction of signal word and color on warning labels: 
Differences in perceived hazard and behavioral compliance. Ergonomics, 38(11), 2207-2220. 
Cabeza, R., & Ohta, N. (1993). Dissociating conceptual priming, perceptual priming, and explicit 
memory. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 5(1), 35-53. 
Cavazza, N., Graziani, A.R., Serpe, A., & Rubichi, S. (2010). Right-wing face, left-wing face: The 
matching effect in the realm of political persuasion. Social Influence, 5(1), 1-22.  
Chan, A.H.S., & Ng, A.W.Y. (2009). Perceptions of implied hazard for visual and auditory alerting 
signals. Safety Science, 47(3), 346-352. 
Clore, G.L., Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1994). Affective causes and consequences of  
social information processing. In R.S. Wyer & T. Srull (Eds.), The handbook of social 
cognition, (2
nd
 ed., Vol 1, pp. 323-417). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
De Houwer, J. (2011). Evaluative conditioning: A review of functional knowledge and mental process 
theories. In T.R. Schachtman & S. Reilly (Eds.), Applications of learning and conditioning (pp. 
399-416). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Deng, X., Hui, S.K., & Hutchinson, J.W. (2010). Consumer preferences for color combinations: An 
empirical analysis of similarity–based color relationships. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
20(4), 476−484. 
Elliot, A.J., & Maier, M.A. (2007). Color and psychological functioning. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 16(5), 250-254. 
Elliot, A.J., Maier, M.A., Binser, M.J., Friedman, R., & Pekrun, R. (2009). The effect of red on 
avoidance behavior in achievement contexts. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(3), 
365-375. 
121 
 
Elliot, A.J., Maier, M.A., Moller, A.C., Friedman, R., & Meinhardt, J. (2007). Color and psychological 
functioning: The effect of red on performance attainment. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology—General, 136(1), 154-168. 
Fazio, R.H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview. Cognition 
and Emotion, 15(2), 115-141. 
Friedman, R.S., & Förster, J. (2002). The influence of approach and avoidance motor actions on 
creative cognition. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(1), 41-55. 
Friedman, R.S., & Förster, J. (2005). Effects of motivational cues on perceptual asymmetry: 
Implications for creativity and analytical problem solving. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 88(2), 263-275. 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral 
judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814-834.  
Hofmann, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyens, F., & Crombez, G. (2010). Evaluative  
 conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136(3), 390-421.  
Jones, T.M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue- 
 contingent model. Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 366-395.  
Kahle, L.R., & Homer, P.M. (1985). Physical attractiveness of the celebrity endorser: A social 
adaptation perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 11(4), 954-961.  
Kamins, M.A. (1990). An investigation into the ‗match-up‘ hypothesis in celebrity advertising: When 
beauty may be only skin deep. Journal of Advertising, 19(1), 4-13.  
Klauer, K.C., & Musch, J. (2003). Affective priming: Findings and theories. In J. Musch & K.C. 
Klauer (Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion (pp. 
7-49). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive developmental approach. In T. 
Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior (pp. 31-53). New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston.  
Kwallek, N., & Lewis, M. (1990). Effects of environmental color on males and females: A red or 
white or green office. Applied Ergonomics, 21(4), 275-278. 
122 
 
Lee, A.Y. (2002). Effects of implicit memory on memory-based versus stimulus-based brand choice. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 39(4), 440-454. 
Lee, A.Y., & Labroo, A.A. (2004). The effect of conceptual and perceptual fluency on brand 
evaluation. Journal of Marketing Research, 41(2), 151-165. 
Lindsey, D.T., Brown, A.M., Reijnen, E., Rich, A.N., Kuzmova, Y.I., & Wolfe, J.M. (2010). Color 
channels, not color appearance or color categories, guide visual search for desaturated color 
targets. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1208-1214.  
Mayer, N.D., & Tormala, Z.L. (2010). ―Think‖ versus ―feel‖ framing effects in persuasion. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(4), 443-454. 
Mehta, R., & Zhu, R.J. (2009). Blue or red? Exploring the effect of color on cognitive task 
performances. Science, 323(5918), 1226-1229.  
Meier, B.P., Robinson, M.D., & Clore, G.L. (2004). Why good guys wear white: Automatic inferences 
about stimulus valence based on brightness. Psychological Science, 15(2), 82-87. 
Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: The Free Press.  
Rest, J.R. (1986). Moral development: Advances in research and theory. New York: Praeger.  
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G.L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative 
and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
45(3),513-523 
Simonson, I. (2008). Will I like a ―medium‖ pillow? Another look at constructed and inherent 
preferences. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18(3), 155-169. 
Smeesters, D., & Liu, J. (2011). The effect of color (red versus blue) on assimilation versus contrast in 
prime-to-behavior effects. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(3), 653-656. 
Spruyt, A., Hermans, D., De Houwer, J., Vandromme, H., & Eelen, P. (2007). On the nature of the 
affective priming effect: Effects of stimulus onset asynchrony and congruence proportion in 
naming and evaluative categorization. Memory & Cognition, 35(1), 95–106. 
Stone, N.J. (2003). Environmental view and color for a simulated telemarketing task. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 23(1), 63-78.  
123 
 
Tsai, C.I., & McGill, A.L. (2011). No pain, no gain? How fluency and construal level affect consumer 
confidence. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(5), 807-821. 
Tulving, E., & Schacter, D.L. (1990). Priming and human memory systems. Science, 247(4940), 301-
306. 
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge,  
 England: Cambridge University Press.  
Whittlesea, B.W.A. (1993). Illusions of familiarity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19(6), 1235-1253. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., & Belli, R.F. (1998). The role of ease of retrieval and attribution in 
memory judgments—Judging your memory as worse despite recalling more events. 
Psychological Science, 9(2), 124-126. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Fazendeiro, T., & Reber, R. (2003). The hedonic marking of processing 
fluency: Implications for evaluative judgment. In J. Musch & K.C. Klauer (Eds.), The 
psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion (pp. 189-217). Mahwah, 
NJ: Erlbaum Associations, Inc. 
Zhao, G.Z., & Pechmann, C. (2007). The impact of regulatory focus on adolescents‘ response to 
antismoking advertising campaigns. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(4), 671-687. 
Zhong, C.B., Bohns, V.K., & Gino, F. (2010). Good lamps are the best police: Darkness increases 
dishonesty and self-interested behavior. Psychological Science, 21(3), 311-314. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
9. Appendices 
 
9.1. Appendix A: Messages about Illegal and Legal Music Downloading (Study 1) – Dutch  
 
 
Muziek downloaden en er niet voor betalen (illegaal downloaden dus) zorgt er voor dat: 
  • werknemers in de muziekindustrie hun job kunnen verliezen 
  • de gewone consument een meerprijs betaalt voor een CD 
  • het bijwonen van muziekoptredens niet langer betaalbaar blijft  
 
                                                    Download muziek dus niet illegaal! 
 
 
 
Muziek downloaden en ervoor betalen (legaal downloaden dus) zorgt er voor dat: 
  • werknemers in de muziekindustrie hun job kunnen behouden 
  • de gewone consument geen meerprijs betaalt voor een CD 
  • het bijwonen van muziekoptredens betaalbaar blijft 
  
                                                         Download muziek dus legaal! 
 
 
125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
9.2. Appendix B: Messages about Illegal and Legal Music Downloading (Study 1) – English  
 
 
Downloading music and not paying for it (illegal downloading) makes it such that: 
  • employees in the music industry might lose their jobs 
  • the ordinary consumer pays more for a CD 
  • attendance at music performances is no longer affordable 
 
                                                    So do not download music illegally! 
 
 
 
Downloading music and paying for it (legal downloading) makes it such that: 
  • employees in the music industry can keep their jobs 
  • the ordinary consumer does not have to pay more for a CD 
  • attendance at music performances remains affordable 
  
                                                         So download music legally! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
9.3. Appendix C: Desirable Consumer Behaviors (Study 2 – Study 3) – Dutch  
 
 
Een consument krijgt teveel wisselgeld terug aan de kassa. De consument zegt dit tegen de 
kassierster en geeft het extra wisselgeld terug. 
 
 
 
Een consument downloadt legaal muziek van het internet en koopt deze muziek dus aan.  
 
 
 
Een consument keert terug naar de supermarkt om te betalen voor een product dat de 
kassierster was vergeten aanrekenen.  
 
 
 
Een consument neemt een blikje frisdrank uit het winkelrek en drinkt het uit. Aan de kassa 
betaalt de consument voor het blikje. 
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9.4. Appendix D: Desirable Consumer Behaviors (Study 2 – Study 3) – English  
 
 
A consumer receives too much change at the checkout. The consumer mentions this to the 
cashier and gives the extra money back. 
 
 
 
A consumer legally downloads music from the Internet and thus pays for this music.  
 
 
 
A consumer returns to the supermarket to pay for an item the cashier mistakenly did not charge 
the consumer for.  
 
 
 
A consumer takes a soft drink from the store shelf and drinks it. The consumer pays for the soft 
drink at the checkout.  
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9.5. Appendix E: Undesirable Consumer Behaviors (Study 2 – Study 3) – Dutch  
 
 
Een consument krijgt teveel wisselgeld terug aan de kassa, maar zegt dit niet tegen de 
kassierster en houdt het extra wisselgeld. 
 
 
 
Een consument downloadt illegaal muziek van het internet in plaats van deze aan te kopen.  
 
 
 
Een consument keert niet terug naar de supermarkt om te betalen voor een product dat de 
kassierster was vergeten aanrekenen.  
 
 
 
Een consument neemt een blikje frisdrank uit het winkelrek en drinkt het uit zonder ervoor te 
betalen. 
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9.6. Appendix F: Undesirable Consumer Behaviors (Study 2 – Study 3) – English  
 
 
A consumer receives too much change at the checkout, but does not mention this to the cashier 
and keeps the extra money.   
 
 
 
A consumer illegally downloads music from the Internet instead of paying for this music.  
 
 
 
A consumer does not return to the supermarket to pay for an item the cashier mistakenly did 
not charge the consumer for.  
 
 
 
A consumer takes a soft drink from the store shelf and drinks it without paying for it.  
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9.7. Appendix G: Statements (Study 3) – Dutch  
 
1. De Eiffeltoren in Parijs is 317 meter hoog tot aan de top van de vlaggenstok 
2. De Belg consumeert gemiddeld 9,69 kilogram chocolade per jaar 
3. De piramide van Cheops in Egypte is 230,4 meter breed 
4. De sociale netwerksite Facebook heeft in 2009 een omzet van 800 miljoen dollar geboekt 
5. Een volwassen menselijk lichaam bevat 5 tot 6 liter bloed 
6. De slechtvalk is het snelste dier ter wereld 
7. De Nijl is de langste rivier ter wereld 
8. De hoogste snelheid ooit gehaald op een fiets is 268,831 km/uur 
9. De tulp komt oorspronkelijk uit Turkije 
10. Vrijdag de 17de is een ongeluksdag in Italië 
11. De grootste diamant is zo groot als de halve maan 
12. Olifanten zijn de enige zoogdieren die niet kunnen springen 
13. Een volgroeide beer kan even snel rennen als een paard 
14. Een mug heeft tanden 
15. Gent heeft een oppervlakte van 156,18 vierkante kilometer 
16. Bart De Wever werd geboren op 21 december 1970 
17. 1522 opvarenden van de Titanic kwamen om het leven 
18. Angelina Jolie won intussen 3 Golden Globes 
19. 74000 Belgen spreken Duits als moedertaal 
20. De Tsjechen consumeren gemiddeld genomen het meeste aantal liters bier in de wereld 
21. Chloor werd in 1774 ontdekt door Carl Scheele 
22. De Wolga is de langste rivier in Europa 
23. 11% van de totale wereldbevolking woont in Europa 
24. De Chinese Muur is 6259 kilometer lang 
25. De eerste grote rol van acteur Leonardo DiCaprio was in de televisieserie ‗Parenthood‘ 
26. De meest voorkomende naam ter wereld is Mohammed 
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27. De film ‗Jurassic Park‘ is gebaseerd op het gelijknamige boek van Michael Chrichton 
28. Er werden reeds 273 afleveringen opgenomen van de reeks FC De Kampioenen 
29. Studio Brussel zond voor de eerste keer uit op 1 april 1983 
30. Svetlana Medvedeva is de vrouw van de Russische president  
31. De Belgische voetbalclub RSC Anderlecht werd opgericht op 29 mei 1908 
32. Potvissen kunnen tot 3000 meter diepte duiken 
33. Kamelen hebben drie oogleden om hun ogen te beschermen tegen het opvliegende zand 
34. ‗Marie‘ is momenteel de populairste voornaam voor pasgeboren meisjes in Vlaanderen  
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9.8. Appendix H: Statements (Study 3) – English  
 
1. The Eiffel Tower in Paris is 317 metres high up to the flagpole 
2. A Belgian consumes 9.69 kilograms of chocolate on average per year  
3. The Cheops Pyramid in Egypt is 230.4 metres wide 
4. The social network site Facebook had a turnover of 800 million dollars in 2009 
5. An adult human body contains 5 to 6 litres of blood 
6. The peregrine is the fastest animal in the world 
7. The Nile is the longest river in the world 
8. The biggest speed one ever reached on a bike is 268.831 kilometres per hour 
9. The Tulip originates from Turkey 
10. Friday the 17th is considered to be an unlucky day in Italy  
11. The biggest diamond is as big as half the moon 
12. Elephants are the only mammals who cannot jump 
13. A full-grown bear can run as fast as a horse 
14. A mosquito has teeth  
15. Ghent has a surface of 156.18 square kilometre 
16. Bart De Wever was born on the 21st of December 1970 
17. 1522 passengers died on the Titanic 
18. Angelina Jolie won already 3 Golden Globes  
19. 74000 Belgians are native speakers of German 
20. Czech consume the highest amount of litres beer on average in the world 
21. Chlorine was discovered by Carl Scheele in 1774 
22. The Wolga is the longest river in Europe 
23. 11 percent of the total world population lives in Europe 
24. The Chinese Wall is 6259 kilometres in length  
25. The first big role of actor Leonardo DiCaprio was in the television serial ‗Parenthood‘ 
26. The most widespread name in the world is Mohammed 
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27. The movie ‗Jurassic Park‘ is based on the novel of the same name written by Michael 
Chrichton 
28. Already 273 episodes of the television serial FC De Kampioenen are recorded 
29. Studio Brussel broadcasted first on the 1st of April 1983 
30. Svetlana Medvedeva is the wife of the Russian president  
31. The Belgian football club RSC Anderlecht was founded on the 29th of May 1908 
32. Sperm whales are able to dive at a depth of 3000 metres 
33. Camels have three eyelids to protect their eyes against up flying sand 
34. ‗Marie‘ is, on this moment, the most popular first name for newborn baby girls in 
Flanders    
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Chapter 4: 
Double Standards: The Role of Techniques of Neutralization 
 
1. Abstract 
 
Previous research shows that consumers use double standards. That is, consumers evaluate 
unethical business actions as more unacceptable compared to similar consumer actions. Double 
standards are often quoted as a major stream in ethical literature, though research dealing with this 
topic remains scarce. Among others, little is known about the process(es) underlying these double 
standards. The purpose of the study reported in this chapter is to investigate whether the ‗techniques of 
neutralization‘ could provide a meaningful way of approaching the double standard phenomenon. 
Findings indicate that the higher the extent to which people agree with arguments explaining away the 
misbehavior enacted by consumers or businesses (i.e., a higher extent of neutralization), the more they 
tolerate these behaviors. Further, findings show that the same respondents who justify questionable 
consumer actions to a certain degree, condone the same misbehaviors enacted by businesses to a much 
lesser extent. In this way, the techniques of neutralization concern a valuable approach to explain the 
double standard phenomenon. 
 
Keywords:  consumer ethics, business ethics, corporate ethics, double standards, ethical beliefs, 
moral hypocrisy, neutralization techniques 
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2. Introduction  
 
A growing number of studies deals with perceptions of unethical consumer and corporate
1
 
practices (e.g., Alexander, 2002; Chiou & Pan, 2008; Ingram, Skinner, & Taylor, 2005; Vitell, Singh, 
& Paolillo, 2007). Nevertheless, research examining the apparent double standard existing between 
what consumers perceive as acceptable consumer behavior and what they believe is acceptable 
corporate behavior, remains scarce. Contradictory, double standards are often quoted as a major 
stream in ethical literature (e.g., Rallapalli, Vitell, Wiebe, & Barnes, 1994; Rawwas, Vitell, & Al-
Khatib, 1994; Vitell, Lumpkin & Rawwas, 1991; Vitell & Muncy, 1992). Previous studies indicate 
that consumers evaluate unethical business actions as more unacceptable compared to similar 
consumer actions (e.g., DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). One of the remaining 
questions concerns possible explanations for the use of these double standards. Only after having an 
idea about the explanatory factors associated with the use of double standards, one can become 
concerned with influencing or changing this phenomenon. The purpose of the present study is to gain 
a better understanding of double standards. More specifically, we examine whether the techniques of 
neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957) could provide a meaningful way of approaching this 
phenomenon. 
 
3. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis  
 
3.1. Double Standards  
 
Business literature suggests that individuals judge the misbehavior of businesses (or their 
representatives) more harshly than similar behavior of individual consumers. A study by Wilkes 
(1978), for example, reflects this idea of consumers tending to hold business to a higher standard than 
they themselves are willing to follow. More specifically, he investigates consumers‘ judgments 
concerning how wrong certain consumer activities are. Even when consumers disapprove of engaging 
in certain questionable activities, they still tolerate some of these. Consumers generally justify these 
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‗points of tolerance‘ using arguments that business rather than the consumer is at fault. Drucker (1981) 
maintains that a double standard is implicit in the treatment of ‗business ethics‘ and ‗business social 
responsibility‘ as topics separate from ethics in general. Specifically, he argues that ‗business ethics‘ 
means holding business to a different (i.e., higher) standard of conduct than ‗ordinary people‘. 
In order to demonstrate a double standard empirically, DePaulo (1985) conducts a telephone 
survey in which respondents have to indicate whether they feel that similar misconduct of a 
salesperson and a consumer is wrong. Results show that 8 percent openly admits to a double standard 
by maintaining that deception is wrong for the salesperson but not for the customer. DePaulo (1987) 
argues that this 8 percent figure probably underestimates the prevalence of double standards, because 
respondents holding double standards may realize their inconsistency and find it embarrassing, or 
because the study does not investigate the degree of perceived wrongness. In trying to avoid these 
problems, a follow-up study (DePaulo, 1987) uses a between-groups design involving two versions of 
an anonymous questionnaire where subjects have to evaluate an automobile salesperson or a customer 
using similar deceptive bargaining tactics. Results indicate that consumers are more critical of sellers 
who engage in unethical behavior than they are of buyers who engage in the same practices. 
Vermeir and Van Kenhove (2008) recently confirm the previous work of DePaulo (1985, 
1987) by showing that consumers have a double standard when it comes to their own unethical 
behavior compared to that of businesses. More specifically, respondents evaluate unethical corporate 
actions as more unacceptable compared to similar consumer actions. Further, their study explores the 
role of gender in double standards and shows that women use less double standards compared to men.  
 
3.2. Techniques of Neutralization  
 
The ‗techniques of neutralization‘ originate from social disorganization and deviance 
literature, and more specifically the work of Sykes and Matza (1957). These techniques of 
neutralization are rationalizations one might use to justify non-normative behavior. Consumers can 
explain away negative consumer or corporate behavior by invoking five distinct techniques 
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representing various motives that can insulate these misbehaving consumers or corporations from any 
blame (cf. Strutton, Vitell, & Pelton, 1994). 
The first technique, ‗denial of responsibility‘, is a circumstance in which individuals argue that 
consumers or corporations are not accountable for their norm-violating actions because factors beyond 
their control are operating. A typical example might be: ‗It‘s not the consumer‘s/corporation‘s fault, 
the consumer/corporation had no other choice‘. Concerning the second technique, ‗denial of injury‘, 
individuals contend that the consumer or corporate misbehavior is not really serious because no party 
suffers directly as a result of it. One might argue: ‗What‘s the big deal? No one was hurt‘. Using a 
‗denial of victim‘ rationalization means that individuals counter any blame for consumer or business 
misactions by arguing that the violated party deserves whatever injury they received. One might 
comment: ‗If they‘re foolish enough to believe that, it‘s their own fault they were taken advantage of‘. 
‗Condemning the condemners‘ refers to individuals deflecting moral condemnation to those ridiculing 
consumers or corporations by pointing out that they engage in similar misbehavior. A typical response 
might be: ‗The consumer/company was only doing what other consumers/companies do all the time‘. 
Concerning the last technique of neutralization, ‗appeal to higher loyalties‘, individuals argue that the 
questionable consumer or corporate behavior is the by-product of the consumer‘s/corporation‘s 
attempt to actualize a higher order ideal or value (whether this ideal or value refers to one‘s own or 
others‘ ‗benefit‘). A comment may be: ‗To some what the consumer/business did may appear wrong, 
but the consumer/business did it for his or her family/employees‘. 
When individuals need to evaluate unethical consumer or corporate practices, they might use 
these various neutralization techniques. In other words, they could render behavioral norms 
inoperative, thereby freeing the respective consumers or businesses from engaging in behavior which 
one would otherwise consider as deviant. If one lowers or removes the societal norms prohibiting 
unethical behavior in a given setting by means of these techniques, any feeling that consumers or 
businesses are doing wrong will be dampened. Consequently, the greater the extent to which people 
neutralize when judging questionable consumer or corporate practices (as a means of reducing 
culpability stemming from this norm violation enacted by consumers or businesses), the more tolerant 
the evaluation of these consumer and corporate misactions will be. In other words, we expect that the 
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extent to which consumers neutralize relates positively to their evaluation of unethical practices 
enacted by a consumer or a corporation (representative). That is, the more people neutralize, the more 
they tolerate questionable (consumer or corporate) practices.  
People are capable of engaging in unethical acts. At the same time, using neutralization 
techniques enables them to get rid of any feeling of responsibility or blame for these acts. Previous 
research shows that this ‗moral leniency‘ extends beyond the self when evaluating moral 
transgressions conducted by in-group members compared to out-group members (Valdesolo & 
DeSteno, 2007). Based on and extending this previous finding, we hypothesize that consumers‘ own 
‗moral mildness‘ extrapolates to some extent toward other consumers‘ (cf. in-group) moral 
transgressions, but not to the same extent toward corporations‘ (cf. out-group)  transgressions. In other 
words, we expect that consumers engage in more consciously motivated reasoning when judging 
transgressions of other consumers, while these motivated reasoning processes do not, or to a lesser 
extent, come into play when judging businesses‘ violations. So briefly stated, we expect that 
consumers will be less likely to neutralize when evaluating unethical corporate acts compared to 
unethical consumer acts.  
The above reasoning is actually supported by what previous research (DePaulo, 1987; Vermeir 
& Van Kenhove, 2008) implied but never investigated: The same respondents who justify their own 
questionable actions and those of other consumers to a certain extent presumably condone the same 
mistreatment instigated by businesses to a much lesser degree. Taking into account the previously 
noted idea of a positive relationship between neutralization and moral judgments, this difference in the 
extent of neutralization is expected to result in a difference in consumers‘ evaluations of similar 
unethical consumer and corporate practices (i.e., the double standard phenomenon). Consequently, we 
believe the techniques of neutralization to be a process giving an explanation of why consumers judge 
similar unethical behaviors as more unacceptable when a corporation rather than a consumer engages 
in them. In other words, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis:  Consumers neutralize to a higher extent when judging unethical consumer practices 
than when judging similar unethical corporate practices. 
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4. Methodology: Sample and Measures  
 
The total sample consists of 278 university students, aged between 18 and 27 (M = 20.77, SD 
= 1.84), of which 160 (57.6%) are female and 118 (42.4%) are male. Participants completing the 
anonymous self-administered online questionnaire have to read five scenarios, of which we randomize 
the order of appearance, depicting questionable practices. Five dimensions of the Consumer Ethics 
Scale (i.e., ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘, ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘, 
‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘, ‗no harm/no foul‘, and ‗downloading 
copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods‘; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005; 
see Chapter 1: Introduction) form the basis for these scenarios.  
We create two versions of our questionnaire: one version asks respondents to make judgments 
of unethical actions enacted by a corporation, the other version asks respondents‘ opinion about 
exactly the same actions but enacted by a consumer (see Appendix A for the original Dutch scenarios 
and Appendix B for the English translation of these scenarios). About half of the respondents complete 
the ‗consumer version‘ [N = 145 or 52.2%; 83 females (57.2%) and 62 males (42.8%)], the other half 
completes the ‗corporation version‘ [N = 133 or 47.8%; 77 females (57.9%) and 56 males (42.1%)]. 
We use this between-groups design to avoid the problem of respondents being unwilling to admit their 
inconsistency when using double standards (DePaulo, 1987). 
After each scenario, respondents have to read five statements reflecting specific techniques of 
neutralization offering potential justification for the consumer‘s or corporation‘s misbehavior as 
depicted in the scenario. Each item addresses the domain of one of the five neutralization techniques 
as one might use in that particular situation (i.e., denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of 
victim, condemning the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties). The two versions of the questionnaire 
state identical techniques of neutralization after similar scenarios (see Appendix A for the original 
Dutch items and Appendix B for the English translation of these items). As they read each statement, 
respondents provide their level of (dis)agreement on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from (1) 
‗totally disagree‘ to (7) ‗totally agree‘ that the circumstances described within a given item explain 
away the consumer‘s or corporation‘s misaction (Strutton, Pelton, & Ferrell, 1997; Strutton et al., 
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1994). For example, in case of the scenario in which a consumer or business company downloads 
(copyrighted) software without paying for it, the ‗condemning the condemners‘ item states the 
following: ‗The company/consumer should not be blamed for this action because other 
companies/consumers also do this‘.  
The reliabilities of the five neutralization items for each of the five scenarios depicting 
questionable actions, split up for the two versions (i.e., consumer version and corporation version) of 
our questionnaire, are as follows: ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ (consumer version: α = 
.80; corporation version: α = .83), ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ (consumer version: α 
= .76; corporation version: α = .76), ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ 
(consumer version: α = .76; corporation version: α = .81), ‗no harm/no foul‘ (consumer version: α = 
.64; corporation version: α = .69), and ‗downloading copyrighted materials/ buying counterfeit goods‘ 
(consumer version: α = .76; corporation version: α = .71). So for instance, the reliability score for the 
five different neutralization items after the ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities consumer 
scenario is .80. The authors sum the five different rationalization items after each (consumer or 
corporation) scenario to come up with one single numeric value representing the extent of 
neutralization for each of the five scenarios depicting questionable consumer or corporate practices. 
After clarifying their (dis)agreement with the different rationalization items, participants have 
to indicate how acceptable they believe the depicted practice to be on a seven-point Likert scale with 
higher scores indicating a more tolerant judgment. We repeat this procedure for all five scenarios that 
each respondent has to read.  
 
5. Results  
 
The results of a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with ‗version‘ (consumer 
versus corporation) as between-subjects independent variable and the evaluations of the five 
questionable practices as dependent variables reveal a significant main effect of ‗version‘, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .63, F(5,272) = 31.59, p < .001. More specifically, findings show that consumers are more 
intolerant toward questionable corporate practices compared to questionable consumer practices.  
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Respondents perceive the business misactions more negatively compared to similar 
questionable consumer practices, denoting a double standard for four out of five scenarios (see Table 
1): ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ (passive), ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or 
questionable) practices‘ (active/ legal), ‗no harm/no foul‘ (no harm), and ‗downloading copyrighted 
materials/buying counterfeit goods‘ (downloading). Respondents‘ perceptions of the ‗actively 
benefiting from illegal activities‘ scenario (active/illegal) are not significantly different between the 
two versions.  
 
Table 1 
Mean values and standard deviations of evaluations of five consumer or corporation scenarios 
 Double standard test  
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133) 
p-value 
 M SD M SD 
Active/illegal 3.08 1.22 3.10 1.22 .92 
Passive 4.02 1.53 2.22 1.07 .00 
Active/legal 3.61 1.24 2.77 1.23 .00 
No harm 4.55 1.26 4.20 1.20 .02 
Downloading 3.99 1.37 3.35 1.16 .00 
 
Legend 
 
Active/illegal: Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
―A consumer/company returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. However, the 
damage was the fault of the consumer/company and not of the supplier.‖ 
 
Passive:  Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
―A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a consumer/company. However, 
by inattention, the company pays 60 euros. The consumer/company notices this, but doesn‘t 
say anything and keeps the extra 20 euros.‖ 
 
Active/legal: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
―A consumer/company doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer about the 
price of a new vehicle.‖ 
 
No harm: No harm/no foul 
―During some weeks, a consumer/company negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the plans 
for a new accommodation, although the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about 
the cooperation with the firm and, maybe, will shrug off the building plan.‖ 
 
Downloading: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
―A consumer/company downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its computers 
without paying for it.‖  
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As previous research indicates gender differences in double standards (Vermeir & Van 
Kenhove, 2008), we want to check the role of gender by adding this variable as a between-subjects 
factor and running a new MANOVA. Neither the main effect of gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .97, 
F(5,270) = 1.53, p > .05, nor the interaction of version with gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F(5,270) = 
.96, p > .05, is significant. 
To test the idea formulated in the theoretical background section that the extent to which 
consumers neutralize in case of specific consumer or corporate questionable practices relates 
positively to their judgments of these practices, we conduct five separate regression analyses² for each 
version of the questionnaire with the extent of neutralization as independent variable and the 
evaluation of each of these five (consumer or corporate) scenarios as dependent variable. Tables 2a-2e 
give an overview of the results of these analyses. Each table represent one dimension of the Consumer 
Ethics Scale (i.e., ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ (active/illegal), ‗passively benefiting at 
the expense of others‘ (passive), ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ 
(active/legal), ‗no harm/no foul‘ (no harm), and ‗downloading copyrighted materials/buying 
counterfeit goods‘ (downloading); Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005). These tables 
clearly indicate that respondents‘ level of neutralization significantly explains their perception of the 
morally dubious consumer and corporate practices. The signs of the respective β-weights are all in the 
expected direction (i.e., positive) for both versions of our questionnaire. That is, the more respondents 
neutralize, the more likely they are to tolerate these questionable consumer and corporate practices.  
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Table 2a 
Results of regression analyses – Active/illegal 
 
  Dependent variable: Active/illegal 
NT consumer .62*** 
NT corporation .68*** 
R² consumer .38 
R² corporation .47 
F-value consumer 88.70*** 
F-value corporation 114.96*** 
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Active/illegal: Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
 
―A consumer/company returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. However, the 
damage was the fault of the consumer/company and not of the supplier.‖ 
 
NT consumer: Extent of neutralization in case of consumer scenario  
 
NT corporation: Extent of neutralization in case of corporation scenario 
 
NT:  Mean score of the following five neutralization items: 
 
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
 
- because the products of the supplier often seem to be of low quality anyway (denial of 
responsibility) 
 
- because the supplier does not suffer by one exchanged product (denial of injury) 
 
- because the supplier wants to take back the product without tracing who‘s to blame for the 
damage. That‘s his problem (denial of victim) 
 
- because other consumers/companies act in similar ways. Why wouldn‘t this consumer/ 
company be allowed to do so? (condemning the condemners) 
 
- because he/she/the company only wants to possess the best materials (appeal to higher 
loyalties)‖ 
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Table 2b 
Results of regression analyses – Passive 
 
  Dependent variable: Passive 
NT consumer .66*** 
NT corporation .74*** 
R² consumer .43 
R² corporation .55 
F-value consumer 107.84*** 
F-value corporation 160.05*** 
***p < .001 
 
 Legend 
 
Passive:  Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
 
―A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a consumer/company. However, 
by inattention, the company pays 60 euros. The consumer/company notices this, but doesn‘t 
say anything and keeps the extra 20 euros.‖ 
 
NT consumer: Extent of neutralization in case of consumer scenario  
 
NT corporation: Extent of neutralization in case of corporation scenario 
 
NT:  Mean score of the following five neutralization items: 
 
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
 
- if the consumer/company wants to repay the money, but does not have the time to do so 
(denial of responsibility) 
 
- because keeping the extra 20 euros is totally not severe and causes damage to nobody 
(denial of injury) 
 
- because the company should have paid more attention to how much money they repaid, 
that‘s not the fault of the consumer/company (denial of victim) 
 
- because other consumers/companies would keep the money too (condemning the 
condemners) 
 
- if the extra money supports a good cause (appeal to higher loyalties)‖ 
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Table 2c 
Results of regression analyses – Active/legal 
 
  Dependent variable: Active/legal 
NT consumer .63*** 
NT corporation .77*** 
R² consumer .40 
R² corporation .59 
F-value consumer 93.98*** 
F-value corporation 187.10*** 
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Active/legal: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
 
―A consumer/company doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer about the 
price of a new vehicle.‖ 
 
NT consumer: Extent of neutralization in case of consumer scenario  
 
NT corporation: Extent of neutralization in case of corporation scenario 
 
NT:  Mean score of the following five neutralization items: 
 
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
 
- in case the consumer/company would not be able to afford such an acquisition in any way 
(denial of responsibility) 
 
- because the car dealer does not suffer by this action (denial of injury) 
 
- as the car dealer himself/herself is responsible to check the verity of this information. It‘s 
the fault of the car dealer himself/herself (denial of victim) 
 
- because also other consumers/companies not always tell the truth when negotiating 
(condemning the condemners) 
 
- if the consumer/company would otherwise get money problems (appeal to higher 
loyalties)‖ 
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Table 2d 
Results of regression analyses – No harm 
 
  Dependent variable: No harm 
NT consumer .62*** 
NT corporation .55*** 
R² consumer .38 
R² corporation .30 
F-value consumer 88.72*** 
F-value corporation 56.48*** 
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
No harm: No harm/no foul 
 
―During some weeks, a consumer/company negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the plans 
for a new accommodation, although the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about 
the cooperation with the firm and, maybe, will shrug off the building plan.‖ 
 
NT consumer: Extent of neutralization in case of consumer scenario  
 
NT corporation: Extent of neutralization in case of corporation scenario 
 
NT:  Mean score of the following five neutralization items: 
 
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
 
- if the consumer/company has no other option than maybe shrugging off the building plan 
due to external factors (denial of responsibility) 
 
- as it causes no damage to the architect‘s firm to negotiate during some weeks, even if the 
consumer/company is not yet completely sure about the cooperation with that firm (denial 
of injury) 
 
- because such a firm had to make a contract to ensure the cooperation (denial of victim) 
 
- because other consumers/companies act in similar ways. Why wouldn‘t this 
consumer/company be allowed to do so? (condemning the condemners) 
 
- if the consumer/company strives for the best offer in the interest of its immediate vicinity 
(appeal to higher loyalties)‖ 
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Table 2e 
Results of regression analyses – Downloading 
 
  Dependent variable: Downloading 
NT consumer .58*** 
NT corporation .66*** 
R² consumer .33 
R² corporation .44 
F-value consumer 72.04*** 
F-value corporation 103.30*** 
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Downloading: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
 
―A consumer/company downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its computers 
without paying for it.‖  
 
NT consumer: Extent of neutralization in case of consumer scenario  
 
NT corporation: Extent of neutralization in case of corporation scenario 
 
NT:  Mean score of the following five neutralization items: 
 
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
 
- if the consumer/company had no other option to obtain the software due to external factors 
(denial of responsibility) 
 
- because software companies earn enough money and do not suffer by downloading 
without paying for it (denial of injury) 
 
- because the software business shouldn‘t ask so much money to obtain their software 
(denial of victim) 
 
- because other consumers/companies also do this (condemning the condemners) 
 
- as knowledge development is a basic right (appeal to higher loyalties)‖ 
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Next to using an average neutralization score, we want to take into consideration the five 
distinct forms of neutralization (i.e., ‗denial of responsibility‘, ‗denial of injury‘, ‗denial of victim‘, 
‗condemning the condemners‘, and ‗appeal to higher loyalties‘). This might give us an idea about 
whether some neutralization techniques are more important than others in explaining the moral 
acceptability scores. Consequently, we repeat the above analyses with the distinct neutralization items. 
Tables 3a-3e represent – for each scenario (i.e., for each dimension of the Consumer Ethics Scale used 
in this study (i.e., ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ (active/illegal), ‗passively benefiting at 
the expense of others‘ (passive), ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ 
(active/legal), ‗no harm/no foul‘ (no harm), and ‗downloading copyrighted materials/buying 
counterfeit goods‘ (downloading)) – the results of the regression analyses between the separate 
neutralization items and the evaluation of the questionable consumer or corporate actions depicted in 
these respective scenarios. To illustrate, Table 3b shows that the regression coefficient for the 
relationship between the (extent to which respondents agree with the) ‗denial of injury‘ statement and 
the evaluation of the ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ consumer misaction is equal to .63. 
The results of these extra analyses confirm what we already found. More specifically, the extent to 
which respondents agree with the various neutralization items relates positively to their judgment of 
the respective misactions. Further, these findings show no specific pattern in terms of which 
neutralization technique is systematically more or less salient in explaining the state of the double 
standards. 
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Table 3a 
Results of regression analyses – Active/illegal 
 
  Dependent variables 
  DOR DOI DOV CTC ATHL 
      
β (consumer) .41*** .63*** .48*** .35*** .43*** 
β (corporation) .62*** .60*** .51*** .46*** .44*** 
R² consumer .17 .39 .23 .12 .18 
R² corporation .39 .36 .26 .21 .19 
F-value consumer 29.45*** 91.91*** 43.43*** 20.04*** 31.97*** 
F-value corporation 82.36*** 73.12*** 46.76*** 35.06*** 31.41*** 
      
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Active/illegal: Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
―A consumer/company returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. However, the 
damage was the fault of the consumer/company and not of the supplier.‖ 
 
DOR:   Denial of responsibility: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because 
the products of the supplier often seem to be of low quality anyway‖ 
 
DOI:   Denial of injury: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the 
supplier does not suffer by one exchanged product‖  
 
DOV:   Denial of victim: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the 
supplier wants to take back the product without tracing who‘s to blame for the damage. That‘s 
his problem‖ 
 
CTC:   Condemning the condemners: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action 
because other consumers/companies act in similar ways. Why wouldn‘t this consumer/ 
company be allowed to do so?‖ 
 
ATHL:   Appeal to higher loyalties: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action 
because he/she/the company only wants to possess the best materials‖ 
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Table 3b 
Results of regression analyses – Passive 
 
  Dependent variables 
  DOR DOI DOV CTC ATHL 
      
β (consumer) .31*** .63*** .62*** .46*** .32*** 
β (corporation) .41*** .62*** .67*** .59*** .45*** 
R² consumer .10 .39 .38 .22 .10 
R² corporation .17 .39 .44 .34 .20 
F-value consumer 15.15*** 92.27*** 88.33*** 39.05*** 16.06*** 
F-value corporation 26.58*** 83.70*** 104.06*** 68.44*** 33.38*** 
      
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Passive:  Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
―A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a consumer/company. However, 
by inattention, the company pays 60 euros. The consumer/company notices this, but doesn‘t 
say anything and keeps the extra 20 euros.‖ 
 
DOR:   Denial of responsibility: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the 
consumer/company wants to repay the money, but does not have the time to do so‖ 
  
DOI:   Denial of injury: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because 
keeping the extra 20 euros is totally not severe and causes damage to nobody‖ 
   
DOV:  Denial of victim: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the 
company should have paid more attention to how much money they repaid, that‘s not the fault 
of the consumer/company‖ 
 
CTC:   Condemning the condemners: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action 
because other consumers/companies would keep the money too‖ 
 
ATHL:   Appeal to higher loyalties: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the 
extra money supports a good cause‖ 
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Table 3c 
Results of regression analyses – Active/legal 
 
  Dependent variables 
  DOR DOI DOV CTC ATHL 
      
β (consumer) .55*** .48*** .41*** .36*** .45*** 
β (corporation) .68*** .59*** .55*** .46*** .62*** 
R² consumer .31 .23 .17 .13 .20 
R² corporation .46 .34 .31 .21 .39 
F-value consumer 63.11*** 41.61*** 29.05*** 20.77*** 35.63*** 
F-value corporation 111.73*** 68.54*** 57.54*** 35.08*** 82.93*** 
      
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Active/legal: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
―A consumer/company doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer about the 
price of a new vehicle.‖ 
 
DOR:  Denial of responsibility: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action in case 
the consumer/company would not be able to afford such an acquisition in any way‖ 
 
DOI:   Denial of injury: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the car 
dealer does not suffer by this action‖ 
 
DOV:  Denial of victim: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action as the car 
dealer himself/herself is responsible to check the verity of this information. It‘s the fault of the 
car dealer himself/herself‖ 
 
CTC:   Condemning the condemners: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action 
because also other consumers/companies not always tell the truth when negotiating ― 
 
ATHL:   Appeal to higher loyalties: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the 
consumer/company would otherwise get money problems‖ 
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Table 3d 
Results of regression analyses – No harm 
 
  Dependent variables 
  DOR DOI DOV CTC ATHL 
 
β (consumer) 
 
.24** 
 
.54*** 
 
.45*** 
 
.32*** 
 
.45*** 
β (corporation) .28** .42*** .51*** .22* .43*** 
R² consumer .06 .29 .20 .10 .20 
R² corporation .08 .17 .26 .05 .19 
F-value consumer 8.84** 58.15*** 36.50*** 15.84 35.43*** 
F-value corporation 10.99** 27.61*** 44.82*** 6.35* 30.27*** 
           
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Legend 
 
No harm: No harm/no foul 
―During some weeks, a consumer/company negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the plans 
for a new accommodation, although the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about 
the cooperation with the firm and, maybe, will shrug off the building plan.‖ 
 
DOR:  Denial of responsibility: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the 
consumer/company has no other option than maybe shrugging off the building plan due to 
external factors‖ 
  
DOI:   Denial of injury: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action as it causes no 
damage to the architect‘s firm to negotiate during some weeks, even if the consumer/company 
is not yet completely sure about the cooperation with that firm‖ 
 
DOV:  Denial of victim: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because such a 
firm had to make a contract to ensure the cooperation‖ 
 
CTC:   Condemning the condemners: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action 
because other consumers/companies act in similar ways. Why wouldn‘t this 
consumer/company be allowed to do so?‖ 
 
ATHL:   Appeal to higher loyalties: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the 
consumer/company strives for the best offer in the interest of its immediate vicinity‖ 
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Table 3e 
Results of regression analyses – Downloading 
 
  Dependent variables 
  DOR DOI DOV CTC ATHL 
 
β (consumer) 
 
.37*** 
 
.43*** 
 
.44*** 
 
.36*** 
 
.44*** 
β (corporation) .28*** .56*** .49*** .44*** .54*** 
R² consumer .14 .18 .19 .13 .19 
R² corporation .08 .31 .24 .19 .29 
F-value consumer 22.90*** 32.31*** 33.44*** 20.87*** 34.05*** 
F-value corporation 11.27*** 58.67*** 41.67*** 31.45*** 52.78*** 
           
***p < .001 
 
Legend 
 
Downloading: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
―A consumer/company downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its computers 
without paying for it.‖ 
 
DOR:  Denial of responsibility: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the 
consumer/company had no other option to obtain the software due to external factors‖ 
 
DOI:   Denial of injury: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because 
software companies earn enough money and do not suffer by downloading without paying for 
it‖ 
 
DOV:  Denial of victim: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the 
software business shouldn‘t ask so much money to obtain their software‖ 
 
CTC:   Condemning the condemners: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action 
because other consumers/companies also do this‖ 
 
ATHL:   Appeal to higher loyalties: ―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action as 
knowledge development is a basic right‖ 
 
The MANOVA testing the effect of ‗version‘ (consumer versus corporation) on the extent of 
neutralization after each of the five scenarios (i.e., the dependent variables) clearly shows that  
respondents neutralize to a higher extent when judging unethical consumer practices compared to 
unethical corporate practices, Wilks’ Lambda = .63, F(5,272) = 32.55, p < .001. Hence, consumers 
explain away consumers‘ questionable actions with a certain degree, but condone the same 
mistreatment instigated by businesses to a much lesser extent. Findings confirm our central hypothesis 
for four out of five scenarios (see Table 4): ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ (passive), 
‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ (active/legal), ‗no harm/no foul‘ (no 
harm), and ‗downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods‘ (downloading). The degree 
to which respondents justify the questionable practices in case of the ‗actively benefiting from illegal 
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activities‘ scenario (active/illegal) does not significantly differ between the consumer and corporation 
version. This is also the scenario for which we do not find a double standard.  
 
Table 4 
Mean values and standard deviations of extent of neutralization in case of five consumer or 
corporation scenarios 
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133) 
p-value 
 M SD M SD 
Active/illegal 2.94 1.13 2.85 1.15 .53 
Passive 3.70 1.23 2.18 .97 .00 
Active/legal 3.53 1.10 2.61 1.07 .00 
No harm 4.54 .94 4.30 1.00 .04 
Downloading 4.04 1.17 3.40 1.05 .00 
 
Legend 
 
Active/illegal: Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
―A consumer/company returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. However, the 
damage was the fault of the consumer/company and not of the supplier.‖ 
 
Passive:  Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
―A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a consumer/company. However, 
by inattention, the company pays 60 euros. The consumer/company notices this, but doesn‘t 
say anything and keeps the extra 20 euros.‖ 
 
Active/legal: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
―A consumer/company doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer about the 
price of a new vehicle.‖ 
 
No harm: No harm/no foul 
―During some weeks, a consumer/company negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the plans 
for a new accommodation, although the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about 
the cooperation with the firm and, maybe, will shrug off the building plan.‖ 
 
Downloading: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
―A consumer/company downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its computers 
without paying for it.‖ 
 
To examine whether there are any gender differences in the use of the neutralization 
techniques (in case of the various unethical consumer and/or corporate scenarios), we conduct a new 
MANOVA and add gender as a between-subjects factor. Results show neither a significant main effect 
of gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F(5,270) = 1.28, p > .05, nor a significant interaction of version with 
gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .96, F(5,270) = 2.10, p > .05. 
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We again want to take into account the distinct forms of neutralization with regard to our 
central hypothesis. Therefore, we repeat these respective analyses with the distinct neutralization 
items. Tables 5a-5e show for each dimension of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005) used in this study (i.e., ‗actively benefiting from illegal activities‘ 
(active/illegal), ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ (passive), ‗actively benefiting from 
deceptive (or questionable) practices‘ (active/legal), ‗no harm/no foul‘ (no harm), and ‗downloading 
copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods‘ (downloading)) the results of the MANOVA testing 
the effect of ‗version‘ (consumer versus corporation) on the extent to which respondents agree with 
each of the neutralization items (i.e., denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, 
condemning the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties). Results show again no specific pattern in 
terms of which kind of neutralization technique is more or less salient in explaining the state of the 
double standards.  
One can notice that only the ‗condemning the condemners‘ neutralization technique generates 
a significant difference between the consumer and corporation version in case of the ‗no harm/no foul‘ 
dimension. This latter ‗no harm/no foul‘ dimension consists of actions that consumers consider as 
being permissible as they cause little or no harm (e.g., trying out clothing for two hours and, finally, 
not buying anything). Consequently, consumers might be likely to engage in these actions from time 
to time and believe that others also engage in this type of behavior at a regular base. This reasoning 
makes the above finding (i.e., only a significant difference for the condemning the condemners 
technique) concerning the ‗no harm/no foul‘ dimension understandable. More specifically, it is more 
likely that people explain away negative behavior included in the no harm/no foul dimension by 
referring to neutralization techniques belonging to the condemning the condemners type as such 
techniques refer to the fact that the misbehavior is not wrong as others also regularly engage in this 
behavior.  
Further, results indicate that for the dimensions depicting moderate questionable behavior (i.e., 
‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ and ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or 
questionable) practices‘), respondents consistently use all of the five neutralization techniques 
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significantly more in case of the consumer (versus corporation) version. Saliency of one specific form 
of neutralization is thus out of the question in comparing these consumer versus corporate scenarios. 
 
Table 5a 
Mean values and standard deviations for neutralization items in case of active/illegal dimension 
 
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133)  
  M SD  M SD p 
      
Denial of responsibility 3.30 1.62 3.27 1.58 .87 
Denial of injury 3.01 1.52 2.83 1.50 .32 
Denial of victim 3.64 1.73 3.55 1.78 .66 
Condemning the condemners 2.37 1.33 2.13 1.26 .12 
Appeal to higher loyalties 2.36 1.33 2.48 1.31 .44 
 
Wilks’ Lambda = .98 , F(5,272) = 1.11, p = .357 
 
 
Legend 
 
Active/illegal: Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
―A consumer/company returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. However, the 
damage was the fault of the consumer/company and not of the supplier.‖ 
 
Denial of responsibility:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the products of the supplier often seem to 
be of low quality anyway‖  
 
Denial of injury:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the supplier does not suffer by one 
exchanged product‖ 
 
Denial of victim:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the supplier wants to take back the 
product without tracing who‘s to blame for the damage. That‘s his problem‖ 
 
Condemning the condemners:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because other consumers/companies act in similar 
ways. Why wouldn‘t this consumer/ company be allowed to do so?‖ 
 
Appeal to higher loyalties:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because he/she/the company only wants to possess 
the best materials‖ 
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Table 5b 
Mean values and standard deviations for neutralization items in case of passive dimension 
 
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133)  
  M SD  M SD p 
 
Denial of responsibility 
 
3.58 
 
1.59 
 
2.36 
 
1.36 
 
.00 
Denial of injury 3.46 1.66 1.71 .96 .00 
Denial of victim 4.45 1.81 2.73 1.63 .00 
Condemning the condemners 2.96 1.73 1.58 1.03 .00 
Appeal to higher loyalties 4.06 1.86 2.52 1.64 .00 
 
Wilks’ Lambda = .66, F(5,272) = 27.59, p = .000 
 
 
Legend 
 
Passive:  Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
―A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a consumer/company. However, 
by inattention, the company pays 60 euros. The consumer/company notices this, but doesn‘t 
say anything and keeps the extra 20 euros.‖ 
 
Denial of responsibility:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the consumer/company wants to repay the 
money, but does not have the time to do so‖ 
 
Denial of injury:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because keeping the extra 20 euros is totally not 
severe and causes damage to nobody‖ 
 
Denial of victim:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the company should have paid more 
attention to how much money they repaid, that‘s not the fault of the consumer/company‖ 
 
Condemning the condemners:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because other consumers/companies would keep 
the money too‖ 
 
Appeal to higher loyalties:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the extra money supports a good cause‖ 
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Table 5c 
Mean values and standard deviations for neutralization items in case of active/legal dimension 
 
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133)  
  M SD  M SD p 
 
Denial of responsibility 
 
3.71 
 
1.56 
 
2.71 
 
1.36 
 
.00 
Denial of injury 3.60 1.56 2.75 1.46 .00 
Denial of victim 3.99 1.59 2.93 1.62 .00 
Condemning the condemners 2.88 1.50 1.98 1.20 .00 
Appeal to higher loyalties 3.47 1.51 2.67 1.40 .00 
 
Wilks’ Lambda = .84, F(5,272) = 10.65, p = .000 
 
 
Legend 
Active/legal: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
―A consumer/company doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer about the 
price of a new vehicle.‖ 
 
Denial of responsibility:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action in case the consumer/company would not be able 
to afford such an acquisition in any way‖ 
 
Denial of injury:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the car dealer does not suffer by this 
action‖ 
 
Denial of victim:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action as the car dealer himself/herself is responsible to 
check the verity of this information. It‘s the fault of the car dealer himself/herself‖ 
 
Condemning the condemners:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because also other consumers/companies not 
always tell the truth when negotiating‖ 
 
Appeal to higher loyalties:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the consumer/company would otherwise get 
money problems‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
Table 5d 
Mean values and standard deviations for neutralization items in case of no harm dimension 
 
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133)  
  M SD  M SD p 
      
Denial of responsibility 5.21 1.32 4.93 1.47 .09 
Denial of injury 4.07 1.66 4.11 1.56 .85 
Denial of victim 4.66 1.51 4.43 1.46 .20 
Condemning the condemners 3.26 1.65 2.80 1.63 .02 
Appeal to higher loyalties 5.51 1.10 5.23 1.39 .06 
 
Wilks’ Lambda = .96, F(5,272) = 2.27, p = .048  
 
      
Legend 
 
No harm: No harm/no foul 
―During some weeks, a consumer/company negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the plans 
for a new accommodation, although the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about 
the cooperation with the firm and, maybe, will shrug off the building plan.‖ 
 
Denial of responsibility:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the consumer/company has no other option than 
maybe shrugging off the building plan due to external factors‖ 
 
Denial of injury:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action as it causes no damage to the architect‘s firm to 
negotiate during some weeks, even if the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about the cooperation 
with that firm‖ 
 
Denial of victim:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because such a firm had to make a contract to 
ensure the cooperation‖ 
 
Condemning the condemners:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because other consumers/companies act in similar 
ways. Why wouldn‘t this consumer/company be allowed to do so?‖ 
 
Appeal to higher loyalties:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the consumer/company strives for the best offer 
in the interest of its immediate vicinity‖ 
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Table 5e 
Mean values and standard deviations for neutralization items in case of downloading dimension 
 
 Consumer (N = 145) Corporation (N = 133)  
  M SD  M SD p 
      
Denial of responsibility 4.77 1.60 4.38 1.71 .06 
Denial of injury 3.54 1.56 2.80 1.32 .00 
Denial of victim 4.78 1.54 3.96 1.60 .00 
Condemning the condemners 3.15 1.79 2.50 1.52 .00 
Appeal to higher loyalties 3.98 1.69 3.34 1.50 .00 
  
Wilks’ Lambda = .91, F(5,272) = 5.20, p = .000 
  
 
Legend 
 
Downloading: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
―A consumer/company downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its computers 
without paying for it.‖ 
 
Denial of responsibility:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action if the consumer/company had no other option to 
obtain the software due to external factors‖ 
 
Denial of injury:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because software companies earn enough money 
and do not suffer by downloading without paying for it‖ 
 
Denial of victim:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because the software business shouldn‘t ask so 
much money to obtain their software‖ 
 
Condemning the condemners:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action because other consumers/companies also do this‖ 
 
Appeal to higher loyalties:  
―The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action as knowledge development is a basic right‖ 
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
Previous studies show that consumers are tempted by the use of double standards. That is, 
consumers are likely to evaluate questionable practices more harshly when they are enacted by 
businesses compared to consumers. Empirical research about this phenomenon is limited (e.g., 
Rallapalli et al., 1994; Rawwas et al., 1994; Vitell et al., 1991; Vitell & Muncy, 1992), although it 
might be of great importance to the business world. Companies often do not consider double standards 
although they might have an interest in taking it into account (Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). For 
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example, companies might assume that when consumers perceive a questionable corporate action as 
inadmissible, they believe the same action enacted by a consumer to be also inadmissible. However, as 
this research shows, consumers use double standards and, as a consequence, they might believe the 
same action enacted by a consumer to be admissible. Not taking this into account could lead to, for 
instance, less effective communication campaigns based on false knowledge about consumers‘ ethical 
perceptions. 
A more extensive example might illustrate this contribution. Imagine that a certain company 
(A) appears in a bad light because it downloaded and used copyrighted software without paying for it. 
The respective software company (B) could see it as a good sign that the public opinion perceives this 
questionable downloading practice negatively. However, this study shows that consumers believe it is 
less inappropriate for them to illegally download software than it is for companies (i.e., a double 
standard). Hence, despite their negative perception of a company which illegally downloaded and used 
software, consumers themselves might be likely to engage in this questionable practice in the future. If 
the software company (B) had been aware of the probability of double standards, it could have 
anticipated on it (see later in this discussion).  
Another reason why it is important for companies to consider double standards is that their 
engagement in unethical actions could initiate negative consumer attitudes. For example, if consumer 
research shows that consumers find an action enacted by consumers to be acceptable, this action 
enacted by the company is not necessarily perceived as acceptable by consumers.  
Knowledge about possible explanatory factors of the double standard phenomenon is limited. 
The goal of the study reported in this chapter is to investigate whether the techniques of neutralization 
offer an explanation for the use of double standards. This study thus also contributes to the knowledge 
of the neutralization concept which is indicated as having much potential explanatory power in the 
study of consumers‘ ethical judgments (Vitell, 2003; Vitell & Muncy, 1992). Findings of this study 
state that the extent to which consumers use these techniques relates positively to their evaluation of 
questionable consumer and corporate actions. In other words, the higher the extent to which people 
agree with arguments explaining away misbehavior enacted by consumers or businesses, the more 
they tolerate this misbehavior. Furthermore and more importantly, these techniques give an answer on 
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the question why people judge businesses more harshly compared to consumers (i.e., why people use 
double standards). More specifically, results show that respondents who justify questionable actions of 
consumers to a certain degree, condone the same mistreatment enacted by businesses to a much lesser 
extent. In this way, the techniques of neutralization concern a process explaining the double standard 
phenomenon. 
Returning to the specific example mentioned above in this discussion, company B could have 
anticipated the probability of consumers‘ illegal downloading practices by using a strategy emanating 
from the concept of neutralization techniques. These techniques enable consumers to develop and keep 
a biased characterization of a questionable action (in this case illegal software downloading) as being 
acceptable. Company B might decrease illegal downloading intentions and behavior by impeding 
consumers‘ abilities to construct these neutralization thoughts with regard to the illegal downloading 
and use of software. Hence, company B could, for example, design campaigns which disrupt 
consumers‘ neutralization oriented motivated cognitions, making it harder for them to deceive 
themselves that the act of illegal software downloading is acceptable (e.g., by showing the harmful 
consequences of illegal downloading practices to counter ‗denial of injury‘ neutralizations; Bersoff, 
1999). 
 
6.1. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
 
We want to end this discussion by pointing to some limitations which may give direction for 
future research. A first restriction concerns the sampling method used in this study. Using students is 
no exception in the consumer ethics area since they represent an important segment of consumers for 
many marketers (Chan, Wong, & Leung, 1998; Higgs-Kleyn, 1998; Muncy & Eastman, 1998; 
Rallapalli et al., 1994). At the same time, students enable researchers to control several sources of 
variation (Waller & Polonsky, 1999). However, a restriction of this sampling frame is that caution 
should be taken in trying to generalize the findings to other samples. Consequently, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate whether this study‘s findings hold when examining non-student populations. 
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Previous research shows people‘s tendency toward moral hypocrisy. That is, people are likely 
to evaluate moral transgressions less harshly when these transgressions are enacted by themselves than 
when these transgressions are enacted by others (e.g., Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008). The present 
study compares consumers‘ use of neutralization techniques with regard to questionable consumer 
versus business practices. It would be worthwhile to examine whether the results of this study 
extrapolate to a study that investigates people‘s use of neutralization techniques with regard to their 
own versus others‘/other consumers‘ questionable practices.  
Another limitation of our study might be the situation specificity of our results. Based on the 
Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005), we create different 
ethical scenarios as ethical judgments are situation specific (Barnett & Karson, 1987). The relative 
similarity of the results between the different scenarios indicates the generalizability of our findings. 
However, future research might include more and other situations in trying to confirm the results of 
this study. These further studies might benefit by using a different methodology than relying on the 
various dimensions of the Consumer Ethics Scale. Besides, it would be valuable to repeat this study 
and use different operationalizations for each neutralization technique in an attempt to generalize our 
findings. 
To argument our central hypothesis (i.e., people neutralize more when confronted with 
unethical consumer behavior compared to unethical business behavior), we assume that people are 
more likely to apply the ‗moral leniency‘ principle (i.e., engaging in unethical behavior and, at the 
same time, explaining away this behavior by using the techniques of neutralization) toward consumers 
as being part of their in-group compared to businesses as being part of their out-group. It might be 
interesting to investigate what would happen when the person evaluating the unethical consumer 
versus business behavior is an employee of the business that engages in this unethical behavior. In 
other words, what would be the result if the evaluator of the negative consumer and corporate behavior 
belongs to both the consumer and the business side? It could be that this particular factor moderates 
our central hypothesis so that no difference in neutralization (in case of the undesirable consumer 
versus corporate behavior) is expected when the evaluator is part of the company that engages in the 
questionable acts.  
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Finally, it would be interesting to not only get a better understanding of the double standard 
phenomenon, but also of the techniques of neutralization. Given the paucity of research about this 
topic as well as the potential to explain much as to why ‗ordinary people‘ sometimes slip into 
unethical behavior, the techniques of neutralization seem capable of giving some direction for 
studying consumers‘ ethical judgments and would be worthwhile to examine in more depth (Vitell, 
2003). Additional research is needed about this concept by investigating which consumers show a 
higher propensity to use such techniques, in which circumstances, and to which degree. Gaining a 
fuller understanding of the cognitions making unethical behavior easier may suggest effective and 
generally applicable strategies for reducing questionable activities in which people too often indulge. 
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Notes 
 
1 
The words corporate/corporation, business, and company are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
 
² 
Similar to Chapter 2, we would like to make clear that, rather than running a full structural model and 
thus including control variables, we ran regression analyses without taking into account any control 
variable.  
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8. Appendices 
 
8.1. Appendix A: Scenarios and Neutralization Techniques – Dutch  
 
Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
Scenario:  Een consument/bedrijf brengt een product terug naar de leverancier omdat het 
beschadigd is. De beschadiging is echter de fout van de consument/het bedrijf zelf en 
niet van de leverancier.  
 
Neutralization techniques: De consument/het bedrijf treft geen schuld voor deze actie: 
- aangezien de producten van de leverancier hoe dan ook al vaak van lage kwaliteit 
blijken te zijn (denial of responsibility) 
- omdat de leverancier geen schade ondervindt van één omgeruild product (denial 
of injury) 
- aangezien de leverancier het product wil terugnemen, zonder de schuld van de 
schade na te gaan. Dat is zijn probleem. (denial of victim) 
- aangezien andere consumenten/bedrijven ook op zo‘n manier handelen. Waarom 
zou deze consument/dit bedrijf dat dan niet mogen? (condemning the condemners) 
- aangezien hij/zij/het bedrijf alleen maar het beste materiaal wil bezitten (appeal to 
higher loyalties) 
 
Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
Scenario: Een bedrijf dient 40 euro terug te storten op de rekening van een consument/bedrijf. 
Door onoplettendheid stort het bedrijf echter 60 euro. De consument/het bedrijf merkt 
dit, maar zegt dit niet en houdt de extra 20 euro. 
 
Neutralization techniques: De consument/het bedrijf treft geen schuld voor deze actie: 
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- indien de consument/het bedrijf het geld wel wil terugstorten, maar de tijd niet 
heeft om dit uit te voeren (denial of responsibility) 
- aangezien het houden van 20 euro helemaal niet erg is en niemand schade bezorgt 
(denial of injury) 
- aangezien het bedrijf maar beter moet opletten hoeveel geld ze geeft, daar kan de 
consument/dit bedrijf niets aan doen (denial of victim) 
- omdat andere consumenten/bedrijven het geld ook zouden houden (condemning 
the condemners) 
- als het extra geld voor een goed doel dient (appeal to higher loyalties) 
 
Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
Scenario: Een consument/bedrijf vertelt niet de volledige waarheid bij het onderhandelen met 
een autohandelaar over de prijs voor een nieuw voertuig.  
 
Neutralization techniques: De consument/het bedrijf treft geen schuld voor deze actie: 
- wanneer de consument/het bedrijf op geen andere manier de aankoop zou kunnen 
veroorloven (denial of responsibility) 
- aangezien de autohandelaar hiervan geen schade ondervindt (denial of injury) 
- daar de autohandelaar zelf verantwoordelijk is voor het nagaan van de waarheid 
van de informatie. Het is de fout van de autohandelaar zelf (denial of victim) 
- aangezien andere consumenten/bedrijven ook niet altijd de volledige waarheid 
vertellen bij het onderhandelen (condemning the condemners) 
- indien de consument/het bedrijf anders in geldproblemen kan komen (appeal to 
higher loyalties) 
 
No harm/no foul 
Scenario: Een consument/bedrijf onderhandelt gedurende enkele weken met een 
architectenbureau over de plannen voor een nieuwe huisvesting, hoewel de 
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consument/het bedrijf nog niet helemaal zeker is wat betreft de samenwerking met het 
bureau en het bouwplan misschien links zal laten liggen. 
 
Neutralization techniques: De consument/het bedrijf treft geen schuld voor deze actie: 
- indien de consument/het bedrijf door externe factoren niet anders kan dan de 
plannen van het bureau eventueel links te laten liggen (denial of responsibility) 
- daar het helemaal geen schade toebrengt aan het architectenbureau om enkele 
weken te onderhandelen, zelfs al is de consument/het bedrijf nog niet zeker van de 
samenwerking met het bureau (denial of injury) 
- aangezien zo‘n bureau maar een contract had moeten opstellen om zekerheid te 
hebben over de samenwerking (denial of victim) 
- aangezien andere consumenten/bedrijven evengoed zo handelen. Waarom zou 
deze consument/dit bedrijf dat dan niet mogen? (condemning the condemners) 
- wanneer de consument/het bedrijf voor de beste offerte gaat in het belang van de 
directe omgeving (appeal to higher loyalties) 
 
Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
Scenario:  Een consument/bedrijf heeft op één van zijn/haar computers (auteursrechtelijk 
beschermde) software gedownloaded zonder hiervoor te betalen.  
 
Neutralization techniques: De consument/het bedrijf treft geen schuld voor deze actie: 
- indien de consument/het bedrijf door externe factoren geen andere mogelijkheid 
had om aan de software te geraken (denial of responsibility) 
- aangezien de softwarebedrijven genoeg geld verdienen en zij geen schade 
ondervinden bij onbetaald downloaden (denial of injury) 
- omdat de softwarebusiness maar niet zoveel geld moet vragen voor hun software 
(denial of victim) 
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- aangezien andere consumenten/bedrijven dit even goed doen (condemning the 
condemners) 
- daar kennisontwikkeling een basisrecht is (appeal to higher loyalties) 
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8.2. Appendix B: Scenarios and Neutralization Techniques – English 
 
Actively benefiting from illegal activities 
Scenario: A consumer/company returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. 
However, the damage was the fault of the consumer/company and not of the supplier. 
 
Neutralization techniques: The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
- because the products of the supplier often seem to be of low quality anyway 
(denial of responsibility) 
- because the supplier does not suffer by one exchanged product (denial of injury) 
- because the supplier wants to take back the product without tracing who‘s to 
blame for the damage. That‘s his problem (denial of victim) 
- because other consumers/companies act in similar ways. Why wouldn‘t this 
consumer/ company be allowed to do so? (condemning the condemners) 
- because he/she/the company only wants to possess the best materials (appeal to 
higher loyalties) 
 
Passively benefiting at the expense of others 
Scenario: A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a consumer/company. 
However, by inattention, the company pays 60 euros. The consumer/company notices 
this, but doesn‘t say anything and keeps the extra 20 euros. 
 
Neutralization techniques: The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
- if the consumer/company wants to repay the money, but does not have the time to 
do so (denial of responsibility) 
- because keeping the extra 20 euros is totally not severe and causes damage to 
nobody (denial of injury) 
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- because the company should have paid more attention to how much money they 
repaid, that‘s not the fault of the consumer/company (denial of victim) 
- because other consumers/companies would keep the money too (condemning the 
condemners) 
- if the extra money supports a good cause (appeal to higher loyalties) 
 
Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices 
Scenario: A consumer/company doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer 
about the price of a new vehicle. 
 
Neutralization techniques: The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
- in case the consumer/company would not be able to afford such an acquisition in 
any way (denial of responsibility) 
- because the car dealer does not suffer by this action (denial of injury) 
- as the car dealer himself/herself is responsible to check the verity of this 
information. It‘s the fault of the car dealer himself/herself (denial of victim) 
- because also other consumers/companies not always tell the truth when 
negotiating (condemning the condemners) 
- if the consumer/company would otherwise get money problems (appeal to higher 
loyalties) 
 
No harm/no foul 
Scenario: During some weeks, a consumer/company negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the 
plans for a new accommodation, although the consumer/company is not yet 
completely sure about the cooperation with the firm and, maybe, will shrug off the 
building plan. 
 
Neutralization techniques: The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
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- if the consumer/company has no other option than maybe shrugging off the 
building plan due to external factors (denial of responsibility) 
- as it causes no damage to the architect‘s firm to negotiate during some weeks, 
even if the consumer/company is not yet completely sure about the cooperation 
with that firm (denial of injury) 
- because such a firm had to make a contract to ensure the cooperation (denial of 
victim) 
- because other consumers/companies act in similar ways. Why wouldn‘t this 
consumer/company be allowed to do so? (condemning the condemners) 
- if the consumer/company strives for the best offer in the interest of its immediate 
vicinity (appeal to higher loyalties) 
 
Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods 
Scenario: A consumer/company downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its 
computers without paying for it.  
 
Neutralization techniques: The consumer/company should not be blamed for this action: 
- if the consumer/company had no other option to obtain the software due to 
external factors (denial of responsibility) 
- because software companies earn enough money and do not suffer by 
downloading without paying for it (denial of injury) 
- because the software business shouldn‘t ask so much money to obtain their 
software (denial of victim) 
- because other consumers/companies also do this (condemning the condemners) 
- as knowledge development is a basic right (appeal to higher loyalties) 
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Chapter 5:  
“What’s the harm in being unethical? These strangers are rich anyway!” 
Exploring Underlying Factors of Double Standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on De Bock, T., Vermeir, I., & Van Kenhove, P. (accepted for publication). 
―What‘s the harm in being unethical? These strangers are rich anyway!‖ Exploring underlying factors 
of double standards. Journal of Business Ethics. 
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Chapter 5: 
“What’s the harm in being unethical? These strangers are rich anyway!” 
Exploring Underlying Factors of Double Standards 
 
1. Abstract 
 
Previous research shows evidence for double standards as individuals tolerate questionable 
consumer practices more compared to similar business practices. However, researchers wondered 
whether these double standards are necessarily due to the fact that one party is a business company 
while the other is a consumer. Results of the studies reported in this chapter demonstrate that 
individuals were not only harsher for unethical business (versus consumer) behavior, but also for 
unethical behavior by prosperous (versus non-prosperous) consumers and prosperous (versus non-
prosperous) business companies (Study 1). Further, they were also less tolerant of unethical behavior 
by consumers (versus one‘s best friend) and business companies with which they have a not so good 
(versus a good) relationship (Study 2).  
These results indicate that double standards are due to differences in perceived wealth between 
subjects
1
 and in one‘s relationship with subjects. These two factors imply that double standards are not 
strictly reserved to consumer-business relations, but might be used in business-business and consumer-
consumer relations too. Further, these results indicate that companies need to be aware of the fact that 
good financial figures may backfire as they might lead individuals to have a more critical view on 
companies‘ deceptive practices. Moreover, these findings point to the importance for businesses to 
keep investing energy in developing high relationship commitment with stakeholders as these good 
relationships lead stakeholders to be less morally condemning of their questionable practices.  
 
Keywords:  consumer ethics, business ethics, double standards, ethical beliefs, marketing ethics, 
moral hypocrisy, relationship, wealth 
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2. Introduction 
 
Previous research shows evidence for double standards as individuals tolerate questionable 
consumer practices more compared to similar business practices (DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & 
Van Kenhove, 2008; see Chapter 4). However, already in his 1987 paper, DePaulo wondered whether 
these double standards are necessarily due to the fact that one party is a business company while the 
other is a consumer. More specifically, he pointed to ‗wealth‘ as a possible underlying factor: 
―Perhaps the critical variable is actually the perceived wealth or vulnerability of the negotiating party‖ 
(p. 103). Furthermore, DePaulo (1987) implicitly raises ‗relationship‘ as another possible underlying 
factor of double standards.  
The purpose of this study is to give a decisive answer about these issues by exploring these 
two possible underlying factors (i.e., wealth and relationship) of the double standard phenomenon 
other than the mere fact of being a business or a consumer. First, business misbehavior may be 
regarded as less acceptable compared to similar consumer misbehavior because businesses are 
perceived as being more financially secure and hence less in need of gaining additional financial 
benefit through deceptive practices (DePaulo, 1987). This would imply that individuals also use 
double standards when evaluating questionable behavior enacted by prosperous versus non-prosperous 
consumers, and prosperous versus non-prosperous business companies. Second, it might be that 
individuals tolerate unethical consumer behavior more compared to unethical business behavior 
because they feel a closer relationship with consumers compared to business companies (cf. DePaulo, 
1987). This would imply that individuals also use double standards when evaluating questionable 
behavior enacted by consumers with which they have a good relationship (e.g., their best friends) 
versus a not so good relationship, and business companies with which they have a good relationship 
versus a not so good relationship. In other words, if these two underlying factors (which we label as 
‗wealth‘ and ‗relationship‘ in the rest of this chapter) determine the use of double standards, this 
would imply that the use of double standards is not strictly reserved to consumer-business relations, 
but might be used in business-business and consumer-consumer relations too.  
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3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
3.1. Double Standards: Consumers versus Business 
 
Business ethics studies ―deal with questions about whether specific business practices are 
acceptable‖ (Ferrell, Fraedrich, & Ferrell, 2008, p. 5)‖, while  consumer ethics deals with the 
―rightness as opposed to the wrongness of certain actions on the part of the buyer or potential buyer in 
consumer situations‖ (Dodge, Edwards, & Fullerton, 1996, p. 823). In this business ethics versus 
consumer ethics realm, double standards involve the investigation of potential differences between 
how unethical business practices are perceived compared to similar consumer practices. Business 
literature suggests that individuals judge the behavior of business (representatives) more harshly than 
similar behavior of individual consumers (e.g., Wilkes, 1978). Drucker (1981) even maintains that a 
double standard is implicit in the treatment of ―business ethics‖ and ―business social responsibility‖ as 
topics separate from ethics in general. Specifically, he argues that ―business ethics‖ means holding 
business to a different standard of conduct than ―ordinary people‖. 
In order to demonstrate double standards empirically, DePaulo (1985) conducts a telephone 
survey in which respondents have to indicate whether they feel that similar misconduct of a 
salesperson and a consumer is wrong. Results show that 8 percent openly admits to a double standard 
by maintaining that deception is wrong for the salesperson but not for the consumer. DePaulo (1987) 
argues that this 8 percent figure probably underestimates the prevalence of double standards, because 
respondents holding double standards may realize their inconsistency and find it embarrassing or 
because the study does not investigate the degree of perceived wrongness. In trying to avoid these 
problems, a follow-up study (DePaulo, 1987) uses a between-groups design involving two versions of 
an anonymous questionnaire where subjects have to evaluate an automobile salesperson or a customer 
using similar deceptive bargaining tactics. Results indicate that consumers are more critical of sellers 
who engage in potentially unethical behavior than they are of buyers who engage in the same 
practices.  
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A recent study by Vermeir and Van Kenhove (2008) as well as the results reported in Chapter 
4 confirm the previous work of DePaulo (1985, 1987) by showing that consumers have a double 
standard when it comes to their own unethical behavior compared to that of a corporation. More 
specifically, individuals evaluate unethical corporate actions as more unacceptable compared to 
similar unethical consumer actions.  
 
3.2. ‘Wealth’ as an Underlying Factor of Double Standards 
 
Several social preference models like those of Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989), 
Messick (1995), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) indicate people‘s general aversion to inequality. 
Situations which are marked by inequality evoke feelings of unfairness and injustice which people like 
to restore or compensate for in one way or another. This idea of individuals preferring a situation 
marked by any type of balance and their likeliness to restore any imbalance, can be traced backed in 
other theories such as the Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978) and the System 
Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). 
The Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978) puts forward that individuals 
show a general need to believe that the world is just, orderly, and stable. Many individuals feel a need 
to perceive the world as just in which rewards and punishments are distributed in correct ways. 
Previous studies applying the Just World Theory show that when individuals‘ belief in a just world is 
endangered, they are likely to use defensive responses such as dismissal or justifying the information 
that caused the threatening of their belief in a just world (see Furnham, 1993; Hafer & Bégue, 2005).  
In a similar vein, research explaining the System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Jost et al., 2004) shows people‘s general tendency to dislike inequality and to believe in a just world. 
Research based on this theory shows people‘s general tendency to enhance disadvantaged entities with 
compensating virtues while acting the opposite in case of advantaged entities (Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay 
et al., 2007). This latter tendency resembles research about people‘s tendency to sympathize with and 
support entities more when they are perceived as underdogs (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2009; Kim et 
al., 2008; Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007).  
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A recent study by Vandello, Michniewicz, and Goldschmied (2011) is in line with the theories 
mentioned above. More specifically, they investigated how power disparities influence judgments of 
the morality of conflicting groups. They found that actions of disempowered groups have greater 
moral license compared to actions of powerful groups. People judge the violent actions of a fictitious 
group as more moral when done by a smaller, less powerful group compared to a larger one. These 
findings are in line with research about people‘s tendency to sympathize with and support entities 
more when they are perceived as underdogs (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2009; Kim et al., 2008; 
Vandello et al., 2007), research about people‘s general tendency to be averse to inequalities (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Messick, 1995), research about dismissing and justifying information that threatens a 
just world belief (Furnham, 1993; Hafer & Bégue, 2005), and system justification research suggesting 
a general tendency to enhance disadvantaged entities with compensating virtues (Kay & Jost, 2003; 
Kay et al., 2007).  
Whenever there is financial inequality between subjects
1
, we might assume, based on the 
related ideas mentioned above, that people would be prone to restore this financial inequality in one 
way or another. One possible way to restore this financial imbalance might be to be more morally 
lenient toward the financially less powerful subjects compared to the financially more powerful 
subjects. In other words, perceptions of financial inequality could trigger feelings of unfairness and 
injustice, or subjects who are perceived financially less (versus more) powerful can be seen as 
disadvantaged, the underdog, or disempowered, causing compensating responses. As consumers are 
generally perceived as financially less powerful compared to companies, we hypothesize that 
individuals would be likely to compensate this financial inequality by being more morally lenient 
toward consumers compared to businesses.  
Stated otherwise, double standards may not necessarily be due to the fact that one party is a 
business company while the other party is a consumer, but might be the result of the fact that 
individuals perceive business companies as wealthier than consumers, and thus less in need of 
financial gain through unethical practices (DePaulo, 1987). If wealth perceptions are underlying 
double standards, people should also use double standards when rating questionable behavior of 
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prosperous versus non-prosperous consumers, or prosperous versus non-prosperous business 
companies. 
 
Gino and colleagues recently examined the role of inequity perceptions in dishonest behavior 
(e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2010a, 2010b). Their experiments demonstrate that perceptions of financial 
inequity motivate dishonest helping or dishonest hurting behavior. More specifically, their findings 
indicate that people engage in unethical behavior that helps others when these others are financially 
less capable. People engage in unethical hurting behavior, on the other hand, when these others are 
financially more capable. This study extends these findings by suggesting that people are not only 
more likely to dishonestly help less (versus more) wealthy subjects, but that those individuals are also 
more morally lenient toward questionable practices enacted by these less (versus more) wealthy 
subjects. Consequently, this study might show that situations marked by financial inequality not only 
influence one‘s own immoral behavior, but also one‘s judgment of others‘ immoral behavior in case 
these others are more or less financially capable. In sum, we propose the following three hypotheses 
which will be tested in the first study: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Consumers perceive unethical practices as less acceptable when these actions 
are enacted by a prosperous subject than when these actions are enacted by a 
non-prosperous subject. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Consumers perceive unethical practices as less acceptable when these actions 
are enacted by a prosperous consumer than when these actions are enacted by 
a non-prosperous consumer. 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  Consumers perceive unethical practices as less acceptable when these actions 
are enacted by a prosperous business company than when these actions are 
enacted by a non-prosperous business company. 
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3.3. ‘Relationship’ as an Underlying Factor of Double Standards 
 
Social Identity Theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) postulates that individuals give 
meaning to their self-concept by means of their connections with social groups. In other words, people 
hold various ―social identities‖ which they derive from their (perceived) membership of various social 
groups. Based on their social identity, people are likely to divide the world into ―them‖ and ―us‖ 
ultimately leading to the development of so-called in-group favouritism at the expense of out-groups. 
The process of categorizing oneself in terms of a particular social identity results in people being 
likely to emphasize and exaggerate the similarities between the self and in-group members and the 
differences between the self and out-group members.  
Banaji, Bazerman, and Chugh (2003) cite this in-group favouritism as one of the sources of 
(un)ethical decision making. People apply different standards of morality to in-groups and out-groups 
despite the existence of shared principles (Vandello et al., 2011). More specifically, people are more 
morally lenient toward in-group members compared to out-group members (Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 
2009; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007).  
This particular finding about the role of in-group favouritism in the moral domain might be 
useful in the context of studying double standards. Previous research never examined whether double 
standards are necessarily about consumers versus businesses. The research of Banaji et al. (2003) 
suggests that this is not the case. More specifically, individuals might be more likely to perceive other 
consumers as in-group members while perceiving business companies rather as out-group members 
(cf. Chapter 4). As a consequence, they might be more morally lenient toward consumers compared to 
businesses, which thus results in consumers using a double standard. In case people would perceive a 
business company to belong to their in-group, they might become morally less harsh for this company 
compared to a company that belongs to their out-group. Or, in case people perceive a consumer to 
belong to their out-group, they might be more morally condemning of their questionable behavior than 
when this behavior is enacted by a consumer that belongs to their in-group. Taken this into account, 
this means that double standards are not restricted to business-consumer relations, but extend to other 
relations (e.g., consumer-consumer, business-business) as well.  
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In other words, people might judge unethical consumer behavior more positively compared to 
similar unethical business behavior (i.e., double standards) because they feel a closer relationship with 
and consequently are less strict for consumers compared to businesses. If this ‗relationship factor‘ 
underlies the double standard phenomenon, this would mean that people should also use double 
standards when they rate questionable behavior of a consumer with which they have a not so good 
relationship versus a consumer with which they have a good relationship (e.g., their best friend), or 
when they compare a business company with which they have a not so good relationship versus a 
business company with which they have a good relationship.  
This proposition is in line with and extends research of Van Kenhove, De Wulf, and Steenhaut 
(2003) and Steenhaut and Van Kenhove (2005). Results of these studies show significant correlations 
between affective commitment to a store and various aspects of unethical behavior toward that store. 
More specifically, highly committed customers report less unethical behavior compared to lowly 
committed customers. This study clearly indicates that the relationship one has with a company 
translates into more moral behavior toward that company. We expect that these findings extrapolate to 
our study meaning that people not only behave more ethically toward a company when having a better 
relationship with it, but that they are also more morally lenient toward that specific company when this 
company engages in unethical behavior. Similarly, we might expect that people are more morally 
lenient toward people with which they have a good relationship compared to people with which they 
have a not so good relationship. Consequently, we propose the following hypotheses which will be 
tested in Study 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Consumers perceive unethical practices as less acceptable when these actions 
are enacted by a subject with which they have a not so good relationship than 
when these actions are enacted by a subject with which they have a good 
relationship. 
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Hypothesis 2b:  Consumers perceive unethical practices as less acceptable when these actions 
are enacted by a consumer than when these actions are enacted by their best 
friend. 
 
Hypothesis 2c:  Consumers perceive unethical practices as less acceptable when these actions 
are enacted by a business company with which they have a not so good 
relationship than when these actions are enacted by a business company with 
which they have a good relationship. 
 
4. Study 1 
 
The goal of Study 1 is to test the hypotheses dealing with ‗wealth‘ as an underlying factor of 
double standards. We postulate three hypotheses. First of all, we expect individuals to judge unethical 
practices done by a prosperous subject as less acceptable compared to unethical practices done by a 
non-prosperous subject (i.e., Hypothesis 1a). Second, we hypothesize that individuals perceive 
unethical practices as less acceptable when these practices are performed by a prosperous consumer 
than when these actions are performed by a non-prosperous consumer (i.e., Hypothesis 1b). Third, we 
assume that individuals evaluate unethical practices as less acceptable when these practices are 
enacted by a prosperous business company compared to a non-prosperous business company (i.e., 
Hypothesis 1c). Below, we elaborate on the sample and methodology we used in this first study. 
Afterwards, the results are explained in more detail.  
 
4.1. Sample and Procedure 
 
In total, 277 participants between 18 and 70 (M = 32.67, SD = 14.20)  participated in our 
anonymous self-administered online questionnaire. Table 1 depicts the socio-demographic 
characteristics of this sample in terms of gender, age, education, and income. Although not having 
used a student sample, this table indicates that a large part of our sample do consist of students  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Sample characteristics  
    N % 
Gender* Male 84 30.3 
  Female 193 69.7 
Age* ≤ 24 125 45.1 
  25 - 34 59 21.3 
  35 - 44 24 8.7 
  45 - 54 34 12.3 
  ≥ 55 35 12.6 
Education** Primary education 0 .0 
  Lower secondary education 10 6.4 
  Higher secondary education 38 24.2 
  Higher (non-university) education 57 36.3 
  Higher university education 45 28.7 
  Postgraduate education 7 4.5 
Income** < 500 euro 0 .0 
  500 - 1000 euro 4 2.5 
  1001 - 1500 euro 31 19.7 
  1501 - 2000 euro 56 35.7 
  2001 - 2500 euro 22 14.0 
  2501 - 3000 euro 10 6.4 
  3001 - 3500 euro 4 2.5 
  > 3500 euro 4 2.5 
  I have (currently) no income 5 3.2 
  I'd rather not say this 21 13.4 
*Total sample: N = 277 (Non-students: N = 157; Students: N = 120); **Non-students: N = 157 
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(i.e., N = 120 or 43.3%). Consequently, the sample depicts a relative overrepresentation of younger 
people. Furthermore, women are also relatively overrepresented  (N = 193 or 69.7%).  
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions of our 2 (subject: consumer 
versus business) by 2 (wealth: prosperous versus non-prosperous) between-subjects design. We 
assigned each respondent to only one of four conditions (i.e., between-subjects design) to avoid the 
problem of respondents being unwilling to admit their inconsistency when using a double standard (cf. 
DePaulo, 1987). Every condition was similar in that sense that each participant had to read five 
scenarios (see Appendix A for the original Dutch scenarios and Appendix B for the English translation 
of these original scenarios), presented in a random order, depicting questionable practices. The five 
dimensions of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005)  
dealing with unethical behavior (i.e., actively benefiting from illegal activities, passively benefiting at 
the expense of others, actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices, no harm/no foul, 
and downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods; see Chapter 1: Introduction) form 
the basis for these scenarios.  
The first scenario concerns the practice of bringing back a damaged product to the supplier 
while the damage is one‘s own fault instead of the supplier‘s fault (i.e., ‗actively benefiting from 
illegal activities‘). The second scenario deals with saying nothing when a supplier repays too much 
money on one‘s bank account (i.e., ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘). Third, participants 
read a scenario about not telling the whole truth while negotiating with a car dealer about the price of 
new vehicle (i.e., ‗actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices‘). A fourth scenario 
depicts the practice of negotiating during some weeks with an architect‘s firm about the plans for a 
new accommodation although not being completely sure about the cooperation with the firm (i.e., ‗no 
harm/no foul). A final scenario deals with the downloading of copyrighted software without paying for 
it (i.e., ‗downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods‘).  
So each participant in each of the four conditions had to evaluate these five questionable 
practices (i.e., five scenarios). The only difference between each of the four conditions was in terms of 
the subject engaging in these five questionable practices. More specifically, the subject was either ‗a 
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prosperous consumer‘, ‗a non-prosperous consumer‘, ‗a prosperous company‘, or ‗a non-prosperous 
company‘.  
After reading a scenario depicting a questionable practice, participants had to indicate how 
acceptable they believed the depicted behavior to be on a seven-point Likert scale going from (1) 
‗completely unacceptable‘ to (7) ‗completely acceptable‘. Consequently, higher scores indicate a more 
tolerant and thus less ethical judgment. This procedure was repeated for all five scenarios which each 
depicted a different questionable practice (cf. supra). As we are interested in the overall result (and not 
in the results for each scenario separately) and want to rule out situation specific influences, the 
dependent variable for each participant consists of the mean score of his/her five acceptability scores 
(α = .64) .  
 
4.2. Results 
 
To test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, we conducted an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
‗subject‘ (consumer versus business) and ‗wealth‘ (prosperous versus non-prosperous) as the between-
subjects independent variables, and the mean acceptability score (i.e., the mean score of respondents‘ 
five acceptability scores) as the dependent variable.  
A significant main effect of subject, F(1,273) = 36.37, p < .001, shows that overall, 
participants evaluate consumers (M = 3.94; SD = 1.00) less harshly compared to business companies 
(M = 3.26; SD = .90). In other words and in line with previous research (e.g., Vermeir & Van 
Kenhove, 2008), respondents judge unethical consumer practices as less unethical than similar 
unethical business practices.  
Further, a main effect of wealth, F(1,273) = 12.91,  p < .001, indicates that in general, 
respondents are less intolerant toward questionable practices enacted by subjects that are financially 
less capable (M = 3.80; SD = .90) compared to subjects that are financially more capable (M = 3.40; 
SD = 1.06). Consequently, Hypothesis 1a is supported.  
 Finally, findings show no significant interaction effect between subject and wealth, F(1,273) = 
.08, p > .05. Figure 1 clearly indicates this non-significant interaction. This figure, however, clearly 
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shows that in case of judging consumers, respondents judge unethical practices more harshly when 
these practices are done by a prosperous consumer (M = 3.75; SD = 1.03) than when these practices 
are done by a non-prosperous consumer (M = 4.12; SD = .92), F(1,273) = 5.32, p < .05. These results 
show evidence for Hypothesis 1b. Further, in case of judging businesses, participants are more critical 
of unethical actions done by prosperous businesses (M = 3.05; SD = .98) compared to unethical actions 
done by non-prosperous businesses (M = 3.48; SD = .76), F(1,273) = 7.73, p < .01). These findings 
confirm Hypothesis 1c.  
 
Figure 1 
Study 1: Non-significant interaction effect between subject and wealth (ANOVA) 
 
 
In sum, results of Study 1 indicate that the use of double standards (i.e., individuals tolerating 
unethical consumer practices more than similar business practices) is not necessarily due to the fact 
that one party is a consumer while the other is a business company. More specifically, findings 
demonstrate that consumers were not only harsher for unethical business (versus consumer) behavior 
(i.e., double standards as traditionally studied), but also for unethical behavior by prosperous (versus 
non-prosperous) consumers, and unethical behavior by prosperous (versus non-prosperous) business 
companies. These results indicate that double standards are due to differences in perceived wealth 
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between subjects engaging in immoral behavior. This ‗wealth‘ factor implies that the use of double 
standards is not strictly reserved to consumer-business relations, but might be used in business-
business and consumer-consumer relations too.  
 
5. Study 2 
 
Study 1 shows evidence for ‗wealth‘ as an underlying factor of double standards. The aim of 
this second study is to test the hypotheses dealing with ‗relationship‘ as an underlying factor of double 
standards. A first assumption to be tested postulates that individuals are more tolerant of unethical 
practices when they are enacted by a subject with which they have a good relationship than when these 
practices are enacted by a subject with which they have a not so good relationship (i.e., Hypothesis 
2a). We further assume that individuals judge questionable practices as less acceptable when these 
actions are performed by a consumer than when these actions are performed by their best friend (i.e., 
Hypothesis 2b). Finally, we hypothesize that individuals tolerate unethical actions less when these 
actions are performed by a business company with which they have a not so good relationship 
compared to a business company with which they have a good relationship (i.e., Hypothesis 2c). 
Before elaborating on the results, we explain the sample and procedure we used (which is similar to 
that used in Study 1) in more detail.  
 
5.1. Sample and Procedure 
 
In total, 264 participants between 17 and 73 (M = 32.72, SD = 13.69) participated in our 
anonymous self-administered online questionnaire. Table 2 depicts the socio-demographic 
characteristics of this sample in terms of gender, age, education, and income. Although not having 
used a student sample, this table indicates that a large part of our sample do consist of students (i.e., N 
= 110 or 41.7%) and thus younger people. Furthermore, women are also overrepresented (N = 199 or 
75.4%).  
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Table 2 
Study 2: Sample characteristics  
    N % 
Gender* Male 65 24.6 
  Female 199 75.4 
Age* ≤ 24 118 44.7 
  25 - 34 52 19.7 
  35 - 44 28 10.6 
  45 - 54 43 16.3 
  ≥ 55 23 8.7 
Education** Primary education 3 1.9 
  Lower secondary education 5 3.2 
  Higher secondary education 23 14.9 
  Higher (non-university) education 67 43.5 
  Higher university education 45 29.2 
  Postgraduate education 11 7.1 
Income** < 500 euro 1 .6 
  500 - 1000 euro 4 2.6 
  1001 - 1500 euro 26 16.9 
  1501 - 2000 euro 53 34.4 
  2001 - 2500 euro 18 11.7 
  2501 - 3000 euro 13 8.4 
  3001 - 3500 euro 5 3.2 
  > 3500 euro 4 2.6 
  I have (currently) no income 11 7.1 
  I'd rather not say this 19 12.3 
*Total sample: N = 264 (Non-students: N = 154; Students: N = 110); **Non-students: N = 154 
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Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions of our 2 (subject: consumer 
versus business) by 2 (relationship: not good versus good) between-subjects design. We used this 
between-subjects design (i.e., assigning each respondent to only one of four conditions) to avoid the 
problem of respondents being unwilling to admit their inconsistency when using a double standard (cf. 
DePaulo 1987). In every condition, participants had to read five scenarios (see Appendix A for the 
original Dutch scenarios and Appendix B for the English translation of these original scenarios), 
presented in a random order, which each depicted a questionable practice based on one of the five 
dimensions of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005; see 
Chapter 1: Introduction). As these practices are identical to those used in Study 1, we do not 
recapitulate them in this section.  
The only difference between each of the four conditions was in terms of the subject engaging 
in these five questionable practices to be judged. More specifically, the subject was either ‗a 
consumer‘, ‗one‘s best friend‘, ‗a company with which one has a not so good relationship‘, or ‗a 
company with which one has a good relationship'.  
After going through a scenario, participants had to indicate how acceptable they believed the 
depicted behavior in that scenario to be on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from (1) ‗completely 
unacceptable‘ to (7) ‗completely acceptable‘. This procedure was repeated for all five scenarios. The 
dependent variable consists of the mean acceptability score (α = .64) .  
 
5.2. Results 
 
To test the three hypotheses with regard to ‗relationship‘ as an underlying factor of double 
standards (i.e., Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c), we conducted an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
subject (consumer versus business) and relationship (not good versus good) as the between-subjects 
independent variables and the mean acceptability score as the dependent variable.  
A significant main effect of subject, F(1,260) = 106.72, p < .001, shows that overall, 
participants evaluate consumers (M = 4.12; SD = .78) less harshly compared to businesses (M = 3.10; 
SD = .84). This result shows evidence for individuals‘ use of double standards.  
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Further, a main effect of relationship, F(1,260) = 9.43,  p < .01, indicates that in general, 
respondents are less intolerant of questionable practices when these practices are performed by 
subjects with which they show a good relationship (M = 3.77; SD = .91) compared to subjects with 
which they show a not so good relationship (M = 3.46; SD = .98). Consequently, Hypothesis 2a is 
supported.  
 Finally, results show no significant interaction effect between subject and relationship, 
F(1,260) = .06, p > .05. Figure 2 clearly indicates this non-significant interaction. This figure, 
however, shows that in case of judging consumers, respondents perceive unethical practices as more 
unacceptable when these practices are done by a consumer with which they have a not so good 
relationship (M = 3.96; SD = .73) than when these practices are done by one‘s best friend (M = 4.29; 
SD = .80), F(1,260) = 5.27, p < .05. These results show evidence for Hypothesis 2b. In case of judging 
business companies, participants are more critical of unethical actions when these actions are done by 
business companies with which they show a not so good relationship (M = 2.97; SD = .94) compared 
to business companies with which they show a good relationship (M = 3.24; SD = .70), F(1,260) = 
4.17, p < .05). These findings confirm Hypothesis 2c.  
 
Figure 2 
Study 2: Non-significant interaction effect between subject and relationship (ANOVA) 
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In sum, findings of the second study indicate that the use of double standards is not necessarily 
due to the fact that one party is a consumer while the other is a business. More specifically, 
participants were not only more unfavorably toward unethical business (versus consumer) behavior, 
they were also more unfavorably toward unethical behavior by consumers (versus one‘s best friend) 
and business companies with which they have a not so good (versus a good) relationship. These results 
indicate that double standards are rather due to differences in one‘s relationship with subjects engaging 
in immoral behavior. This ‗relationship‘ factor, for which the second study shows evidence, implies 
that the use of double standards is not strictly reserved to consumer-business relations, but might be 
used in business-business and consumer-consumer relations as well.  
 
6. Discussion  
 
A growing number of studies deal with the (un)acceptability of business practices (i.e., 
business ethics) and, to a lesser extent, the (un)acceptability of consumer practices (i.e., consumer 
ethics). However, empirical research which compares business ethics with consumer ethics remains 
scarce, although often quoted as an important line of research (e.g., Rallapalli, Vitell, Wiebe, & 
Barnes, 1994; Rawwas, Vitell, & Al-Khatib, 1994; Vitell, Lumpkin, & Rawwas, 1991; Vitell & 
Muncy, 1992). Next to demonstrating the existence of double standards (i.e., business misbehavior 
being judged more harshly than similar consumer misbehavior) and thereby confirming previous 
studies (e.g., DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008; see Chapter 4), this research 
deepens our understanding about this phenomenon by exploring two underlying factors (i.e., wealth 
and relationship). As these factors determine double standards, this implies that double standards go 
beyond business-consumer relations as they are also used in case of business-business and consumer-
consumer relations.  
First of all, we investigated ‗wealth‘ as a possible underlying factor of double standards. Study 
1 demonstrates that participants were not only harsher for unethical behavior by business companies 
(compared to consumers), but also for unethical behavior by prosperous consumers (compared to non-
prosperous consumers) and prosperous business companies (compared to non-prosperous business 
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companies). More generally stated, people are more tolerant of unethical behavior when performed by 
financially less capable subjects compared to financially more capable subjects. In other words, the 
perceived difference in wealth between subjects may lead to different moral judgments of unethical 
behavior enacted by these subjects.  
Research shows that individuals are more likely to behave dishonestly when they are 
confronted with a wealthier counterpart (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). For instance, a study by Hayes 
(1996) demonstrates that college students tolerate shoplifting more when it takes place in a large store 
compared to a small store. Another example is a recent study by Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010). 
They examined the drivers of opportunistic customer claiming during service recovery (i.e., customers 
engaging in an opportunity to financially benefit of a company‘s service failure and recovery efforts; 
Berry & Seiders, 2008) and found that consumers were more likely to be opportunistic when dealing 
with large compared to small firms. In both examples, consumers might reason that large stores are 
less harmed by questionable consumer practices compared to small stores as they are financially more 
secure.  
Our study extends the findings above by not only showing that people act more unethically 
toward wealthy (versus less wealthy) companies, but that they also are less tolerant of unethical 
behavior enacted by these wealthy (versus less wealthy) companies. In other words, individuals 
tolerate unethical business behavior more when it is performed by financially less capable companies 
compared to financially more capable companies. Taken together, businesses should be aware of the 
fact that good financial performances might backfire in times in which they engage in morally 
questionable behavior as individuals become more morally critical. 
Second, next to ‗wealth‘, we examined ‗relationship‘ as a possible underlying factor of double 
standards. Study 2 indicates that respondents were not only less tolerant of unethical behavior by 
business companies (compared to consumers), but also of unethical behavior by consumers (versus 
one‘s best friend) and business companies with which they have a not so good relationship (versus 
business companies with which they have a good relationship). More generally, people are less 
tolerant of unethical behavior when performed by subjects with which they have a not so good 
relationship (versus subjects with which they have a good relationship). In other words, the difference 
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in relationship with subjects may lead to different moral judgments of unethical behavior enacted by 
these subjects.  
Much literature is devoted to and shows evidence for the positive consequences retailers and 
businesses more generally experience due to committed customers. For instance, recent research 
shows that loyal customers are more likely to adopt loyalty cards (faster) compared to less loyal 
customers (Demoulin & Zidda, 2009). The positive influence of businesses being able to rely on 
committed and satisfied consumers has been demonstrated for many other variables, such as brand 
equity (e.g., Torres & Tribo, 2011), customer retention (e.g., Verhoef, 2003), and stock returns (e.g., 
Aksoy, Cooil, Groening, Keiningham, & Yalçin, 2008).  
In the marketing ethics domain, previous research indicates that consumers being highly 
committed to a company behave more ethically toward that company compared to low committed 
consumers (Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2005). Our findings contribute to and extend this particular 
finding, and research on customer loyalty more generally, by showing that consumers tolerate 
unethical behavior of companies more when they have a good relationship with these companies 
compared to a not so good relationship. In other words, these results indicate that similar questionable 
business practices might be judged differently based on the relationship one has with these businesses. 
Translated into a practical implication, these results point to the importance for businesses to keep 
investing time and energy in developing high relationship commitment with stakeholders as these 
good relationships lead stakeholders to be less morally condemning of their questionable practices. Of 
course, high relationship commitment cannot be interpreted as a safeguard for excessive levels of 
unethical business behavior.  
 Previous research showed evidence for people‘s use of double standards. That is, unethical 
business actions are rated systematically less admissible compared to similar consumer actions 
(DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). All these previous studies have in common 
that they study double standards in the realm of consumers versus businesses. They do not question 
whether the use of double standards is restricted to these consumer-business relations as they do not 
investigate possible underlying factors which might imply the occurrence of double standards in other 
relations too. Yet, this issue was already raised by DePaulo in 1987. He wondered to what extent the 
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double standard might necessarily be due to the consumer-business ‗opposition‘. More specifically, he 
pointed to wealth as a possible underlying factor: ―Perhaps the critical variable is actually the 
perceived wealth or vulnerability of the negotiating party‖ (p. 103). DePaulo (1987) also implicitly 
raises relationship as a possible underlying factor of double standards. The present study gives a 
decisive answer about these issues. Future research about double standards should take into account 
that double standards are not inherently tied to business-consumers relations, but might be used in 
business-business as well as consumer-consumer relations as well.  
 
6.1. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This study has some limitations which may give direction to future research. A first restriction 
of our study might be the situation specificity of our results. Based on the Consumer Ethics Scale 
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005), we created different ethical scenarios as ethical 
judgments are situation-specific (Barnett & Karson, 1987). Future research might include more and 
other situations in trying to confirm and generalize the results of this study.  
In the present chapter, the scenario for the ‗passively benefiting at the expense of others‘ 
dimension of the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992) was 
operationalized as the practice in which a company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a 
subject, but, by inattention, pays 60 euros, which the subject notices but doesn‘t say and keeps the 
extra 20 euros. For further research, it should be a better idea to keep this scenario more ‗neutral‘ (i.e., 
repaying too much money instead of a certain amount of money) as 20 euros extra possibly means 
something completely else for a consumer compared to a business company.  
Previous research demonstrates several positive consequences businesses might experience 
when having good financial grades. For instance, a recent study by Stanaland, Lwin, and Murphy 
(2011) shows that high perceived financial performance positively influences perceived corporate 
social responsibility which in turn positively impacts perceptions of corporate reputation, consumer 
trust, and loyalty. Based on such findings, one might expect that consumers are more morally lenient 
toward companies with good financial figures or companies that are financially wealthy. This 
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expectation is, however, opposite to the findings described in this chapter. It might be valuable for 
further research to examine this particular contradiction in more depth.  
To tackle this issue, it would certainly be an advantage for further studies to manipulate 
‗wealth‘ in more strict ways. Do respondents only take into account wealth when reading about 
immoral behavior enacted by financially capable versus financially less capable companies? Or do 
respondents, based on the financial information about a company, infer this company‘s size or 
efficient organisation and, consequently, also take such factors into account when making these moral 
judgments? If this would be the case, what about possible interaction effects between for instance 
company size and company wealth? Perhaps, consumers are especially critical of immoral behavior 
enacted by big and rich companies, and not so much of immoral behavior enacted by big and poor 
companies or small and rich companies. 
In a similar vein, further studies would benefit from defining the ‗relationship‘ factor more 
rigorously. In this chapter, the corporate scenarios described a company with which one has a good 
relationship versus no good relationship. The consumer scenarios, however, described a consumer 
versus one‘s best friend. In other words, in case of the corporate scenarios, relationship was 
operationalized in terms of a good relationship versus no good relationship, while in the consumer 
scenarios, relationship was operationalized in terms of no relationship versus a good relationship. This 
inconsistency needs to be tackled in future research. Further, it needs to be investigated how 
respondents interpreted the particular description of the subjects. For instance, did they perceived this 
description in terms of relationship quality, relationship strength, or rather in terms of subject 
similarity or the ability to identify?  
This study indicates that people judge unethical consumer behavior as more acceptable than 
similar business misbehavior. The question can be raised whether this difference in judgment is 
present for all people and in every situation. It may be worthwhile to examine to which extent the 
findings of this study apply to all individuals. A personality variable that may be of importance in this 
context is one‘s ethical ideology. According to Forsyth (1980, 1992), moral philosophies or ethical 
ideologies can be classified into idealism and relativism. While idealistic individuals adhere to moral 
absolutes when making ethical judgments, relativistic individuals feel that what is moral depends on 
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the nature of the situation, the prevailing culture and the individuals involved (Forsyth, 1980, 1992). 
Based on these definitions, we might expect that idealists will not judge the same unethical behavior 
differently depending on the subject of this behavior. Relativists, on the other hand, are expected to be 
prone to the use of double standards as their judgments of unethical practices depend on the subject 
performing these practices.  
Further, previously we noted that companies need to be aware of the fact that good financial 
figures may backfire as they might lead individuals to have a more critical view on companies‘ 
deceptive practices. However, good financial figures might also benefit companies in terms of, for 
instance, trust and investor‘s interest. Consequently, one might wonder whether these advantages 
outweigh the possible disadvantages of good financial figures (e.g., individuals‘ judging questionable 
practices more harshly). In other words, taken all the advantages and disadvantages together, does a 
good financial performance really ‗backfires‘ in the end?  
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Note 
 
1 In the present chapter, whenever the word ‗subject‘ is mentioned, this can point to both a consumer 
and a business company.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 
 
7. References 
 
Aksoy, L., Cooil, B., Groening, C., Keiningham, T.L., & Yalçin, A. (2008). The long-term stock  
market valuation of customer satisfaction. Journal of Marketing, 72(4), 105-122. 
Banaji, M.R., Bazerman, M.H., & Chugh, D. (2003). How (un)ethical are you? Harvard Business  
Review, 81(12), 56-64.  
Barnett, J.H., & Karson, M.J. (1987). Personal values and business decisions: An exploratory   
investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 6(5), 371-382. 
Berry, L.L., & Seiders, K. (2008). Serving unfair customers. Business Horizons, 51(1), 29-37.  
Demoulin, N.T.M., & Zidda, P. (2009). Drivers of customers‘ adoption and adoption timing of a new  
loyalty card in the grocery retail market. Journal of Retailing, 85(3), 391-405. 
DePaulo, P. (1985). The ethics of deception in retail bargaining: Do consumers accept the game  
analogy? Paper presented at the 1985 conference of the Southwestern Marketing Association, 
New Orleans.  
DePaulo, P. (1987). Ethical perceptions of deceptive bargaining tactics used by salespersons and  
customers: A double standard. In J. Saegert (Ed.), Proceedings of the Division of Consumer 
Psychology (pp. 201-203). Washington DC: American Psychological Association.  
Dodge, H.R., Edwards, E.A., & Fullerton, S. (1996). Consumer transgressions in the marketplace:  
Consumers‘ perspectives. Psychology & Marketing, 13(8), 821-835. 
Drucker, P. (1981). What is business ethics? The Public Interest, 63(2), 18-36. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K.M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817-868.  
Ferrell, O.C., Fraedrich, J., & Ferrell, L. (2008). Business ethics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.  
Forsyth, D.R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of Personality and Social  
Psychology, 39(1), 175-184. 
Forsyth, D.R. (1992). Judging the morality of business practices: The influence of personal moral  
philosophies. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(5-6), 461-470. 
Furnham, A. (1993). Just world beliefs in twelve societies. Journal of Social Psychology, 133(3), 317– 
211 
 
329. 
Gino, F., Gu, J. & Zhong, C. (2009). Contagion or restitution? When bad apples can motivate ethical  
behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(6), 1299-1302. 
Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2010a). Robin hood under the hood: Wealth-based discrimination in illicit  
customer help. Organization Science, 21(6), 1176-1194. 
Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2010b). Lying to level the playing field: When people may dishonesty help or  
hurt others to create equity. Journal of Business Ethics, 95(1), 89-103.  
Goldschmied, N., & Vandello, J.A. (2009). The advantage of disadvantage: Underdogs in the political  
arena. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 24-31.  
Hafer, C.L., & Bégue, L. (2005). Experimental research on just world theory: Problems,  
developments, and future challenges. Psychological Bulletin, 131(1), 128–167. 
Hayes, R.R.Jr. (1996). Selling the concept of loss prevention. Security Management, 40(12), 53-57. 
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M.R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production  
of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33(1), 1-27. 
Jost, J.T., Banaji, M.R., & Nosek, B.A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated  
evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political Psychology, 
25(6), 881-919.  
Kay, A.C., & Jost, J.T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of ‗poor but happy‘ and ‗poor but  
honest‘ stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice 
motive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(5), 823-837.  
Kay, A.C., Jost, J.T., Mandisodza, A.N., Sherman, S.J., Petrocelli, J.V., & Johnson, A.L. (2007).  
Panglossian ideology in the service of system justification: How complementary stereotypes 
help us to rationalize inequality. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 39(6), 305-338. 
Kim, J., Allison, S.T., Eylon, D., Goethals, G.R., Markus, M.J., Hindle, S.M., & McGuire, H.A.  
(2008). Rooting for (and then abandoning) the underdog. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 38(10), 2550-2573.  
Lerner, M.J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press. 
Lerner, M.J., & Miller, D.T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back and  
212 
 
ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85(5), 1030–1051. 
Loewenstein, G.F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M.H. (1989). Social utility and decision making in  
interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(3), 426-441. 
Mazar, N., & Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. Journal of  
Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1), 117-126. 
Messick, D.M. (1995). Equality, fairness, and social conflict. Social Justice Research, 8(2), 153-173.  
Muncy, J.A., & Vitell, S.J. (1992). Consumer ethics: An investigation of the ethical beliefs of the final  
consumer. Journal of Business Research, 24(4), 297-311. 
Rallapalli, K.C., Vitell, S.J., Wiebe, F.A., & Barnes, J.H. (1994). Consumer ethical beliefs and  
personality traits: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(7), 487-495. 
Rawwas, M.Y.A., Vitell, S.J., & Al-Khatib, J.A. (1994). Consumer ethics: The possible effects of  
terrorism and civil unrest on the ethical values of consumers. Journal of Business Ethics, 
13(3), 223-231. 
Stanaland, A.J.S., Lwin, M.O., & Murphy, P.E. (2011). Consumer perceptions of the antecedents and  
consequences of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(1), 47-55. 
Steenhaut, S., & Van Kenhove, P. (2005). Relationship commitment and ethical consumer behavior in  
a retail setting: The case of receiving too much change at the checkout. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 56(4), 335-353. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1979). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel, &  
W.G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47). Chicago: Nelson- Hall. 
Torres, A., & Tribo, J.A. (2011). Customer satisfaction and brand equity. Journal of Business  
 Research, 64(10), 1089-1096. 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2007). Moral hypocrisy: Social groups and the flexibility of virtue.  
Psychological Science, 18(8), 689-690.  
Vandello, J.A., Goldschmied, N., & Richards, D.A.R. (2007). The appeal of the underdog. Personality  
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(12), 1603-1616. 
Vandello, J.A., Michniewicz, K.S., & Goldschmied, N. (2011). Moral judgments of the powerless and  
213 
 
powerful in violent intergroup conflicts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(6), 
1173-1178. 
Van Kenhove, P., De Wulf, K., & Steenhaut, S. (2003). The relationship between consumers‘  
unethical behavior and customer loyalty in a retail environment. Journal of Business Ethics, 
44(4), 261-278.  
Verhoef, P.C. (2003). Understanding the effect of customer relationship management efforts on  
customer retention and customer share development. Journal of Marketing, 67(4), 30-45. 
Vermeir, I., & Van Kenhove, P. (2008). Gender differences in double standards. Journal of Business  
Ethics, 81(2), 281-295. 
Vitell, S.J., Lumpkin, J.R., & Rawwas, M.Y.A. (1991). Consumer ethics: An investigation of the  
ethical beliefs of elderly consumers. Journal of Business Ethics, 10(5), 365-375.  
Vitell, S.J., & Muncy, J.A. (1992). Consumer ethics: An empirical investigation of factors influencing  
ethical judgments of the final consumer. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(8), 585-597. 
Vitell, S.J., & Muncy, J.A. (2005). The Muncy-Vitell Consumer Ethics Scale: A modification and  
application. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 267-275. 
Wilkes, R.E. (1978). Fraudulent behaviour by consumers. Journal of Marketing, 42(4), 67-75.  
Wirtz, J., & McColl-Kennedy, J.R. (2010). Opportunistic customer claiming during service recovery.  
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(5), 654-675. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
8. Appendices 
 
8.1. Appendix A: Scenarios – Dutch (Study 1 and Study 2)  
 
Scenario 1: Actively benefiting from illegal activities. 
Een [subject]* brengt een product terug naar de leverancier omdat het beschadigd is. De beschadiging 
is echter de fout van het [subject]* zelf en niet van de leverancier.  
 
Scenario 2: Passively benefiting at the expense of others. 
Een bedrijf dient 40 euro terug te storten op de rekening van een [subject]*. Door onoplettendheid 
stort het bedrijf echter 60 euro. Het [subject]* merkt dit, maar zegt dit niet en houdt de extra 20 euro. 
 
Scenario 3: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices. 
Een [subject]* vertelt niet de volledige waarheid bij het onderhandelen met een autohandelaar over de 
prijs voor een nieuw voertuig.  
 
Scenario 4: No harm/no foul. 
Een [subject]* onderhandelt gedurende enkele weken met een architectenbureau over de plannen voor 
een nieuwe huisvesting, hoewel het [subject]*  nog niet helemaal zeker is wat betreft de samenwerking 
met het bureau en het bouwplan misschien links zal laten liggen. 
 
Scenario 5: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods.  
Een [subject]* heeft op één van zijn/haar computers (auteursrechtelijk beschermde) software 
gedownloaded zonder hiervoor te betalen.  
 
* Dit subject was ‗een consument‘, ‗je beste vriendin‘, ‗een bedrijf waar je geen goede band mee 
hebt‘, ‗een bedrijf waar je een zeer goede band mee hebt‘, ‗een consument die het financieel niet breed 
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heeft‘, ‗een consument die het financieel zeer goed heeft‘, ‗een bedrijf dat het financieel niet breed 
heeft‘, of ‗een bedrijf dat het financieel zeer goed heeft‘. 
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8.2. Appendix B: Scenarios – English (Study 1 and Study 2) 
 
Scenario 1: Actively benefiting from illegal activities. 
A [subject]* returns a product to the supplier because it‘s damaged. However, the damage was the 
fault of the [subject]* and not of the supplier.  
 
Scenario 2: Passively benefiting at the expense of others. 
A company needs to repay 40 euros on the bank account of a [subject]*. However, by inattention, the 
company pays 60 euros. The [subject]* notices this, but doesn‘t say anything and keeps the extra 20 
euros.  
 
Scenario 3: Actively benefiting from deceptive (or questionable) practices. 
A [subject]* doesn‘t tell the whole truth when negotiating with a car dealer about the price of a new 
vehicle.  
 
Scenario 4: No harm/no foul. 
During some weeks, a [subject]* negotiates with an architect‘s firm about the plans for a new 
accommodation, although the [subject]* is not yet completely sure about the cooperation with the firm 
and, maybe, will shrug off the building plan.  
 
Scenario 5: Downloading copyrighted materials/buying counterfeit goods.  
A [subject]* downloaded (copyrighted) software on one of his/her/its computers without paying for it.  
 
* This subject was a consumer, one‘s best friend, a company with which one has a not so good 
relationship, a company with which one has a good relationship, a non-prosperous consumer, a 
prosperous consumer, a non-prosperous company, or a prosperous company. 
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Chapter 6:  
Summary and Discussion 
 
As demonstrated by specific examples in the introductory chapter, misbehavior among 
consumers is the rule rather than the exception, which can result in detrimental effects for business, 
consumers, and society in general (Fullerton & Punj, 2004). Yet in the marketing ethics field, most 
attention focuses on the (un)acceptability of business practices (i.e., business ethics), whereas research 
into the (un)acceptability of consumer practices (i.e., consumer ethics) is far less prevalent (Fukukawa, 
2003; Neale & Fullerton, 2010). By examining ethical issues related to three specific consumer topics, 
the studies in this dissertation try to fill a gap in marketing ethics literature and generate more insight 
into the consumer ethics domain. First, I investigate the impact of personality on consumer ethical 
beliefs (Chapter 2). Second, I focus on the important influence of intuitive feelings on people‘s moral 
judgments (Chapter 3). Third, I examine the moral hypocrisy phenomenon in more depth (Chapters 
4–5).  
In this chapter (structured according to the three topics), I recapitulate the main findings of the 
studies reported in the four previous chapters, while also outlining their implications, contributions, 
limitations, and directions for further research. After this elaboration, I conclude with some general 
remarks and ideas for ongoing research, which encompass all three topics and reflect the consumer 
ethics domain in general.  
 
1. The Role of Personality in Consumer Ethical Beliefs 
 
The overall importance of personality in the consumer ethics field has received support (e.g., 
Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 1993). However, the roles of more specific personality variables are less certain 
(Vitell, 2003; Vitell, Singhapakdi, & Thomas, 2001), leading researchers to call for more studies that 
investigate the range of antecedents of consumer misbehavior (e.g., Al-Rafee & Cronan, 2006; 
Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Vitell, 2003). Chapter 2 complies with this call by investigating the impact of 
self-regulatory focus on consumer ethical beliefs or consumers‘ judgments of unethical consumer 
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practices. Self-regulatory focus is highly influential and relevant for a wide variety of consumer 
behaviors (Joireman & Kuhlman, 2004; Roth, 2003). Yet, less attention has been directed to the role of 
the regulatory focus framework in marketing (e.g., Aaker & Lee, 2001; Andrade, 2005; Cohen & 
Andrade, 2004; Kidwell, Hardesty, & Childers, 2008), and no previous study has linked it to consumer 
ethical beliefs.  
Findings of Study 1, which uses a student sample, and Study 2, which uses a sample drawn 
from a more general population, show that self-regulatory focus significantly influences consumer 
ethical beliefs. In particular, promotion affects attitudes toward questionable consumer practices; 
people with a stronger (versus weaker) promotion focus are less likely to believe that these practices 
are unacceptable. Prevention also influences perceptions of questionable consumer practices, such that 
people with a stronger (versus weaker) prevention focus are more inclined to evaluate these practices 
as unacceptable. 
 Studying consumer ethics is beneficial, in that it generates a better understanding of why 
consumers slip into unethical behavior (Vitell & Paolillo, 2003) and thus might help reduce such types 
of misbehavior (Vitell, 2003). The knowledge that self-regulatory focus relates to consumer ethics 
could help businesses mitigate the damages due to such misbehavior. Suppose, for example, that the 
music industry wants to minimize illegal music downloading. Recognizing that self-regulatory focus, 
as well as representing an individual difference variable, might be situationally induced, the music 
industry could create a context in which the prevention focus dominates (e.g., focusing on oughts, 
obligations, duties, responsibilities). To ensure the value of this approach, it would be helpful if future 
research examined consumer ethical beliefs or behavior after a temporal inducement of motivation 
states, rather than measuring people‘s promotion and prevention focus with self-reported measurement 
scales.  
 Such established scales to measure self-regulatory focus (e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Higgins 
et al., 2001; Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002) are limited by the extent to which people have insight 
into themselves (Summerville & Roese, 2008). Further research therefore might rerun my study but 
substitute tests that can distinguish well between promotion and prevention foci for the self-reported 
measurement scales (e.g., choice test; Wang & Lee, 2006). With these tests, respondents do not need 
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good knowledge about their own self-regulatory focus, nor are they aware of the real purpose of the 
measure. Chapter 2 measures consumer ethical beliefs with the Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005), which has been used extensively, proven valid, and 
updated in 2005 (Vitell & Muncy, 2005). But it would be worthwhile to revise and update this 
questionnaire to include, among other things, more salient consumer issues such as self-service 
supermarket checkouts and online music and video file sharing (Neale & Fullerton, 2010).  
Chapter 2 also indicates that self-regulatory focus explains only limited variance in consumer 
ethical beliefs. Although this is not exceptional, it would be helpful to explain the interrelationship 
more completely by clarifying its underlying process(es). Further, to gain a fuller understanding of 
consumer ethics, a host of other specific personality variables that might influence consumer ethical 
beliefs should be scrutinized (Vitell, 2003; Kavak, Gürel, Eryigit, & Tektas, 2009). Beyond 
personality variables, the characteristics of the situation also affect people‘s likelihood to behave 
unethically (Wiltermuth, 2011). Although consumer ethics research has generated fruitful results in the 
past, more research should address the role of situational factors and their influence on consumer 
ethics (Vitell, 2003).  
Finally, unethical behavior depends not only on personality and situational variables but also 
on their interactions (e.g., Ford & Richardson, 1994). Research in the moral domain would benefit 
from examining the antecedents of dysfunctional consumer behavior (i.e., personality and situational 
variables) more holistically (Harris & Reynolds, 2003); a more systematic exploration of the 
interaction of personal and situational variables in the moral domain is warranted (Walker & Frimer, 
2007). After a version of Chapter 2 was published in Journal of Business Ethics, Gino and Margolis 
(2011) investigated how regulatory focus influences unethical behavior, noting that it would be 
worthwhile to examine the boundary conditions of the effects they observed. For example, they 
assume that if lying or cheating serves a goal of security, people with a prevention focus might be 
more likely to behave unethically than those with a dominant promotion focus. This research direction 
is a good example of a way to apply a personality  situational approach to study consumer ethics.  
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2. The Role of Intuitive Feelings in Moral Decision Making 
 
The omnipresent and far-ranging consequences of moral judgment (Hofmann & Baumert, 
2010) make it very important to gain comprehensive insights into various aspects that might influence 
these judgments. Traditionally, moral judgments have been considered outcomes of rational and 
deliberate reasoning processes (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976; Rest, 1986). More recently, researchers provide 
evidence of and call for more research about the role of moral intuition (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Chapter 3 
adds to this research stream by investigating the impact of affective priming and conceptual fluency on 
moral decision making. The three studies that constitute this chapter examine if and how the valence 
of color cues affect evaluations of positively and negatively valenced behaviors. Therefore, these 
studies add to the emerging stream of research on color functioning too (e.g., Deng, Hui, & 
Hutchinson, 2010; Lindsey et al., 2010).  
Studies 1 and 2 use colors with definite valence differences (i.e., red versus green); Study 3 
uses neutral colors, endowed with negative versus positive versus neutral valences through an 
evaluative conditioning paradigm. In all three studies, respondents regard undesirable behaviors as less 
unacceptable when described on negatively valenced (versus positively valenced) background colors. 
Desirable consumer behaviors appear more acceptable when described on positively valenced (versus 
negatively valenced) background colors. In other words, a match between the valence of the 
judgmental (un)desirable behavior and the valence of its background color renders processing 
conceptually fluent, which ultimately translates into a more positive/less negative evaluation of the 
judgmental behavior. By adding a neutral control condition, Study 3 shows that the obtained effects 
are due to processing fluency in case of valence matches and not to disfluency in case of valence 
mismatches.  
 From a practical point of view, these findings are useful for those who want to improve 
individual morality. The findings particularly warn against relying on common intuition: One might 
expect that messages using negative color cues increase the undesirability of negative behaviors, but 
the findings of Chapter 3 show that such messages render these behaviors even more acceptable/less 
unacceptable. Both prevention and promotion campaigns should avoid the use of negatively valenced 
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colors, like red. Our findings are thus counterintuitive, in that red has produced positive consequences 
in various situations (e.g., Braun & Silver, 1995; Chan & Ng, 2009; Kwallek & Lewis, 1990; Stone, 
2003). However, Chapter 3 demonstrates that red easily can backfire and prompt negative 
consequences. Noting that a match of the valence of message elements may backfire in a persuasive 
context, my results also fly in the face of research documenting so-called match or fit effects (e.g., 
Adams, Faseur, & Geuens, 2011; Zhao & Pechmann, 2007).  
 Additional research might examine the extent to which the findings in Chapter 3 generalize to 
other cues (e.g., symbols, pictures, mood state) and situations (e.g., consumption experiences, real 
behavior). For example, in some countries and cultures, red evokes positive perceptions (e.g., China), 
and green might be perceived as negative (e.g., in Latin American countries, green might evoke the 
jungle and thus danger). It would be interesting to investigate whether opposite effects arise in 
countries in which red and green are perceived in ways opposite to the scenarios in my study. Further 
research might also examine how to counter the effects or take a closer look at possible boundary 
conditions.  
 I argue that conceptual fluency underlies the effects in all three studies. However, Chapter 3 
does not show whether people experience fluency and/or a positive affective state, because the 
experimental design did not include any such measures. Next to investigating alternative explanations, 
further research should test this underlying process, such as by using moderation mechanisms. For 
example, if processing speed is the primary reason, then manipulating cognitive load should mitigate 
this effect. Other methods that could provide evidence of the underlying process are self-reported 
measures of ease of processing or response time during judgment. Alternatively, a separate test might 
measure response times to related words presented against a certain background color that matches or 
mismatches the valence of these words.  
 More generally, a rational approach in the moral domain is limited to the role of rational 
thought; other decision-making processes such as intuition and emotions are excluded (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2009). Nevertheless, research has shown that emotions can overcome rational thoughts 
(Vohs, Baumeister, & Loewenstein, 2007) and drive unethical decisions (Schweitzer, & Gibson, 
2008). Although research dealing with intuitive feelings in the moral domain is certainly growing, 
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more studies are needed. For example, few studies consider the impact of meta-cognitive experiences 
on moral judgment (Laham, Alter, & Goodwin, 2009). Furthermore, researchers might question the 
extent to which moral judgments represent rational thinking processes versus intuitive feelings.  
 Another, more general limitation of the rational approach is its failure to account adequately 
for the role of contextual biases. Even as research dealing with these contextual biases in the moral 
domain increases (e.g., Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010), more 
studies are needed. Research should continue to explore contextual biases to identify conditions in 
which such factors operate and to develop strategies to counter the influence of contextual biases, 
which ultimately might result in less ethical or more unethical choices (Boyle, Dahlstrom, & Kellaris, 
1998).  
 
3. Moral Hypocrisy 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 refer to the unacceptability versus acceptability of consumer practices (i.e., 
consumer ethics). Business ethics instead involves the unacceptability versus acceptability of business 
practices. To date, research dealing with the comparison of business ethics and consumer ethics 
remains scarce, though such a comparison is often cited as an important line of research (e.g., 
Rallapalli, Vitell, Wiebe, & Barnes, 1994; Rawwas, Vitell, & Al-Khatib, 1994; Vitell , Lumpkin, & 
Rawwas, 1991; Vitell and Muncy, 1992). Previous research examining this particular comparison 
indicates a so-called double standard: Business misbehavior is judged more harshly than similar 
consumer behavior (e.g., DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir and Van Kenhove, 2008). The findings in 
Chapters 4 and 5 confirm this finding, as well as add to the limited knowledge about possible 
underlying factors.  
Chapter 4 investigates specifically whether the neutralization techniques provide a 
meaningful way to approach double standards. In addition to the positive relationship between the 
extent to which people explain away consumer/business misbehavior and their acceptability judgments 
of this misbehavior, these findings show that individuals who justify questionable consumer actions to 
a certain degree condone the same actions by businesses to a much lesser extent, which ultimately 
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leads to a difference in their acceptability judgments (i.e., double standard). Consequently, 
neutralization techniques involve a process to explain the double standard phenomenon. A strategy 
emanating from the neutralization concept might counter the use of double standards. Specifically, 
people‘s abilities to construct neutralization thoughts in case of consumer misbehavior could be 
impeded (cf. Bersoff, 1999). 
Chapter 4 also contributes to the limited knowledge about the neutralization concept, which 
likely has significant explanatory power for the study of consumer ethics (Vitell, 2003; Vitell and 
Muncy, 1992). Little research exists about this topic, despite its potential to explain why ―ordinary 
people‖ sometimes slip into unethical behavior. The likelihood of acting unethically increases with the 
likelihood of finding reasons to justify these actions (Pillutla & Thau, 2009), so neutralization 
techniques deserve more in-depth investigation (Vitell, 2003). Further research should examine the 
role of personality and situational factors, as well as their interactions, in connection with people‘s 
propensity to neutralize (Aquino & Becker, 2005; Chatzidakis, Hibbert, & Smith, 2007; Detert, 
Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011; Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2006). Gaining 
a fuller understanding of the cognitions that make unethical behavior easier, as well as the 
characteristics that increase the likelihood of these cognitions, should provide practical insights for 
those seeking to reduce unethical decision making and behavior (Chatzidakis et al., 2007; Detert et al., 
2008; Kieffer & Sloan, 2009).  
For example, previous research shows that techniques of neutralization are more likely to 
appear in questionable disposition situations compared to questionable acquisition situations (Strutton, 
Vitell, & Pelton, 1994). This finding is supported by the guilt mechanism. Strutton et al. (1994) more 
particularly note that less guilt might be anticipated on in disposition (versus acquisition) situations, so 
it is easier for people to apply neutralization techniques. However, the opposite argument also makes 
sense: People might be more likely to neutralize when they need to alleviate a high level of anticipated 
guilt. It would be interesting for research to tackle this particular issue.  
In addition to examining personality and situational variables related to neutralization 
techniques, it would be worthwhile to investigate how people perceive others who use such 
techniques. Denial of injury, denial of victim, and condemning the condemners techniques all rely on a 
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sense of the seller‘s fault, placing the blame on the seller. Other techniques, such as an appeal to 
higher loyalties and denial of responsibility, refer to uncontrollable circumstances as they place the 
blame on extraneous events (cf. Rosenbaum & Kuntze, 2003; Steenhaut, 2006). Do people‘s 
judgments of others‘ questionable behavior vary when those others use mainly seller‘s fault versus 
uncontrollable circumstances techniques? A difference in judgment could arise because techniques 
that blame the seller could be used repeatedly, whereas blaming uncontrollable circumstances seems 
less frequently available and even might be used only once, for one specific situation.  
Other persons can explain away their undesirable behaviors to different degrees too. A person 
who engages in high levels of neutralization might give the impression that he or she feels guilty; 
alternatively, this high level of neutralization could imply that the person already has participated 
many times in this misbehavior and thus has had many opportunities to create neutralization skills. 
Furthermore, judgments of a neutralizing person might vary depending on whether he or she belongs 
to an in-group versus out-group: An in-group member might receive the benefit of the doubt, such that 
high neutralization levels suggest a high level of guilt. However, the high neutralization level of an 
out-group member might rather be perceived as the result of the development of a skill. 
Chapter 4, as well as other studies (e.g., DePaulo, 1985, 1987; Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 
2008), investigates double standards without questioning whether their use is due to the presence of a 
business versus a consumer. The aim of Chapter 5 was to examine two possible underlying factors of 
double standards, with the prediction that they might not be reserved to consumer–business relations 
but also might appear in business–business and consumer–consumer relations. With regard to the 
underlying wealth factor, participants not only judge unethical business behavior more harshly than 
similar consumer behavior, but they also exhibit harsher judgments of misbehavior by prosperous 
consumers than non-prosperous consumers and of misbehavior by prosperous than non-prosperous 
businesses. In other words, the perceived difference in wealth between subjects can lead to different 
moral judgments of unethical behavior enacted by these subjects. Earnings have benefits for a 
company, but companies must also realize that strong financial figures may backfire as they allow 
consumers to adopt a more critical view of their deceptive practices. 
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With regard to the relationship factor, participants are not only less tolerant of business 
misbehavior compared with similar consumer misbehavior, but they are also less tolerant of unethical 
behavior by consumers compared with similar behavior by a best friend, or of unethical behavior by 
businesses with which they have a not so good (versus a good) relationship. In other words, the 
difference in the relationships with subjects leads to different moral judgments of unethical behavior 
enacted by these subjects. Consumers who are highly committed to a company behave more ethically 
toward it than do less committed consumers (Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2005). Our findings 
contribute further to this finding; highly committed consumers also are more tolerant of the company‘s 
unethical behaviors than are less committed consumers. These results highlight the need for businesses 
to invest time and energy in developing high relationship commitment with stakeholders, because 
these strong relationships make stakeholders less morally condemning. However, businesses might 
interpret high relationship commitment not as a means to behave excessively immoral.   
Future research might comply with the recent calls for more research into conditions that 
temper the moral hypocrisy phenomenon (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). Is the difference in people‘s 
judgment of their own versus others‘ unethical behavior consistent across all people and in every 
situation? Future research might investigate the role of personality and situational variables in 
relationship with moral hypocrisy in more depth. For instance, one might assume that idealists (i.e., 
people who adhere to moral absolutes when making ethical judgments; Forsyth, 1980, 1992) do not 
judge the same unethical behavior differently across varied adopters of this behavior, whereas 
relativists (i.e., people who believe that what is moral depends on the nature of the situation, the 
prevailing culture, and the people involved; Forsyth, 1980, 1992) instead may be prone to moral 
hypocrisy as their judgments of unethical practices depend on who enacts these practices. Another 
variable that might be worth investigating is the outcome bias (i.e., people‘s tendency to judge the 
quality of decisions and the competence of decision makers on the basis of the outcomes of their 
decisions; Baron & Hershey, 1988). One could expect that moral hypocrisy does not arise in situations 
in which misbehavior results in positive (versus negative) consequences.  
Finally, it might be worthwhile for further studies to perceive the moral hypocrisy 
phenomenon in light of the self-serving bias and, more generally, the attribution theory. This latter 
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motivational theory is concerned with how people give meaning to a certain event or, in other words, 
how they attribute causes to the events around them. People are likely to internally (i.e., attribute to 
personality factors) attribute others‘ failures while own failures are externally (i.e., attributed to 
situational factors) attributed. Others‘ successes, on the other hand, are likely to be attributed to 
external circumstances while people are prone to attribute own successes internally. Such attributions 
are self-serving as people avoid any personal recrimination. At first sight, there seem to be points of 
similarity between such self-serving biases and the moral hypocrisy phenomenon. Consequently, it 
might be valuable for further studies to investigate this particular issue in more depth. One might 
question, for instance, whether similar mechanisms are underlying these apparently related 
phenomena.  
 
4. General Remarks and Ideas for Research 
 
By studying consumer ethics, this dissertation has aimed to contribute to the marketing ethics 
field, moving beyond the main focus of attention on the business side, compared with the consumer‘s 
side. A recent conference asked whether the consumer has been forgotten in the business ethics 
domain (Tagung: Die Rolle des Konsumenten in der Wirtschaftsethik, KWI, Essen, November 29, 
2011). I find that specialized ethics and marketing/business ethics journals (e.g., Journal of Business 
Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly) clearly focus more on the business side. As Vitell (2003) has noted, 
―a large body of literature has developed concerning ethics in the marketplace; however, much of this 
research has focused primarily on the seller side of the buyer/seller dyad‖ (p. 33).  
However, the growing amount of research dealing with morality, especially in the psychology 
domain, seems to be counterbalancing this marketing ethics literature gap. Although the moral issues 
tackled in psychological studies are somewhat different in nature, they provide insight into why 
ordinary consumers behave in undesirable ways. De Cremer (2009) postulates that ―the application of 
psychological insights will be necessary to promote our understanding of why it is the case that good 
people sometimes can do bad things as well‖ (p. 4). Unfortunately, in some cases different domains 
study similar matters, without considering each other‘s evidence or even knowing that other domains 
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exist that study similar topics. This description applies, for instance, to marketing ethics studies 
dealing with double standards and psychological research dealing with moral hypocrisy. To gain more 
insight into the phenomenon of unethical consumer behavior, we cannot take root in our own singular 
literature field but rather must be receptive to cross-fertilization and ―immerse ourselves in the varied 
perspectives and positions that exist‖ (Reynolds & Harris, 2009, p. 330).  
Even if we were to take cross-fertilization for granted, I argue that we need to question the 
validity of existing knowledge about consumer ethics due to the possible influence of social 
desirability biases. A recent study by Dalton and Ortegren (2011) shows evidence for raising this 
remark. Previous studies demonstrate that women are more ethical than men (e.g., Ang, Cheng, Lim, 
& Tambyah, 2001; Rawwas, 1996) but also that women are more likely to respond in a socially 
desirable way compared to men (Bernardi & Guptill, 2008; Chung & Monroe, 2003). Dalton and 
Ortegren (2011) thus postulate that we cannot discern whether gender differences in the ethics domain 
are due to women‘s greater ethicality or their greater proneness to social desirability compared with 
men. Their results suggest that the effect of gender in the ethics domain is largely attenuated when 
social desirability is taken into account.  
The social desirability issue might be pertinent for, for instance, research on moral hypocrisy. 
In addition to influencing the validity of the research findings, a social desirability bias might push 
individuals to profess that they are more ethical than they actually are. This bias stems from people‘s 
propensity to rate themselves above average on several positive characteristics (Dalton & Ortegren, 
2011). In self-reported questionnaires, people likely perceive themselves as more ethical than they 
really are. A question for future research is whether consumers still exhibit moral hypocrisy when 
controlling for social desirability. 
More generally, any interpretation of results in an ethics domain should recognize the 
possibility of social desirability bias. In turn, it would be valuable for research to provide more insight 
into the relationship between social desirability and consumer ethics. For example, it might be 
interesting to delineate the conditions in which impression management and self-deception are more 
likely to affect ethical responses (Dalton & Ortegren, 2011).  
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In line with many studies in the consumer ethics domain, the dependent variables of the 
research included in this dissertation refer to individuals‘ ethical beliefs or moral judgments. For 
example, my study about self-regulatory focus (i.e., Chapter 2) uses the Consumer Ethics Scale 
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 1992, 2005), which measures respondents‘ beliefs about 
questionable consumer practices. Although this scale has been validated and applied many times in 
previous consumer ethics studies, measuring beliefs is inherently limited, in that inferences are based 
on what people say about their beliefs, rather than what they do. In the other studies in this 
dissertation, my coauthors and I used ethical beliefs as a proxy for behavior, with the theory that these 
beliefs influence intentions to engage in questionable practices, which then influences behavior. 
Additional studies might include actual behavioral measures, which support more ecologically valid 
conclusions (DeAndrea, Carpenter, Shulman, & Levine, 2009). Paper-based or computer-generated 
contexts that ask consumers to indicate how they would behave cannot perfectly replicate the 
multiplicity of crucial determinant factors that are associated with any consumer misbehavior decision 
situation (Reynolds & Harris, 2009). Furthermore, measuring behavior partly solves the social 
desirability issue mentioned previously.  
In this dissertation, ethics reflect a decision that takes place in one particular moment. 
However, little research addresses sequential ethical decision making. Similar to the approach I have 
taken, most previous studies concentrate on solitary ethical decisions, without consideration of one‘s 
moral history or future (Zhong, Ku, Lount, & Murnighan, 2010). Research on moral compensating and 
moral licensing, for instance, shows that previous (un)ethical deeds might influence one‘s (un)ethical 
behavior on a particular moment in time. For example, when people have engaged in good deeds, they 
might be confident about their morality level, which might become that high that morally questionable 
behavior in the present is allowed (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). It would be an interesting 
research endeavor to take a closer look at this ―sequential picture‖ when studying consumer ethics.   
Another way to grasp this ‗broader view‘ could be to study ethics from a more social 
perspective. Social learning theory (Bandura, 1986), social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), and social 
information processing theory (Salanick & Pfeffer, 1978) all highlight how people look to their social 
environment for cues about appropriate ways to behave (Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2009). Group 
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decision making, for example, is a common practice that enables otherwise ethical people to behave in 
deviant ways. When everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible (Bandura, Barbaranelli, 
Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). A better understanding of consumer misbehavior might derive from 
studying it with a ‗sequential and social perspective‘. 
Another general remark concerns the focus in many ethics studies on the negative functions of 
consumers behaving badly. But the same negative behavior of consumers might also serve positive 
functions; for example, consumers behaving badly could contribute to other people‘s personal sense of 
well-being. The sense that many citizens lie on their income taxes may help others who do not lie feel 
better about themselves (Fisk et al., 2010). Studying consumer misbehavior from this positive 
perspective might enrich the consumer ethics domain.  
Ultimately, the consumer ethics domain is interested in the unacceptability versus 
acceptability of consumer practices. In this dissertation, I have focused on the negative side of the 
consumer ethics definition by studying consumer misbehavior. However, consumers also have another 
ethical responsibility, that is, to act in ethical or good ways—such as recycling, buying fair trade 
products, or taking animal welfare into account in buying decisions. These actions refer to the concept 
of consumer social responsibility. Further research should answer the question whether or not similar 
processes and perspectives can be used to study both the negative and positive side of consumer 
ethics.  
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